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EDITOR’S NOTE

When landscape architect Frederick Law Olmstead produced his earliest sketches of the Stanford University Main Quad in 1888, the History Corner figured prominently into the plan. Rounding the Oval by carriage, the first students to arrive at the university would have met with a monumental Memorial Arch that was itself the keystone of the rhythmic array of sandstone buildings. At the Quad’s smoothed northeast corner stood the Department of History. Today students pass through the same wooden double doors and ascend the grand staircase to attend a broad offering of over 200 history courses. Under the tutelage of 51 History Department professors, undergraduates of many majors study the history of myriad times and places, from ancient Rome to modern Afghanistan.

Herodotus’ mission is to publish and disseminate the best work of undergraduate students of history at Stanford University. Today, more resources are available to history students than ever before. Not only do we have some six million books through our extraordinary Stanford University Libraries, but also millions more available online through initiatives like the Google Books Library Project. The mass of books and articles is both a blessing and a curse. Amidst the tempest of information, the covers of Herodotus bound a sanctuary of young academic work. The essays in this journal are selected for their persuasive analysis, precision, prose, and appeal. This year’s volume brings together a wide range of academic interests: the United States, Europe, and the Pacific; exploration, religion, activism and even cooking. We hope our readers will enjoy this volume and continue to delight in reading history.

HERODOTUS
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Introduction by Dr. Gabrielle Moyer

That formidable historian and former Professor of Comparative Literature at Stanford, Hayden White, proposed many decades ago that by narrating history we make it real. What happens, though, in the translation from events to narrative?

This question, about the space between fact and fiction, science and art, is one that captured Jake’s imagination as it has captured many students’ imagination. Set alight by the Meriwether Lewis and William Clark story as he knew it, he was perplexed and disappointed by his encounter with The Journals of The Lewis and Clark Expedition. In the place of confident adventurers, he found taciturn, scientific, even banal, reporters, often unsure of themselves. Why, he wondered, had representations of Lewis and Clark—at festivals, in biographies, in paintings—strayed so far from the “facts”?

To answer this question, Jake thinks recursively, turning and re-turning to historical narratives as he thinks and rethinks their rhetoric. De-liberately resisting the temptation to think in hierarchical binaries, this essay lets in the “wildness” of history. Through its form, it embodies the dizzying layers of desire that shape and make American history. In its conclusions, the essay urges us to take note of the rhetorical conjuring within all narratives: the American, the scientific, the most sacred.
Legend and Legacy:  
A Rhetorical History of Lewis and Clark

Jake Sonnenberg

This summer, the Lewis and Clark Foundation will host the 25th Annual Lewis and Clark Festival in Great Falls, Montana. This small city of less than 60,000 marks an important point on the map of American History and the portrait of American psychology. Geographically, however, Great Falls’ location is unremarkable. Lying seventy miles northeast of Helena, Montana, the inconspicuous Great Falls is commonly defined by its proximity to other places.

Although today Great Falls seems a quotidian western city among hundreds of others, it was once the site of a harrowing encounter. In the summer of 1805, the Missouri River’s cascading rapids at Great Falls forced the members of the Lewis and Clark expedition to make a grueling portage and simultaneously abandon their hopes of discovering a continuous water route to the Pacific. The agony of this humbling experience is vividly communicated in The Journals of The Lewis and Clark Expedition, which were meticulously recorded by Lewis, Clark, and others throughout their cross-country expedition. After confronting wild grizzly bears and enduring an overland march that nearly killed William Clark, on June 14, 1805 Lewis remarked that it seemed as if “all the beasts of the neighbourhood had made a league to destroy me, or that some fortune was disposed to amuse herself at my expence.”\(^1\) Caught in the midst of a difficult struggle, facing the prospect of agonizing humiliation, and seemingly at a loss for rational explanation, Lewis surrendered his fate to the whims of nature. Resigned to the mercy of wild beasts and fortune, he found himself at the pinnacle of despondence.

Despite marking a low-point for the Lewis and Clark expedition, the portage at Great Falls is recalled triumphantly in America’s collective memory. Charles Fritz’s painting The Arrival of Captain Meriwether Lewis at The Great Falls (2005), one of the most famous images of the Lewis and Clark expedition, underscores this paradoxical movement, in which a moment of despair is transformed into one of achievement.\(^2\) Fritz depicts Lewis standing proudly on a boulder overlooking the falls. His eyes locked on the horizon, Lewis is an idealized explorer in an idealized scene. The absence of hardship, an overabundance of light, and an intensity of majestic landscapes in Fritz’s painting sear a powerful narrative into the mind of any viewer. Seemingly at odds with historical events, this is a picture of pure accomplishment and absolute serenity.
Fritz’s deviation from the historical record presents a complex puzzle that calls into question modern understandings of history as well as the ways in which the past is interpreted and represented. Most importantly, it is vital to consider why an artist would portray the Lewis and Clark expedition in a manner that contradicts widely available historical records as well as the journals of the individuals who actually experienced the historical events in question. Professor Jerzy Topolski, a prominent scholar of history and historiography, examines precisely this issue in his article, *The Role of Logic and Aesthetics in Constructing Narrative wholes in Historiography* (1999). Topolski contends that “imagination as well as logic [...] generates the more or less concretized images constituting the background onto which the historian, ‘playing’ with basic information, imposes some content and portrays some event by means of a narrative,” underscoring the complexity and fluidity of historical interpretation.

Although there is only one correct version of history, in the sense that only one course of events could have transpired prior to the present, Topolski stresses the multiplicity of historical narratives that can be drawn from the same set of facts. Thus, although Fritz’s painting is somewhat incorrect, because it might mischaracterize the past, it may still be possible to understand it as legitimate history. Since modern historians cannot actually witness the portage at Great Falls, it seems as if they have no choice but to construct, or to an extent imagine, historical narratives out of the few accessible fragments of information.

Pursuing this line of analysis further, it seems as if multiple contradictory narratives of the Lewis and Clark expedition can reasonably be considered true, because the same pieces of evidence can support a variety of theories. Topolski expands upon this point, explaining that “one evidence source can underwrite many different theories. [...] One and the same source of information may be used to construct various historical accounts of any fragment of the past.” Understanding history in this way, perhaps Fritz’s depiction does not actually stray from the historical “facts” any more than the writings of an author who imagines the portage at Great Falls as a terrifying and humbling journey. “Facts” about the expedition’s struggles at Great Falls cannot possibly chronicle anything more than a tiny sampling of the countless events that took place during the summer of 1805. Indeed, it is impossible to say for certain that there was not a moment in which Meriwether Lewis stood tall on a boulder, triumphantly overlooking the Great Falls, just as Fritz imagined.

Topolski’s conceptualization of historiography as a rhetoric in flux presents a major obstacle to modern understandings and analyses of the Lewis and Clark expedition. To accept historical records as utterly indeterminate is to undercut historians’ ability to assert with confidence what actually happened in the past. On the other hand, proclaiming one definitively
correct version of history makes it nearly impossible to make sense of the varied representations of the past that linger in the modern world.

Despite this historical ambiguity, modern Americans fondly and feverishly celebrate the legacy of the Lewis and Clark expedition as a definitive and profound historical event. Historian Thomas Slaughter, in his book *Exploring Lewis and Clark* (2003), declares that modern portrayals of the Lewis and Clark expedition, “blending fact, fiction, and myth have buried the explorers under a mountain of celebratory words.”5 As Topolski would say, by injecting an element of myth into an historical event, modern narratives of the Lewis and Clark expedition “concretize” the past. Ambiguity is removed from the story, and the past morphs into a very specific and easily knowable tale. Discussing modern accounts of the Lewis and Clark expedition, historians Kris Fresonke and Mark Spence remark that the “most remarkable feature [...] is not the volume of material, but its narrow scope.”6 The consistency of Lewis and Clark narratives is stunning, something that Fresonke and Spence liken to “a favorite national children’s bedtime story—which [...] Americans insist on hearing over and over.”7

The very particular narrative of the Lewis and Clark expedition espoused by America’s collective memory is sustained through modern attitudes towards Lewis and Clark. The two explorers are not merely respected or honored. They are adored. Writing as the expedition’s bicentennial approached, University of Miami History Professor Andrew Cayton explained that the nation’s excitement about Lewis and Clark amounted to “a fascination that took hold [...] and threatens to swamp us all.”8 This zeal of enthusiasm continues to this day. Nearly two thousand Americans will travel to the Lewis and Clark Festival in Great Falls this summer.9 In fact, Lewis and Clark festivals in places like Cut Bank, Montana, Onawa, Iowa, St. Clark, Missouri, and Clarksville, Indiana will overrun the western United States in the summer months, as they do every year.

Although the Lewis and Clark expedition has come to be seen as “an iconic narrative of Americana,” as Cayton describes it, it is unclear what drives the intensity of attention that is paid to the expedition.10 Turning to Lewis and Clark festivals’ own promotional materials offers insights into the appeal of the expedition. For instance, the festival in Great Falls suggests that, if you are lucky, you might be able to “re-live the high energy” of the expedition.11 Cut Bank’s festival actually promises to let you “live the experience.”12 It seems, then, that Americans flock to Lewis and Clark festivals to fill themselves with the vivaciousness of the Lewis and Clark expedition. Hoping to live the experiences of Lewis and Clark, Americans apparently see the expedition as a catalogue of larger-than-life experiences, a set of magnificent phenomena utterly inaccessible during ordinary life.

But what is it about the Lewis and Clark expedition that Americans want to re-live? What are the experiences that they want to re-create? The
beauty captured in paintings like Fritz’s suggests that Americans are drawn to the notion of traversing a vast and uncharted wilderness, of encountering and somehow triumphing over the grandeur of nature. However, despite its elegance, this explanation is incomplete. Thousands of nameless fur-trappers, anonymous explorers, unknown traders, and ordinary weekend hikers have ventured into the wild, faced difficult trials, and immersed themselves in the natural world, many of them years before Lewis and Clark ever set foot in the western United States. Yet, as Cayton explains, it is easy to “witness the obscurity of their accomplished predecessors.” Americans don’t fondly re-tell the stories of “Alexander Mackenzie, who crossed the breadth of North America a decade” before Lewis and Clark, nor do they celebrate the accomplishments of James Mackay and John Thomas Evans, who “mapped the Missouri Valley during their 1795-1797 expedition.” More than the appeal of critical encounters with nature, then, must drive adoration of the Lewis and Clark expedition in the nation’s collective memory.

Popular narratives of the Lewis and Clark expedition focus heavily on the majestic storyline of Lewis and Clark, as the ‘first’ people to explore the west. In what is likely the most significant book ever written about Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, Stephen Ambrose embraces this stately narrative with elegance and dramatic force. Few images capture the sentiment of his popular account better than the simple engraving on the spine of Ambrose’s book. In gold block letters, glistening against a backdrop of deep green leather, it reads: Undaunted Courage. Imposing, yet unassuming, the title and its setting conjure feelings of drama and tranquility, vulnerability and fortitude, uncertainty and strength. From the cover of his book through its final pages, Ambrose presents an account centered on indefatigable bravery and unflinching might.

Ambrose’s narrative fits well with and complements the rhetorical grandeur surrounding modern attitudes towards the Lewis and Clark expedition because it embraces spectacle and magnificence. Like festivals that promise to expose visitors to experiences of greatness, Ambrose champions the drama surrounding the iconic adventure. As he describes Lewis preparing to set off on his journey, he begins to build a narrative of conquest and heroism. Declaring that Lewis “was as close to entering a completely unknown territory [...] as any explorer ever was,” he goes on to assert that Lewis “was entering a heart of darkness.” Here, Ambrose betrays the totalitarianizing nature of his narrative. In this epic storyline, the West is not only unfamiliar and external to the known world but also dangerous and imposing. Ambrose portrays the uncharted western territories as the very epicenters of peril. If the West was a heart of darkness, Lewis and Clark were the deliverers of light.

Ambrose’s narrative is also consistent with modern depictions of the Lewis and Clark expedition. In his essay Why Lewis and Clark Mat-
ter (2003), Lewis and Clark historian James Ronda agrees, explaining that “textbook history often portrays Lewis and Clark as the vanguard of America’s triumphant westward expansion, a movement that brought civilization and progress to a savage wilderness.” From Fritz’s portrayal of a gloriously victorious Meriwether Lewis to Ambrose’s dramatic chronicle of grand legacies, it seems as if the themes of triumph and inevitable progress are inescapable in modern depictions of the Lewis and Clark expedition.

In his essay *On the Tourist Trail with Lewis and Clark: Issues of Interpretation and Preservation* (2004), Andrew Gulliford deconstructs the dramatic narrative championed by Ambrose and American society. Quoting Ronda, Gulliford explains that Lewis and Clark explored “a crowded wilderness,” full of Native Americans, fur trappers, traders, animals, societies, feuds, alliances, and histories. Arguing that “the expedition would have failed miserably without the constant support and guidance of Native Americans,” Gulliford’s alternative narrative stresses cooperation and interdependence, rather than individual persistence and strength. This is a far cry from Ambrose’s image of Lewis and Clark as conquering heroes who bested man and beast and the wild in order to reach the ocean and expand an empire. Gulliford insists instead that “Lewis and Clark moved, not through an unknown wilderness world, but rather through an Indian landscape where even the rocks and trees had names.”

Gulliford’s suggestion that such small features were labeled by the time that Lewis and Clark arrived powerfully rejects Ambrose’s claim that their expedition was entering completely unknown territory.

The glaring incongruity between fact and legend suggests that the popular rhetoric of the Lewis and Clark narrative has been somehow fabricated, entrenched, and maintained over time. Despite its prevalence, the roots of America’s dramatic narrative are surprisingly elusive in *The Journals of The Lewis and Clark Expedition*. In the expedition’s journals, a rhetoric of uncertainty and simplicity abound. Consider Clark’s entry for May 12, 1804. His account of the entire day consists of nothing but the brief statements, “Doctor Catlet set out at 11 o’clock,” “rain all evening,” and “I still arranged the stores.” Clark’s unemotional tone makes it difficult to imagine someone wanting to re-live his experiences. It seems odd as well to want to re-live February 13, 1805, when all Lewis had to say was “the morning cloudy— thermometer 2° below naught—wind from the SE-- visited by the Black-Cat—gave him a battle ax with which he appeared much gratified.” Even a brief examination the expedition’s journals demonstrates that the trip’s logs are not about America’s inevitable march to the Pacific or, as Ambrose puts it, the “opening of the American West.” They are instead about monotony, science, measurement, and frustration. The two explorers generally focus on their day-to-day struggles and operations, specific plants and animals, and ordinary events. This story seems significantly less ap-
pealing than the heroic tale chronicled by Ambrose and America’s popular psyche. If the majestic narrative presented by Ambrose is true, Lewis and Clark seem to have made every effort to conceal it.

However, on April 7, 1805, the day of their departure, the dryness of Lewis’ journal gives way to something gentler. Surveying the supplies, boats, and men that would journey west with him, Lewis explained that, although their “little fleet” was not “so respectable as those of Columbus or Capt. Cook,” it was still viewed by the explorers “with as much pleasure as those deservedly famed adventurers ever beheld theirs.”

At this moment of embarkation and suspense, Lewis swelled with pride. Dramatically declaring that his expedition would “penetrate a country [...] on which civilized man had never trodden,” Lewis’ dramatic rhetoric demonstrates that he has already begun to construct his preferred narrative of his journey. Like Columbus, who painstakingly wove fiction and falsehood into his records to portray himself as the “first” person to see the “New World,” Lewis goes to great lengths in his journal to secure a spot for himself on the mantle of historical “firsts.”

Addressing this phenomenon, Slaughter describes the journals “as crafted perspectives consciously framed with a view to their effect on audiences.” Deliberately fashioned to communicate and defend the significance of the expedition and the legacy that Lewis and Clark hoped would succeed them, the journals are more than scientific logs. For Lewis and Clark, the journals were an opportunity to concretize a legacy and dictate how they would be remembered. In their journals, Lewis and Clark wrote history.

In writing and shaping how history would remember them, however, Lewis and Clark helped transform their expedition from an historical event into a type of mythical tale. Perhaps understanding the expedition as a legendary story can help make sense of the rhetorical uncertainty that surrounds it. The Lewis and Clark story, as it is generally understood, has become a legend in the truest sense. It is a story that is celebrated for its stylistic and dramatic appeal, a chronicle of events that is captivating and exciting, dangerous and monumental. As Cayton notes, the main reasons people are drawn to the Lewis and Clark expedition are “more literary than historical.” Historical “facts” about whether or not Lewis and Clark were actually the first people to explore the West or about the expedition’s genuine historical significance take a back seat to the construction of an epic account.

Approaching the Lewis and Clark story as a literary account helps make sense of many contradictory, inaccurate, and hyperbolic characteriza-
tions of the past. In popular narratives, and even historical texts, Lewis and Clark are portrayed as classical heroes. They are archetypes of strength, bravery, and fortitude. Ambrose, for example, asserts that Lewis’ “determination was complete” as he prepared to set sail and that “he could not, would not, contemplate failure.” This seems impossible, inhuman even. Are we to believe that Lewis, a man who stood at the edge of the known world, was truly incapable of even thinking about failure? Did he really, as Ambrose claims, know that “he would be making history”? Ambrose’s willingness to use superlatives and to make bold and unqualified declarations is stunning, but also befitting of the legacy that he seeks to perpetuate. In passages like this, Ambrose’s writing might read like a novel because it is written, perhaps unwittingly, more as a dramatic story than as a genuine chronicle of the past.

In a sense, the Lewis and Clark expedition has always been seen more as a story than an historical event. Thomas Jefferson, the main sponsor of the Lewis and Clark expedition, actually referred to the journals of Lewis and Clark as “literary” as early as 1803. The characterization of the Lewis and Clark story as literature is nothing new. However, the Lewis and Clark expedition is not only a story. It is a journey, one of the types of stories that novelist Willa Cather once proclaimed would “go on repeating themselves as fiercely as if they had never happened before.” There is something irresistible about this journey, its context, the transformations that took place around it, and the revolutionary people and events that shaped it. Occurring at the threshold of America’s rapid ascension to power and industrialization, this journey to the Pacific is an allegorical tale. Binding the North American continent, Lewis and Clark dramatically bade farewell to the past and gracefully ushered in the future.

However, even this canonized and concretized legacy is profoundly fluid, constantly changing and ever evolving. The Lewis and Clark expedition has meant many different things to many different people. As John Spencer explains in his essay We Are Not Dealing Entirely with the Past (2004), even today, while some historians celebrate the expedition as a seminal moment of progress, a shining beacon of America’s bold pursuit of destiny, others deride it as a colonialist enterprise, yet another dark chapter of conquest on America’s tireless imperial march. Throughout history, the expedition’s legacy has changed dramatically as well. Spencer explains that although the expedition was largely ignored and considered historically and scientifically inconsequential when it first concluded, it gained prominence again in the late nineteenth century, when proponents of America’s new industrialist society “invoked Lewis and Clark to justify the new social order, seeing an opportunity to “link the new society to a more fluid, democratic past.” Spencer traces this evolution into the modern day, a time in which he believes that diverging legacies have led to the growth of a new narra-
tive, one in which Lewis and Clark have begun to "symbolize exactly the opposite of what they stood for a hundred years ago: environmentalism [...] instead of industrial development, multiculturalism instead of [...] imperial conquest." The dynamic, yet captivating, nature of its legacy suggests that something magnificent lies at the heart of the Lewis and Clark expedition.

However, this dynamism might also suggest something more enigmatic as well. The legacy of the Lewis and Clark expedition has garnered consistent and nearly endless fascination throughout the years, yet its central tenets and ultimate commitments steadfastly resist static definition. It is mystifying that this event, which has always derived its greatest meaning from its historical grandeur, has left a legacy that is simultaneously so uncertain and so vibrant. Despite its critics, its detractors, its opponents, its revisionists, and its champions, the expedition has remained a perennial force in American culture for well over one hundred years. No matter the time nor the place, the Lewis and Clark narrative has offered a majestic historical backdrop to pressing issues and changing attitudes. The Lewis and Clark story has also always been uniquely American, combining growth and destiny, progress and nature, hardship and triumph. It is familiar, since Lewis and Clark travelled across what is now the heartland of America, but it is also foreign, since Lewis and Clark were, in a way, the first and last truly great American explorers.

When they set out on their expedition, Lewis and Clark were in a situation utterly foreign to any American who is alive today. The two men, and the party of explorers that they commanded, did not know where they were going. Admittedly, they knew some things about the West. Many travelers had been there before, a fact that – as has already been mentioned – people have often forgotten. However, a map printed by French cartographer Nicolas de Finiels in 1798 betrays the deep extent of their ignorance. Carried by Lewis and Clark during their travels through the Missouri River, Finiels’ simple Map of Missouri River and Vicinity from Saint Charles, Missouri, to Mandan Villages of North Dakota, is strikingly sparse and remarkably inaccurate. Not only is it not nearly drawn to scale, the map also amounts to little more than a rough outline of a few converging rivers. It is devoid of topographical features or the names of most settlements and many prominent locations. So lacking in reliable information were Lewis and Clark that, at one point, the two men actually thought that they might discover living wooly mammoths, then referred to as “The Ohio Monster,” whose fossils had been uncovered along the Ohio River. Lewis, Clark, and even Thomas Jefferson were enveloped in the frenzy of adventure. Traveling to what seemed to be another world, even encounters with mythical creatures seemed possible.

These great explorers journeyed to a place that neither Lewis, nor Clark, nor anyone that either man had ever met could accurately describe—
neither its basic geography, nor its most common inhabitants, nor its history, nor even its weather. Modern Americans have never known what it is like to venture into the wild—to voyage somewhere that has not been mapped out, scanned by satellites, surveyed by engineers, measured by radar, photographed from the air, travelled by humans, conquered. Certainly, we may try to capture a taste of this feeling. We visit national parks, camp out in the wilderness. Even then, when we venture beyond the comfort of the concrete jungles that we inhabit, we remain confined within rigidly defined spaces and ultimately pre-examined locations. There is nowhere else to go. If we are trapped by the limits of our world, then the world that Lewis and Clark explored was limitless.

When they address this topic, modern narratives of the Lewis and Clark expedition generally focus on how Lewis and Clark made the unknown known. Like Fritz’s idealized scene and Ambrose’s theatrical rhetoric, they tend to ignore the vulnerability and lack of knowledge of two of history’s greatest explorers. Hardly anyone pauses to consider things like Jefferson’s hope to find “The Ohio Monster” and what that hope might reveal about the expedition’s more intimate secrets. Lewis and Clark, two national heroes, set off into a land in which they expected to encounter actual monsters. One can only imagine the uncertainties and reservations harbored by these men. Still, these themes are hardly ever confronted in narratives of the Lewis and Clark expedition.

That fact is surprising, to say the least. Despite being largely overlooked in modern chronicles of the expedition, it seems as if weakness and vulnerability should be central components of a story about any kind of journey. After all, journeys are captivating not just because they traverse physical spaces, but also because they facilitate travels through personal struggles, contemporary attitudes, and even more complex planes of meaning. Audiences adore stories in which great men are changed by their surroundings and brought to their knees by the vastness of nature, the challenges that they face, and the hardships that they must endure. Readers long for their heroes to proudly brandish their humanity, to shed the impregnable armor of their personas, and show the world that despite their heroism, they are like us. Americans adore the image of the naval officer stealing a kiss as he returns home – the hardened warrior, still in love.

In his essay What Sacagawea Means to Me (2002), Sherman Alexie approaches the legacy of the Lewis and Clark expedition with an eye towards historical contingency and rhetorical indeterminacy. Dissecting the binaries and historical biases that have clouded modern understandings of the expedition, Alexie’s writing clashes with popular narratives. Declaring that “in the future, every U.S. citizen will get to be Sacagawea for 15 minutes,” Alexie attempts to create a space in which contemporary readers can come to terms with the multiplicity of historical narratives embodied by the
Lewis and Clark expedition. Encouraging readers to re-live the experiences of Sacagawea, Alexie offers an alternative to the festivals that litter the American West, which seek only to let visitors re-live the experiences of Lewis and Clark themselves. Still, Alexie’s alternative paradigm does not reject narratives like Ambrose’s in which “the two captains will lead the adventure, fighting rivers, animals, weather and diseases for thousands of miles.” Rather, it asks readers to “march right beside them” and imagine themselves as “aboriginal multitasker[s]” who “will also breast-feed.” For Alexie, there is more to the story than conquest and heroism. Building upon historical inquiries like Gulliford’s, Alexie’s narrative challenges modern understandings precisely because it demands ambiguity.

Although external forces and historical contingencies foundationally influenced the course of their expedition, both Lewis and Clark reveal a persistent resistance to this clear vulnerability. In his journals, Lewis chose to explicitly narrate a story of his rise to historical prominence. Clark, on the other hand, exposed splinters of his preferred narrative in the act of creating his journals. In his original notes on August 22, 1804, Clark references “This creek I call Roloje, a name given me last night in my sleep.” However, in the edited transcript of the journal that he submitted for publication, he speaks only of “this creek I call Roloje.” There is no mention of the dream.

Clark’s self-editing divulges the manner in which he hoped to be remembered. Like Lewis, Clark seems reluctant to admit to weakness or fallibility or anything else that might not be consistent with the heroic narrative he sought to create. Perhaps it seems childish or unprofessional for a great explorer to name a river based off a dream. However, it also seems poetic. The prophetic William Clark, face to face with the wild, finally succumbs to a whim and abandons pure science. Projecting his dreams and his musings onto the landscape around him, he creates fantasy. Why, though, is this unacceptable for Clark? Perhaps naming a creek for a dream would represent a momentary lapse in judgment, a departure from diligent scientific methodologies. Meticulously removing this miscarriage from his journals, Clark demonstrates that he, like Lewis, has already begun to consciously shape the rhetoric that will be his legacy. Still, Clark’s willingness to ultimately name the creek Roloje is pleasing, somehow reassuring. Despite their grand legacies and heroic personas, at least we know that these men dreamed as well.
ENDNOTES:


3 Jerzy Topolski, “The Role of Logic and Aesthetics in Constructing Narrative Wholes in History,” History and Theory 38, No. 2 (May, 1999), 198.

4 Ibid, 199.


7 Ibid.


11 22nd Annual Lewis and Clark Festival (Lewis and Clark Foundation, 2011).


15 Ibid, 283.


19 James P. Ronda, Lewis and Clark Among The Indians (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 2.


21 Ibid, 244.


23 Lewis, 13 February 1804.

24 Ambrose, Undaunted Courage, 5.

25 Lewis, 7 April 1805.

26 Ibid.

27 Slaughter, Exploring Lewis and Clark, 33-34.

28 Ibid, 51.


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Clark, 22 August 1804.

BALANCING IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICALITY: CONSTRUCTING ‘SETTLER SOVEREIGNTY’ IN NEW SOUTH WALES, 1810-1836

Introduction by Professor Jack Rakove

Olivia Bryant’s paper was written for the Approaches to American Legal History Colloquium, which is part of the History & Law track within the department. The main goal of the course involves examining book-length monographs in legal history, chosen primarily because they illustrate the diverse ways in which an interest in developing conceptions and practices of law intersect with larger changes in society and culture. With her intriguing trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific connections, Olivia developed a particular interest in the Australian scholar Lisa Ford’s book, Settler Sovereignty, a pioneering work of comparative history which explores how European settlers in New South Wales and the American state of Georgia exercised authority over aboriginal populations. In both societies, much of this story pivots on the ways in which local incidents of violence, theft, and the use of resources were often resolved by acknowledging the coexistence of multiple legal systems operating at one time. But over time, the imperatives of European notions of sovereignty—the ultimate concentrated authority of a rational state—triumphed over this initial “legal pluralism.” Olivia’s paper carefully and incisively explores this issue, using Ford’s book as a point of departure for a broader discussion of this complicated topic.
Balancing Ideology and Practicality: Constructing ‘Settler Sovereignty’ in New South Wales, 1810-1836

Olivia Bryant

In February 1836, an aboriginal man named Jack Congo Murrell was brought before the Supreme Court of New South Wales and was tried for the murder of another aboriginal man. Murrell joined a small number of indigenous Australian people who, up to that date, had been prosecuted for committing criminal offences in New South Wales. The previous year, only twenty-one aboriginal people were brought before the Supreme Court and tried for theft, murder or rape. The Murrell case was revolutionary for one primary reason; the Supreme Court definitively declared that, “Aborigines… had no sovereignty”.

Prior to *R v Murrell*, the settler courts of New South Wales rarely heard disputes that occurred *between* aboriginal people; Australia’s indigenous community was excluded from the protection of settler jurisdiction on the basis that aboriginal people were protected under indigenous customary law. *R v Murrell* confirmed that, within the territorial boundaries of New South Wales, aboriginal people were to be fully incorporated under settler jurisdiction.

*R v Murrell* had remarkable consequences for the concept of sovereignty in New South Wales. By incorporating aboriginal people within the jurisdictional control of settler courts, colonial officials consolidated a territorial notion of settler sovereignty that was all encompassing. After 1836, any misconduct that occurred within the territorial boundaries of New South Wales was theoretically prosecuted under settler law, regardless of the ethnicity of those involved. As historian Lisa Ford states:

> the watershed cases of the 1830’s, (colonial jurists in New South Wales) redefined settler sovereignty as a territorial measure of authority and left little or no space for indigenous rights to property, to sovereignty, or to jurisdiction. They recrafted plural settler polities into modern nation-states whose legitimacy was predicated on the subordination of indigenous rights.

From *R v Murrell* through to the present day, Australia’s supreme court has utilized a concept of sovereignty based on territoriality.

The consolidation of settler sovereignty in New South Wales occurred in a period where the global concept of sovereignty, and how it re-
lated to the modern international system, was also in flux. Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century with the emergence of legal positivism, influential European jurists and legal theorists such as Emer de Vattel and John Austin began crafting the modern definition of sovereignty as the *supreme authority within a territory*. This begs the question, to what extent were jurists in early nineteenth-century New South Wales drawing from European positivist ideology to construct complete settler sovereignty? Was the territorialization of sovereignty in the peripheral settler states of the British Empire enabled by the emergence of the modern concept of the 'sovereign state'? Legal officials in the courts of New South Wales drew heavily from Vattel’s *The Law of Nations* to achieve their project of completely erasing indigenous jurisdiction. Yet it was not solely positivist ideology that prompted jurists to redefine settler sovereignty as a territorial notion.

Historically, the concept of sovereignty has not been static; its meaning has continued to evolve in response to the specific requirements needed for states to solidify political power over and above other forms of authority. In the modern context of international relations, the sovereign is commonly accepted to mean ‘the supreme authority within a specified territory’. It is reliant on the establishment of territorial boundaries. Sovereignty, however, has not always been territorial in nature. Traditionally, sovereignty was taken to mean “a final and absolute authority in a political community”. It was concerned with defining the extent to which a political authority could rule over its subjects. This early form of sovereignty justified a particular jurisdiction as the absolute authority as opposed to asserting jurisdictional supremacy within a bounded territory.

Armed with this early concept of sovereignty, from the sixteenth century, Britain began to expand its Empire. The Crown was able to establish supreme political authority over subjects residing in territory outside of its recognized jurisdiction by claiming itself as the sovereign power. It is important to note, however, that the early understanding of sovereignty did not presuppose the supreme authority of the Crown to the extent that non-Christian and indigenous polities were completely dismissed. Drawing from natural protestant law, early imperial jurists recognized that indigenous people were able to own property and form political communities. As a result, the early British Empire was characterized by legal pluralism, which embodied itself in the numerous English charters that the colonial office drew up with indigenous peoples. Up until the mid-eighteenth century, therefore, sovereignty was not predominantly an exclusionary mechanism used by British imperialists to control indigenous people; it was a concept that helped to justify order and governance under the Crown.

From the middle of the eighteenth century, the understanding of sovereignty in international law began to shift, driven in part by the emergence of legal positivism. Influential positivist jurists in Europe, such as
Emer de Vattel, John Austin and John Westlake helped to craft a new global concept of sovereignty that was based on territoriality. Prior to the eighteenth century, natural law dominated the international legal sphere. According to natural legal theory, international laws were derived from human reason and, therefore, the sovereign was bound by a system of natural laws. Positivism, by contrast, asserted that laws were constructed by the sovereign and consequently, the sovereign was able to administer and enforce the law. Positivist ideology posed a dilemma; if the sovereign state had the power to create law, what characteristics should define a sovereign state?

Positivist jurists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries solved this dilemma by assuming a difference between civilized and non-civilized nations. Antony Anghie has termed this development the ‘dynamic of difference’. According to Anghie, “jurists, using the conceptual tools of positivism, postulated a gap, understood principally in terms of cultural differences, between the civilized European and uncivilized non-European world”. One of the fundamental criteria that defined a civilized state was the appropriation and cultivation of territory. In his influential work *The Law of Nations* published in 1758, Vattel argued that a ‘wandering tribe’ became sovereign when it appropriated land and established a political community. Such a theory was developed and consolidated by prominent positivist jurists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thomas Lawrence subsequently stated, “International Law regards states as political units possessed of proprietary rights over definite portions of the earth’s surface. So entirely is its conception of a state bound up with the notion of territorial possession that it would be impossible for a nomadic tribe, even if highly organised and civilized, to come under its provisions”. According to positivist theory, therefore, sovereignty was only granted to civilized states, and civilized states were defined by having acquired recognized control of cultivated territory.

Soeverignty thus became territorial. As the Crown extended its empire to encompass new and expansive regions, it looked increasingly to solidify its own jurisdiction as the sovereign form of rule within the territorial boundaries of the Empire. Many scholars, most notably historian Charles H. Alexandrowicz, have argued that positivism provided colonial officials with the necessary weaponry to complete the colonial project and subordinate non-European people fully under European jurisdiction. Using the ideology provided by positivist theorists in Europe, colonial officials were able to demonstrate that indigenous communities lacked sufficient political organization and territorial control to be classified sovereign. The Crown was therefore able to assert itself as the sovereign power and thus, within the boundaries of the colonial state, indigenous jurisdiction became obsolete. According to scholars such as Alexandrowicz, therefore, positivism rather than imperialism enabled colonial officials to fully subordinate colonized peoples.
The ways in which colonial officials established territorial sovereignty in the settler state of New South Wales, however, paints a different picture. The British colony of New South Wales was established in 1786 under the governorship of Arthur Phillip. For the first three decades of its existence, this small colony on the periphery of the Empire operated a legal system that was highly pluralistic. In her comparison of jurisdiction and indigenous people in America and Australia, Lisa Ford reveals the ways in which colonial officials in the settler states of Georgia and New South Wales pursued pluralism as a policy. Diverging from the previous works of scholars who have argued that colonial philosophy left little space for aboriginal custom, Ford demonstrates how legal officials in New South Wales did not fully dismiss indigenous jurisdiction and territory; rather they used it as a means of negotiation.  

Colonial jurists adjudicated cases according to their own discretion, drawing from a mixture of British common law, customary settler law and, most contentiously, customary indigenous law. Pluralism was seen as the best policy to maintain the Public Peace.

The main concern of Ford’s book is to track the emergence of a complete territorial notion of settler sovereignty that was consolidated in the period 1820-1840 in these two peripheries of the Empire. According to Ford, prior to the 1820’s, settler sovereignty in New South Wales was a “fluid and contested notion”, exemplified by the incoherent ways in which “governors, law officers, and courts” responded to indigenous violence.  

Colonial officials struggled to discern who was, and who was not, subject to the jurisdiction of the settler state. Aboriginal people posed a particular problem for colonial officials who looked to control indigenous violence without extending the protections associated with being a subject of the Crown. In this respect, the settlers were wrestling with a jurisdictional notion of sovereignty that had equally concerned European theorists prior to the emergence of positivist ideology.

Up until the 1820’s, aboriginal people were, for the most part, exempted from settler jurisdiction as they were not thought to be subjects of the crown and therefore did not fall under the control of settler jurisdiction. Colonial officials acknowledged indigenous customary law as a means of mediating violence that occurred between aboriginal people. The settlers, however, still looked to control indigenous violence through extralegal means such as “negotiation and state-sponsored violence”. Aboriginal people still faced the wrath of the settler state, but not in the formal legal setting. Up until the 1820’s, therefore, aboriginal people in New South Wales were not formally subject to the sovereign authority of the Crown. Settler sovereignty was a jurisdictional notion, intertwined in a legal system that was inherently pluralistic.

In the space of two decades leading up to R v Murrell of 1836, settler sovereignty in New South Wales was transformed from a notion based
on determining the jurisdictional limits of the Crown, to one based on determining the territorial limits of the settler state. The notion of settler sovereignty that emerged closely paralleled the modern concept of the ‘sovereign state’ as defined by having a ‘supreme authority within a specified territory’. This begs the question, to what extent did colonial officials redefine settler sovereignty using the European concept of the ‘modern state’? The process through which the settlers created perfect territorial sovereignty can be traced by examining influential court rulings. These rulings reveal that the transformation in settler sovereignty in New South Wales was not a product of external positivist ideology, as some historians claim. By contrast, it was driven by an internal legal revolution that altered the bureaucratic capacity of the settler state and made it possible, and in the settlers’ eyes necessary, to subordinate indigenous people under settler jurisdiction.

In 1816, Lachlan Macquarie, the Governor of New South Wales, launched the first attempt to solidify territorial boundaries within which Crown jurisdiction would rule supreme. When faced with escalating aboriginal violence both on the frontiers of the settler state and in the populated settlements, Macquarie issued a proclamation to Aboriginal people declaring that violent acts committed by ‘natives’ and the infliction of “punishments on transgressors of their own Customs and Manners at or near Sydney, and other principal Towns and Settlements in the Colony, shall be henceforth wholly abolished, as a barbarous Custom repugnant to British Laws”.

Macquarie’s 1816 Proclamation was radical as it formally legislated the superiority of Crown jurisdiction over indigenous custom. Macquarie therefore needed to provide a legal foundation for his Proclamation. He did not, however, turn to the works of Vattel. Instead, he liberally interpreted the ancient laws of conquest, which asserted that when land was conquered, indigenous customary laws would immediately be replaced by British common law if they were considered ‘barbarous’. Macquarie was drawing pragmatically from the legal tradition that provided the best justification for his goal of displacing indigenous jurisdiction and consolidating territorial control. In 1816, Macquarie found his answer in ancient British common law concerning the conquest of territory.

Macquarie by no means succeeded in creating perfect settler sovereignty. Following his 1816 Proclamation, settlers continued to rely heavily on customary indigenous law to govern aboriginal-aboriginal violence that occurred within the largest colonial settlements such as Sydney. Eighteen months after Macquarie’s Proclamation, an aboriginal man named Mirout murdered another aboriginal man on the streets of Sydney and was put in jail by colonial officials. Mirout was not incarcerated because he faced criminalization for an act that was classified ‘barbarous’ under the procla-
mation. Rather, settlers were supposedly protecting Mirout from the retaliation of other aboriginal people, a response that commonly occurred under indigenous custom. Macquarie’s attempt to create a more perfect settler sovereignty by establishing territorial enclaves of British jurisdiction was undermined by the overriding commitment of settler’s to pursuing a system of legal pluralism.

In 1827, the supreme court of New South Wales wrestled again with the question of whether aboriginal people were subjects of the crown when an army lieutenant named Nathaniel Lowe was put on trial for the murder of an aboriginal man named Jackey Jack. Two highly respected colonial lawyers, Dr. Wardell and Mr. W.C. Wentworth, represented Lowe. Wardell and Wentworth objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the basis that Jackey Jack was not a subject of the crown and was not, therefore, protected by settler jurisdiction. In respect to the concept of territorial sovereignty, Lowe’s council argued that New South Wales had not drawn up the necessary treatise with aboriginal people to conclude that Crown jurisdiction extended to the frontiers of the settlement. Lowe was not prosecutable because he murdered Jacky Jack in frontier territory where aborigines were not subject to the protection of the Crown.

Wardell and Wentworth constructed their defense drawing heavily from the works of Vattel. Aboriginal communities did not supposedly meet the necessary criteria to be classified as ‘sovereign’. Nevertheless, they were still subject to the Law of Nations and therefore the British “could not, according to any principles, have assumed any right of sovereignty over them; they are the free occupants of the demesne or soil, it belongs to them by the law of nations, anterior to any laws which follow from human institutions”. In *R v Lowe*, Vattel was used to defend the position that aboriginal people were independent from Crown jurisdiction.

The early positivist ideology, as found in Vattel’s influential work “The Laws of Nations”, did not provide clear instructions on the political and legal status of indigenous people. In his book, “Aboriginal Sovereignty: Three Nations, One Australia?” Henry Reynolds presents the flexibility with which New South Wales’ legal officials interpreted Vattel’s work. Reynold’s contends that, “Vattel does not provide the support for the British annexation of New South Wales to anywhere near the extent that Australian jurists, politicians and publicists in the past have supposed”. Jurists “twisted international law” to justify their objective of creating a perfect sovereign state. Ultimately, according to Reynolds, “The law became a weapon wielded by the conquerors”.

Reynolds provides some important insights into the construction of settler sovereignty in New South Wales. The perfect settler sovereignty that was created in New South Wales cannot exclusively be treated as a product of positivism. Jurists drew from the works of Vattel to argue both for and
against subordinating aboriginal people under the laws of the Crown. In 1849, one British jurist observed that “Vattel was “more frequently cited than any other writer because…. his doctrines are so loosely expressed that it is easy to find in his book detached passages in favor of either side”. Vattel by no means provided a solid legal justification for creating the perfect settler sovereignty in New South Wales by dissolving indigenous legal and political autonomy.

Although Reynolds has contributed significantly to understanding the history of sovereignty in Australia, his work also has to be read with a high degree of caution. Reynolds’ interpretation of history is molded by his objective of proving aboriginal sovereignty existed prior to the creation of the settler state in Australia. Such an approach has been termed by one New Zealand scholar as “juridical history… a mode of representing the past so as to make it available to legal and quasi-legal judgment of the present”. One particularly troublesome aspect of Reynolds work is a tendency to over emphasize the role of legal doctrine in driving the creation of perfect settler sovereignty. Reynolds argues that it was the ideological zeal of colonial officials that drove them to construct the perfect settler sovereignty. Colonial officials, however, were also tempered by the administrative and political problems of establishing a centralized settler state in such a vast territory. In his paper on colonial authorities and indigenous law in Australasia, legal scholar Damen Ward claims that the colonial office in the 1830’s and 1840’s was a “reactive body” that was “under-staffed and over-worked”. It was pragmatic considerations and aspirations that ultimately drove colonial officials to construct the modern “sovereign state”. European legal theory, such as the works of Vattel, merely provided the ideological armory that backed up this colonial project.

Two cases that appeared in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 1829 and 1836 reveal how colonial officials were both driven and constrained by practical considerations when tackling questions of sovereignty. In 1829, an Aboriginal man named Ballard was put on trial for murdering another aboriginal man, Dirty Dick, in the center of Sydney. The Chief Justice of the time, Francis Forbes, confronted the question of whether the Supreme Court could adjudicate indigenous-indigenous crime. By drawing from natural law, Justice Forbes ruled that the Court lacked the jurisdiction to do so. Ballard and Dirty Dick were, “wild savage[s]… wandering about the country, and living in the uncontrolled freedom of nature” and “Until the aboriginal natives of this Country shall consent, either actually or by implication, to the interposition of our laws in the administration of justice for acts committed by themselves, I know of no reason human, or divine, which ought to justify us interfering with their institutions”. By appealing to “natural justice”, the Court ruled that British jurisdiction did not apply to
aboriginal people, even within the territorial boundaries of populated settlements such as Sydney.  

Although the Supreme Court framed its legal argument in the Ballard case by drawing predominantly from natural law and British common law, the court was also swayed by pragmatic considerations. In his opening statement, Justice Forbes noted that for “not merely matter of theory but practice… In the absence of a magistry”, it would be unviable to enforce British jurisdiction upon aboriginal people. Aboriginal communities were still heavily reliant upon their own customs and “interference in the affairs of harmless inoffensive savages” would lead to results as “incompatible as impolitic”. Justice Forbes, in a similar vein to Governor Macquarie, faced the practical limitations of governing such a vast settler state with limited institutional capacity. Forbes clearly considered it impractical to establish complete settler sovereignty in New South Wales. While common law provided the ideological basis for R v Ballard, a lack of law enforcement in the colony rendered perfect settler sovereignty unfeasible. British common law was the legal ideology which best justified the court’s pragmatic conclusion.

By the time Jack Congo Murrell was brought before the Supreme Court in 1836, the colonial administration in New South Wales was ready to claim complete settler sovereignty. Justice William Burton, an Englishman who arrived in New South Wales having spent time in the Cape Colony, wrote the main judgment for the case. Burton turned predominantly to the works of Vattel to argue that Aboriginal people had neither cultivated nor acquired land and therefore could not be assumed to hold property. Consequently, they did not have claims to sovereignty and were to be protected as individuals by the Crown.

In rendering indigenous autonomy null and void, Burton established a territorial notion of settler sovereignty. Within the boundaries of New South Wales, crown jurisdiction was from that point on to become the sovereign authority. As Ford notes:

By announcing the territoriality of sovereignty, [Burton] declared that the colony of New South Wales was more than a periphery of empire, it was part and parcel of a modern territorial state- a state in which indigenous jurisdiction was an unacceptable anomaly.

New South Wales had transitioned from a notion of settler sovereignty based on jurisdiction to one based on territory.

Although Burton drew heavily from the works of Vattel, it was not positivist ideology that drove the construction of perfect settler sovereignty. In order to understand why the Supreme Court legislated a notion of perfect settler sovereignty in 1836, it is important to look beyond the ideological de-
developments that were occurring in Europe. In 1836, New South Wales was in the midst of significant economic and legal transformations that made complete territorial control both possible and necessary in the eyes of colonial officials.

In the early decades of the nineteenth century, New South Wales was emerging as a global exporter of wool. As it transformed from a small periphery of the Empire to an important global economic stakeholder, New South Wales undertook the project of centralizing and strengthening its bureaucratic structures. The wool industry in New South Wales was heavily reliant on settlers and convict laborers to maintain production. The rapid rise in wool production, however, went hand-in-hand with a rise in civil and criminal disputes, often occurring between settlers and convicts. The local courts that were in place to deal with these disputes were overwhelmed and consequently, New South Wales was forced to revolutionize its legal system to cope with its new status as a settler enterprise.\(^{43}\)

In 1823, the first Supreme Court of New South Wales was established to deal with the backlog of cases that resulted from the growing wool industry. The court was immediately faced with determining the legal status of convicts and free settlers as subjects of the state. Almost inevitably, the status of indigenous people was also brought to the forefront of legal consciousness. Whereas in the early years of the settler state, small-scale industry had fostered a local legal system where the legal status of individuals was administered according to ‘local exigencies, expediency and self-interest’, the rise of the wool industry required a centralized legal system within which the legal status of individuals was determined.\(^{44}\)

Burton was part of a new class of attorney generals that took up the project of defining the legal status of peoples in New South Wales.\(^{45}\) According to these attorneys, the Crown needed to assert itself as the jurisdictional force that administered all peoples if the state’s economic and political aspirations were to be accommodated. Legal pluralism could no longer be tolerated. Such an opinion was confirmed by the rise in indigenous violence in frontier territory that was occurring during the 1820’s and 1830’s. The crown imperium needed to extend to even the furthest frontiers of the colony.

In February 1835, the Supreme Court revealed its desire to control indigenous peoples in frontier territory when an aboriginal man named Lego’me was brought before the court and accused of stealing a pipe from a settler called Patrick Sheridan on the King’s Highway. Lego’me’s counsel argued that Sheridan had been squatting on Lego’me’s land and had “frequently committed great depredations on his Kangaroos”. In response, Sheridan stated, “The prosecutor… said, that he believed the ground belonged to the Government”.\(^{46}\) Sheridan constructed his argument around the concept
of Crown *imperium*; land unoccupied by the settlers was supposedly *terra nullius* and therefore belonged to the Crown.

What is most intriguing about the Lego’mé case is that the Supreme Court was willing to invest both time and resources into a case that was relatively insignificant. Lego’mé had stolen nothing more than a pipe from Sheridan and there had been no resulting physical injuries. Why was the court so invested in Sheridan’s appeal? After all, New South Wales was by no means void of serious criminal offences for the Supreme Court to adjudicate. The court’s excessive response to Sheridan’s appeal can be attributed to one major factor: the court was fully committed to asserting its jurisdictional control over indigenous people even in the furthest frontier territories.

Although perfect settler sovereignty was not declared until 1836, the Lego’mé case was an important step in the process. Rather than utilizing the local legal structures, Sheridan brought the case to the Supreme Court, which was based in the state’s most populated settlement, Sydney. By 1835, therefore, the Court was asserting itself as the central legal authority in the state. Both, legal officials and local settlers were increasingly seeing eye-to-eye about the need to control indigenous violence under the jurisdiction of the Crown. As the legal system in New South Wales became progressively uniform, and the outposts of the colony were drawn into the centralized bureaucracy, defining territorial limits within which Crown jurisdiction would rule supreme became a practical reality. The stage was set for Burton to complete the process of creating perfect settler sovereignty.

Burton acted with a great deal of creative licence in piecing together the legal justification needed to assert territorial sovereignty. By drawing heavily from the works of Vattel, and qualifying his position with enlightenment logic regarding the notions of race and civilization, Burton argued that, “the various tribes (of Australia) had not attained at the first settlement of the English people amongst them to such a position in point of numbers and civilization, and to such a form of Government and laws, as to be entitled to be recognized as so many sovereign states governed by laws of their own”. Burton declared that:

> From this it is evident that not only all those who are subjects but all who live within any country of the realm are under the King’s peace or protection, & that any offence committed against any local person is committed against the King’s Peace- all offences are local & triable at common law.

By means of Burton’s carefully constructed judgment, perfect settler sovereignty was declared in New South Wales.
The legal status of aboriginal people continued to be debated by legal officials in New South Wales following the Murrell case. In 1841, Justice Willis, a resident New South Wales judge, objected to the precedent set by Murrell. In the Bon Jon case, Willis argued that aboriginal people were not subjects of the Crown, as they had not consented to British occupation or sovereignty. According to Willis, aboriginal communities were distinct political entities and should be governed by their own customs and laws. In a lengthy and emotional judgment that revealed his sympathies with humanitarian logic, Willis’ declared aboriginal people “a vast and hitherto neglected, oppressed, and deeply injured multitude of the human race”.49 Bon Jon was acquitted, which rendered it unnecessary for Willis to reach a conclusion on whether aboriginal-aboriginal violence should be under settler jurisdiction.50 Chief Justice Dowling of the New South Wales Supreme Court subsequently stated, however, that Willis was wrong to question the legal status of indigenous peoples. Dowling declared that the Murrell ruling had settled the issue once and for all. From 1836, any attempts to reestablish aboriginal sovereignty were declared invalid. In legal terms, Aboriginal people were fully subordinated under settler jurisdiction.

It is important to recognize, however, that the legal declaration of settler sovereignty in 1836 did not lead to complete jurisdictional control in a practical sense. Many aboriginal communities, especially those living in frontier territory, continued to act in accordance with their own indigenous customs even into the early twentieth century.51 The practical difficulties of governing such a vast territorial state such as New South Wales meant that perfect settler sovereignty was aspirational rather than grounded in reality. What Murrell did, however, was to provide the settlers with the legal means of controlling indigenous violence as and when they desired. As the bureaucratic capacity of the settler state increased through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, indigenous people were increasingly at the mercy of settler jurisdiction. Settler sovereignty was a mechanism by which aboriginal people were stripped of their rights.

The practical application of sovereignty as a weapon used by settlers to control aboriginal people makes the ideological basis of the concept of sovereignty look comparatively unimportant. It was not the rise of positivist ideology and the concept of the ‘modern state’, which drove the creation of perfect settler sovereignty in New South Wales. Rather, it was internal legal and economic transformations that made it both possible and, according to the settlers, necessary for settler jurisdiction to control all peoples within the state’s territorial boundaries.

In the first two decades of the nineteenth century, New South Wales was not ready claim to complete territorial sovereignty; it did not have the legal capacity or the commitment of the settlers to subordinate indigenous people fully within settler jurisdiction. Sovereignty therefore continued to
operate as a jurisdictional notion rather than territorial notion. Macquarie’s attempts to assert enclaves of territorial sovereignty were premature. By 1836, New South Wales was well on its way to transforming into a centralized state with the capacity to assert perfect settler sovereignty, at least in terms of legal formalities. When provided with the opportunity to write the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Murrell case, Burton was able to consolidate perfect settler sovereignty into state legislature.

The construction of settler sovereignty in New South Wales is relevant not only to the history of law in Australia, or more broadly, to the history of the British Empire; the revolutionary transformation that occurred in New South Wales and culminated in the 1836 declaration of complete settler sovereignty has great implications for the history of sovereignty as a global concept. Sovereignty is traditionally thought of as a concept that was formulated in Europe by political theorists such as Machiavelli, Luther, Bodin, and Hobbes and was subsequently transformed into a territorial notion by positivist theorists such as Vattel and Austin. There is an influential body of scholars who argue that colonial states were able to subordinate non-European peoples by using positivist ideology formulated by European theorists. Thus, according to these scholars, sovereignty and positivism were almost completely constituted within European thought. Yet the history of New South Wales tells a different story. The emergence of territorial sovereignty in New South Wales was not a product of external ideology; it was rather driven by internal developments that made it both possible, and according to settlers necessary, to establish settler jurisdiction as the sovereign authority within the state’s territorial boundaries. Positivist ideology was merely one strand of thought that New South Wales’ jurists utilized to construct the ideological armory needed to justify perfect settler sovereignty. Sovereignty is not therefore a construct of European thought; it is a notion that evolved in even the remotest of territories.
ENDNOTES:


4 Ibid., 206.

5 In 1992, the High Court of Australia declared its intent to set up a reconciliation plan to address the wrongs of the settlers against aboriginal people following *Mabo v Queensland*. The court recognized aboriginal land rights under the term “native title”. In 1994, an aboriginal man argued that the court had no right to arrest him on aboriginal land on the basis of the Mabo ruling. However, his appeal was overturned as the court responded “There is nothing in the recent decision of Mabo vs. Queensland… to support the notion that the Parliaments of the Commonwealth and New South Wales lack legislative competence to regulate or affect the rights of Aboriginal people”. Thus, perfect territorial settler sovereignty was confirmed.


12 Positivism is referred to here as a ‘will-based approach to common law thought and method’. There is much debate over when international law became ‘positivized’. In respect to this paper, Emer de Vattel is treated as an early positivist theorist due to his assertion that law is created by the sovereign and not by a natural order.


14 Ibid., 10.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., 5.


25 Ibid., 52.
29 Ford, *Settler Sovereignty*, 77.
31 Kercher, “R v Murrell.”
33 Ibid., 54.
38 Kercher, “R v Ballard.”
40 Kercher, “R v Ballard.”
44 Ibid., 15-19.
46 *R v Lego ‘me*, 1835, Decisions of the Superior Courts of New South Wales, 1788-1899.
47 *R v Murrell*.
48 Ibid.,
49 *R v Bonjon*.
WHEN THE PERSONAL BECAME POLITICAL:
BLACK-JEWISH INTERMARRIAGE
DURING THE RISE OF
IDENTITY POLITICS, 1960s-1970s

Introduction by Professor Estelle Freedman

Megan McKoy’s WIM paper for my research seminar on “Race, Gender, and Sexuality in U.S. History” exemplified the process of successfully refining a research question and carefully polishing drafts to produce an original and well-written final paper. Megan began with a broad question about Black-Jewish relations during the Civil Rights Movement. After investigating a range of primary sources, she began to focus on the interracial and interfaith marriages of several couples who left rich print sources about their lives. She ultimately selected two of them, the black writers Amiri Baraka and Alice Walker and their respective Jewish spouses. Through close readings of memoirs, fiction, and essays Megan showed how changing identity politics, based on race and gender, deeply affected interpersonal relationships. It was pleasure to see this paper grow stronger at every stage of research, writing, and revising.
When the Personal Became Political: 
Black-Jewish Intermarriage during the 
Rise of Identity Politics 

Megan McKoy

While love is unfashionable
Let us live
Unfashionably.
…While love is dangerous
let us walk bareheaded
beside the great River.
Let us gather blossoms under fire.¹

In her January 1973 collection of poetry Revolutionary Petunias &
Other Poems, Alice Walker addressed her Jewish husband “Mel” in
the poem “While Love is Unfashionable.” She described their love as
“dangerous,” politically defiant, and even revolutionary. Despite the risk
of remaining in an interracial marriage in Mississippi, she declared: “Let
us live unfashionably.” Walker presented their interracial marriage not as
an isolated relationship between herself and Leventhal. A number of influ-
ences, including dismissive community response and rising identity politics,
made their love “unfashionable” and “dangerous.” Walker’s desire to re-
main married, though, was fleeting. Later that year, Walker and her husband
moved to Brooklyn and legally separated.

Since the turn of the twentieth century, Blacks and Jews had main-
tained an important political and economic relationship in America. As
Jewish allies supported and participated in the Civil Rights Movement dur-
ing the 1960s, Blacks and Jews closely interacted within the movement and
within urban communities. Although interracial marriage was uncommon
during the Civil Rights Era, Walker and Leventhal followed a small but sig-
nificant trend of Black-Jewish marriages during the 1960s.

A number of other prominent Black writers and political leaders
married Jewish partners, including Richard Wright, Lorraine Hansberry,
Julius Lester, and Leroi Jones. This paper will examine two of these mar-
rriages: between Leroi Jones, a Black writer who was later known as Amiri
Baraka, and Hettie Cohen, a Jewish writer who adopted the last name Jones,
and between Alice Walker, a Black writer, and Melvyn Leventhal, a Jew-
ish civil rights attorney. Because their Jewish spouses were less prominent
figures, few accessible sources include their perspectives. As a result, this
paper mainly explores the essays, novels, poetry, and autobiographies writ-
ten by Jones and Walker to examine their interracial, interfaith marriages. An analysis of these sources reveals not only the interpersonal marital relations in both marriages, but also the community and political environments in which they existed.

Numerous historians have written about Black-Jewish relations during the Civil Rights Era but have mainly focused on political and economic ties. In Troubling the Waters: Black-Jewish Relations in the American Century (2006), historian Cheryl Lynn Greenberg examined the impact of rising identity politics on Black-Jewish relations during the mid to late 1960s. She claimed that a number of Civil Rights leaders and organizations began to question the involvement of whites, including Jews. According to Greenberg, the decision to exclude Jews from Civil Rights efforts marked a departure from earlier Jewish funding and political involvement in the Black community. Greenberg analyzed the impact of this political and economic break on Black and Jewish communities nationally and regionally but did not delve into interpersonal sexual relations.

For Jones and for Walker, the line between political and personal was gray. The rise in identity politics largely shaped the community response and political climate of their intermarriages. In his marriage from 1958 to 1964, Jones contended with the ethnic and racial identity of his wife Hettie, as he became a prominent Black writer and racial separatist. Walker, who married Leventhal in 1967 and divorced him in 1976, contended not only with race but also with gender, as she became a major figure in the Black feminist movement by the early to mid-1970s. She contributed a gendered perspective that Jones failed to address. As a womanist, Walker advocated for racial and gender solidarity and desired a Black female independence outside of her marriage. The written work of Jones/Baraka and Walker presented a shift from the racial separatism supported by Black Nationalists during the 1960s to Walker’s articulation of womanism, a theoretical foundation of Black Feminism beginning in the 1970s.

**Leroi Jones and Racial Separatism**

In the fall of 1964, Leroi Jones traveled to Washington, D.C. without his wife, Hettie. Howard University was hosting a performance of his play Dutchman, and his friend Marion Brown, a saxophonist, had invited him to attend his jazz set. The trip marked the beginning of the end of his marriage. Two decades later in The Autobiography of Leroi Jones, Amiri Baraka recalled his decision to leave his wife behind in their New Jersey home. He felt a resentment towards whites that was usually “other-directed” but now, as he explained, “it had settled in me, directed at my wife.” Baraka concluded that “I had begun to see her as white!” The anger he felt towards other whites had gradually seeped into his relationship with Hettie.
The racial tension between Leroi and Hettie, though, encompassed more than their personal relationship. His interracial marriage with a white woman conflicted with his public image as a Black Nationalist who supported racial separatism. Hettie Jones’s 1990 autobiography, *How I Became Hettie Jones*, confirmed that in 1964 her husband would not let her travel with him because she was white. While other Blacks had often called her “the white woman,” “his white wife,” and “the Devil,” his words pained her the most.\(^3\) Though devastated, Hettie described her husband’s decision to leave her as inevitable, in large part because both Black and Jewish communities had been unaccepting of their interracial marriage.

At the beginning of their relationship in 1957, racial difference drew Leroi to Hettie. According to Baraka, their inexperience in interracial sex added to a mutual sexual desire. He admitted, “There was sex, fueled up a little higher maybe by the mutual curiosity each of us felt about the other.”\(^4\) While Baraka viewed race as a factor in sexual attraction, Hettie argued that she considered race only after they became sexually involved. Reflecting on their relationship, she described herself as “amazingly naïve about interracial sex” when they initially met.\(^5\) Only after she read Jewish writer Norman Mailer’s “The White Negro: Superficial Reflections on the Hipster” (1957) did she begin to consider race. Mailer’s essay described the appeal for white hipsters, such as Hettie, of Black culture, music, and sex. Specifically, Mailer animalized the Black man as a body fulfilled only by the sexual and musical orgasm. The white hipster, who desired an escape from white civilization, became a “white Negro” in search of the Black orgasm. In mentioning Mailer’s essay, Hettie suggested that perhaps she had subconsciously considered race when she began a sexual relationship with Leroi.

Hettie’s ethnicity added to her appeal. While Leroi viewed Hettie as white, her Jewish ethnicity was just as apparent to him in the early stages of their relationship. Reflecting on their first meeting in Greenwich Village in 1958, Baraka described Hettie as “a Jewish girl from Long Island trying to make it in the Village.”\(^6\) He emphasized Hettie’s continual struggle for acceptance in the American middle-class, where she found “only Jewish middle-classdom.”\(^7\) Baraka claimed that white America barred both Blacks and Jews from cultural inclusion into the middle-class. He consequently felt connected to Hettie in their shared experience of white oppression.

Attracted to their racial and ethnic differences, Leroi married Hettie in 1958. They were one of the few interracial, interfaith married couples in America. Despite a dramatic increase in intermarried Jews in the 1960s, interracial marriage remained comparatively rare. Among all Jewish unions, the percent of interfaith marriages jumped from 6 percent before the 1960s to 31.7 percent by the late 1960s. Intermarriages across all races comprised only 0.7 percent of all national marriages by 1970.\(^8\) Of the hand-
ful of interracial marriages in America, Black-Jewish marriages made up a small fraction.

At the time, sociologists and historians argued that Black-Jewish marriages were common, particularly in New York City. In a 1967 Reconstructionist article “The Interracial Jewish Child,” sociologist Werner Cahman suggested that Black men who chose white wives often chose Jewish women. Based on data he collected in New York City during the mid-1960s, Cahman estimated that about 70 to 80 percent of white partners of black men were Jewish women. Historian Keren McGinity later agreed that in New York City Jewish women married Black men at a comparatively higher rate than elsewhere. According to McGinity, large populations of Jewish women and Black men lived in the city but did not begin to interact as sexual and marital partners until the 1960s when white women experienced greater sexual freedom and religious difference became less important. She argued that with the persistence of racial prejudice, the image of black men as “forbidden fruit” likely contributed to their appeal, similar to the sexual appeal that Norman Mailer ascribed to Black men in “The White Negro.”

Rising Jewish intermarriage became a major cultural crisis in the Jewish community. Jewish leaders viewed the trend as an endangerment to the growth of Jewish families, and numerous publications added to fears of a shrinking Jewish population. In 1964, Look magazine ran a cover story titled “The Vanishing American Jew” that invoked a “Threat to Jewish Survival.” The article suggested that the American Jewish population would disappear by the twenty-first century if intermarriage rates continued to climb. In the midst of this cultural crisis, McGinity argued Jews, particularly intermarrying Jews, began to question their Jewish identity and experienced “insecurity about being Jewish.”

In the context of these critiques of intermarriage, Hettie Jones experienced a sense of insecurity in her own Jewish identity. Both Hettie and Baraka discussed her struggle to maintain her identity as a Jewish woman. Baraka admitted that one night he read in her journal, “I think I’m losing my Jewishness.” Referring to the same journal entry, Hettie’s memoir explained that she felt “haunted by the problem of remaining a Jew.” She did not know how to remain a Jewish woman outside of a Jewish marriage. As Hettie Jones, she struggled to hold onto the Jewish culture and ancestry that her family prized.

While an individual decision between Leroi and Hettie, their marriage was also a public statement of interracial intimacy, one that bothered her family and Jewish community members. Her familial response was not uniform. After she told her parents of her first pregnancy in 1959, her father advised her to fly to Mexico to get an abortion, but her mother consulted a rabbi on how to accept a mixed-race child into the family. The couple continually contended with negative community responses to their inter-
marriage, for which Hettie remained largely unprepared. When walking in public with Leroi in their neighborhood, she recalled that she often deferred to her husband’s judgment if others harassed them. Her instinctual response to catcalls and jeers was “to fight or preach,” but Jones quickly taught her to avoid conflict and possible violence. As a Black man, he knew how to limit his emotional reaction to avoid conflict. As family and neighbors increasingly dismissed her intermarriage, Hettie tried to diminish the influence of their opinion. “Race disappears in the house--in the bathroom, under the covers,” she wrote. “It was a joke to us, that we were anything more than just the two of us together.” According to Hettie, race was not a reason for tension in her marriage, and she rarely noticed any racial differences when alone at home with Leroi.

By the mid-1960s, escalating frustration with economic disparities led to a rise in identity politics within urban Black communities. Leaders such as Malcolm X, whose doctrine Jones ardently followed, emphasized Black consciousness as the best strategy in the fight against white oppressors. A number of political organizations and Black leaders who expressed Black Nationalist views severed their alliances with Jews. Despite years of receiving significant financial support from the Jewish community, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) rejected further Jewish involvement. In December 1966, SNCC voted to expel white members, because Black separatists within the organization desired “to purify SNCC of all white influences.” SNCC separatists argued that their decision to do so was not “antiwhite,” but rather because “each race had its own job to do.” A number of Black leaders took a similar stance toward Jews. In 1967, James Baldwin strategically published the article “Negroes Are Anti-Semitic Because They’re Anti-White” in the New York Times, which had a high Jewish readership, to defend against charges of Black Anti-Semitism. He clarified to readers that the “Jewishness” of Jews did not make them any different from white Christians and that the “Negro is really condemning the Jew for having become an American white man.” According to Baldwin, Blacks’ resentment of Jews simply reflected a general anti-white attitude. He saw no need for any white assistance in attaining economic and political progress for Black communities.

The ideological transformation not only weakened political ties between Blacks and Jews but also strained interpersonal relationships, including the marriage of Leroi and Hettie. During the mid-1960s, the rise in identity politics fueled racial tensions between Blacks and Jews that were hard for them to ignore, especially as Leroi’s prominence within the movement grew. His political participation in Black Nationalism was a gradual process. In the early 1960s, he expressed his apprehension toward becoming directly involved. In a September 1961 letter to his friend Edward Dorn, a white poet, Leroi described his internal debate between remaining an artist
Black-Jewish intermarriage and becoming a Black political leader. He always viewed himself as a poet who wanted “soft music and good stuffy purity,” she wrote. Despite his desire to remain an artist, the police often targeted Jones as a Black man. As a victim of white harassment, he had personal motivation to become more politically involved in the Black community. He viewed his art, in particular, as a means of fueling intellectual vitality among Blacks. Despite these reasons, he remained conflicted about joining the cause, in part because many Black Nationalists opposed his marriage to Hettie. Leroi asked himself, “Do I owe these people that much? Negroes, I mean. So, some foulmouthed prick nationalist gets up on a box and denounces me for having a white wife! Brrr.”21

Leroi Jones increasingly interpreted the opposition as a valid response to their marriage. By the early to mid-1960s, his notoriety as a writer and activist had grown considerably, and he received more backlash from other Blacks. As he became well known in activist circles, political leaders continually questioned his commitment to the Black Nationalist cause while he was still married to Cohen. As an emerging leader in the movement, Leroi’s marriage to a white woman contradicted his public call for black self-determination. When Black women discovered he was married to a white woman, they immediately rejected his sexual advances.22 Leroi internalized this dismissal of their intermarriage. Commenting on the contention of marrying across racial lines in the 1960s, he wrote, “The running bohemians of the black-white hookups I knew didn’t (I didn’t think) get married….The black-white thing wasn’t no normal US shit, it was out.”23 Baraka drew a line between casual “black-white hookups” and interracial marriage. While interracial sex was common, especially within his Bohemian circle, intermarriage was far less common.

Although Leroi felt dismayed over Nationalist disapproval of his marriage, he gradually became more invested in the movement. Over the next few years, he realized the political power he possessed in his written work. In a 1970 interview with biographer Theodore R. Hudson, Jones – then Baraka – reflected on his transition into Black Nationalism and explained that his “work kept changing steadily and I kept being aware of how it was changing and what it meant.”24 In the early and mid-1960s, he expressed Black Nationalist views in a series of political essays. In the 1962 essay “‘Black’ Is a Country,” Jones called for blacks to “act upon” white exploitation in an “extreme Black nationalism.” He described this Black Nationalism as “independence from the political, economic, social spiritual, and psychological domination of the white man.”25 During the mid-1960s, his political support for Black Nationalism only intensified. Similar to Baldwin’s beliefs, Jones argued that Blacks in New York City needed to prepare for economic independence from Jews. Addressing Black Harlem residents in the essay “The Legacy of Malcolm X and The Coming of the
Black Nation” (1965), he urged Blacks to help transfer back businesses into Black hands as soon as Jews decided to leave Harlem after the next race riot or “disturbance.”26 By the mid-1960s, the political climate of Black Nationalism and his written work had converged. He no longer expressed apprehension about his role in the movement.

As Leroi Jones became more invested in Black Nationalism, he increasingly referred to Hettie as white instead of Jewish. Over the course of their marriage, Hettie’s Jewish identity became less significant in their relationship, as he no longer viewed her as the “Jewish girl from Long Island.”27 His contention with Hettie as a white woman appeared throughout his fiction. Dutchman and The Slave, two plays he collectively published in 1964, likely reflected Leroi’s view of Hettie, especially his growing perception of her as white rather than as a Jew. Dutchman is a one-act drama set on a New York train. A white woman named Lula makes advances at Clay, an Ivy League-educated Black man, and urges him to conform to her vision of the Black man as a “hip field-nigga.” Her taunts push Clay to reveal his true identity under his “Ivy League” façade. He tirades about black oppression, and the play ends with Lula stabbing Clay in retaliation. In a 1972 review, the black novelist Sherley Anne Williams explored the implications of the plot. The play, she wrote, suggested that “the survival of the Black man in America” was “predicated upon his ability to keep his thoughts and his true identity hidden.”28 This theme recurred in his 1964 “A Poem for Wil- lie Best,” in which Jones further described the “mask” covering the Black man’s “true identity” in a white environment. He wrote that the Black man remains “A renegade/ behind the mask. And even/ the mask, a renegade/ disguise.”29 In both works, Leroi suggested that the Black man could not express his true identity, especially with a white woman.

In The Slave, the Black man vindicates the death of his true identity in Dutchman. The play is a two-act science fiction that takes place in the future, during the middle of a race war in the 1970s. A black man named Walker Vessels visits his white ex-wife, Grace Easley, with whom he had a child. Walker decides to take away his child and murders Grace and her white husband Brad. Both Hettie and Baraka contended that their marriage inspired both Dutchman and The Slave. When Leroi decided to leave for Washington, Hettie stated that she embraced the role of the white murderer and referred to herself as “Lula the murderer.” When she saw The Slave on stage for the first time, she recalled that the actress who played Gracie thanked Hettie for creating the role.30 Baraka himself described The Slave as a play31 that Hettie particularly disliked, because “it was so close to our real lives.”32 Both Hettie and Leroi agreed that the two plays paralleled their relationship, particularly his perception of her as the white enemy, an identity that Hettie herself had accepted by 1964.
The rise in identity politics and his growing involvement with Black Nationalism largely contributed to Leroi’s divorce from Hettie. In a 1978 interview with novelist CWE Bigsby, he described his decision to leave Cohen as a necessary step in practicing the Black Nationalist views he advocated. He told Bigsby, “I felt I was not being actually true to what I felt, or what I was beginning to feel.” His marriage to a white woman directly conflicted with his belief in Black self-reliance. Reflecting on their divorce in her autobiography, Hettie also emphasized the influence of identity politics on their relationship. She stated that their divorce “fit right in with dissolving black-white political alliances.” Their marriage was not the only interracial relationship to end in divorce in the mid-1960s. She observed that “there was pressure on all black people to end their interracial relationships.”

While their marriage was a private relationship, it existed within an intensifying political climate that influenced Jones to choose between his white wife and his Nationalist, separatist beliefs. By 1967, Leroi, as Amiri Baraka, had chosen Black Nationalism.

In 1967, Leroi Jones became Amiri Baraka. When he visited activist Ron Karenga in Los Angeles, Jones converted to Islam and became an advocate of Kawaida, an African philosophy dedicated to “cultural revolution” and “radical social change.” In the completion of his conversion to Islam, he adopted the name Amiri Baraka, or “the Blessed Prince.” His new name represented a major shift in his political belief system, a process that had begun towards the end of his marriage to Cohen. In his autobiography, he reflected on the inner transformation he experienced when he became Amiri Baraka. He stated that when he adopted his new name, he was “now literally being changed into a blacker being” by “discarding my ‘slave name’ and embracing blackness.”

Alice Walker and Womanism

In the summer of 1973, Alice Walker, Melvyn Leventhal, and their daughter Rebecca left Jackson, Mississippi to search for a new home in Brooklyn. After a week, they decided to buy and repair a dilapidated brownstone. In a short memoir written decades later, *The Way Forward Is With a Broken Heart*, Walker alluded to the “ruin” of both their new home and their dissolving marriage. During a long renovation process, she recalled that “our blood went into that house. And the last shred of the love that had so characterized our life.” Despite their efforts to repair their home and marriage, by 1973 both Leventhal and Walker agreed that their marriage was heading towards divorce.

When reflecting on their relationship years later, they gave different reasons for completing their divorce in 1976. In an interview with journalist Evelyn C. White, Leventhal pointed to “race” as the main reason why
they “drifted apart.” Walker agreed that the “racism” they experienced as an interracial couple contributed to their divorce. Similar to the experience of Leroi and Hettie Jones, many Black and Jewish family members and friends dismissed Walker and Leventhal’s marriage. Living in the Deep South, the Leventhals also faced terror and violence, specifically of the Ku Klux Klan during the height of the Civil Rights Era. Race, however, did not fully explain Walker’s feelings of isolation within their marriage. Along with racism, “sexism” served as an equally significant factor. Throughout her fiction, essays, and poetry written in the early 1970s, Walker expressed her dismay with the sexist rhetoric of Black Nationalism and encouraged Black women to explore their own identity independent of men. As she became a prominent figure of Black Feminist literature and politics, her marriage to a white man no longer fulfilled her identity as a Black woman. Walker’s contention with both race and gender as a Black woman in the 1970s complicates the racial and ethnic tension that Jones and Cohen illustrated in the 1960s.

When Walker and Leventhal began their relationship in 1966, both were conscious of the public and political backlash they would receive as an interracial couple. As Civil Rights activists living in the Deep South, they frequently witnessed and experienced racial harassment and violence. If they wanted to continue their interracial relationship in Mississippi, Walker felt it was important to marry Leventhal legally and obtain marital rights. Walker explained in an interview that, as husband and wife, they did not fit into the “long tradition of white men having black mistresses.” Their marriage publicly challenged years of interracial affairs that were often unacknowledged in the South. Walker and Leventhal decided to marry not only because of the love and admiration they shared. Their marriage was also a political and public statement that directly challenged the southern social order.

As a married couple, Walker and Leventhal contended with the disapproval of family, friends, and white townspeople, similar to the experiences of Jones and Cohen. While Walker’s family generally accepted her marriage to Leventhal, a number of her family members and friends struggled to accept a white Jew into their family. She recalled that her mother, who was a devout southern Christian and lacked any understanding of Judaism, called her husband a “Christ-killer” when her mother first met him. Aside from her mother, many disapproved of Walker’s marriage because of her husband’s race. In an interview with journalist White, Walker’s brother Bobby recalled his dismissal of her marriage to a white man, for he did not understand why “she couldn’t find a Black man.” Addressing “her young husband” in her memoir, Walker recalled that Leventhal “struck an ancient terror” of deadly racial violence among her Black family and friends.
though Leventhal worked as an attorney to secure the legal rights of Blacks living in Mississippi, Walker’s family and friends immediately associated him with a southern legacy of white racism.

In addition to coping with familial disapproval, Walker and Leventhal faced the overt harassment and violence of the Ku Klux Klan, a challenge that Baraka and Cohen did not confront in the North. In her 1976 article “Lulls: A Native Daughter Returns to the Black South,” Walker explained that they “were often afraid our house would be attacked.” Because Klansmen and white townspeople often attacked or bombed the homes of Civil Rights activists, they remained terrified, especially as an interracial couple. Often, they depended on their Black neighbors to warn them if a “car full of strange people” circled around their house. While Baraka and Cohen experienced public harassment in New York, Walker and Leventhal coped with a more constant, open threat of racial violence while living in Mississippi.

Similar to Cohen’s initial response to communal opposition, Walker attempted to ignore the discrimination. While Cohen was initially oblivious to racial harassment, Walker was completely aware of the racism that she and Leventhal would experience as an interracial couple. Walker, however, actively discounted any opposition when they married. Addressing Leventhal in her memoir, she described how at first their “love made us bulletproof, or perhaps invisible.” Their “bulletproof” love protected them when they walked down the street, according to Walker, and the “bullets that were the glances of the racist onlookers seemed turned back and sent hurtling off into outer space.” They often believed that they “outwitted racism and racist laws.” Their shared love and sense of protection was short-lived, however. Walker reflected that “living interracially, attempting to raise a child, attempting to have a normal life, wore us out.”

Despite Walker’s effort to ignore familial disapproval and racist townspeople, by the early 1970s “living interracially” had significantly strained their marriage. In the 1973 essay “Choosing to Stay at Home: Ten Years After the March on Washington,” Walker argued that the white South was gradually becoming more accepting of interracial couples by the 1970s, claiming that “the racial climate is as good as it is in most areas of the North.” Even with a better “racial climate,” however, Walker concluded that she “cannot forget and will never forgive” the racial harassment and intimidation she experienced. Walker insisted on leaving Mississippi, in spite of her husband’s desire to continue his job and remain in the South.

While Walker and Leventhal did not move to New York until 1973, Walker was fully aware of the growth of the Black Nationalist movement throughout the North. Although she supported the Black Nationalist call for self-determination, she also condemned the movement as sexist. Before she left the South, she wrote in 1973, “News from Black movements
in the North is far from encouraging.” She believed Black identity politics were currently moving “backward from the equalitarian goals” of the Civil Rights Movement.\textsuperscript{50} She often called Black Nationalist leaders hypocritical for supporting racial equality while suppressing the rights of Black women.

Walker’s writings fueled several other critiques of the movement. In \textit{Black Macho and the Myth of the Superwoman} (1978), Black feminist Michele Wallace claimed that Black Nationalism was largely unsuccessful in attaining racial equality, because the movement did not fully involve Black women. She specifically called out Amiri Baraka for supporting “Black Macho,” which she defined as “the moral and physical superiority of the black man.”\textsuperscript{51} Wallace condemned “Black Macho” because the philosophy maintained that “Black men had been more oppressed than Black women” and “Black women had contributed to that oppression.”\textsuperscript{52} Wallace raised the question of Black female liberation in the face not only of sexist white men and women but also of sexist Black men. Wallace contributed to a rise in political discourse among Black women that was largely rooted in Walker’s earlier works.

Walker’s poetry conveyed her criticism of the movement. Published in her 1973 poetry collection \textit{Revolutionary Petunias}, “Women” illustrated Black women as revolutionaries in the fight for racial equality. She explained how Black women of her mother’s generation “battered down/doors” and “led/armies/…to discover/books/desks/a place for us.”\textsuperscript{53} Walker emphasized the leadership of women that was often overlooked by men in Black political movements. Although she did not directly mention Black Nationalism, she published the poem in 1973 during the movement’s peak. Walker additionally expressed her dismay over the influence of Black Nationalism on perceptions of interracial dating in Black communities. While a number of male Black Nationalists engaged in interracial sex with white women, Walker argued that they hypocritically harassed Black women who dated white men. As a result, Black women exercised limited sexual agency within the movement and within their own communities. In a 1973 interview, Walker expanded on a poem, “The Girl Who Died #2,” which she had written after a Black female student committed suicide at Sarah Lawrence College, Walker’s alma mater. Intimidated by her family and friends, the girl became severely depressed because she “refused to limit her interest to Black men,” according to Walker. In both poems, Walker criticized Black Nationalist leaders for perpetuating the political and sexual subjugation of Black women.

The harassment described in “The Girl Who Died #2” mirrored Walker’s experience while living in New York with Leventhal. Despite moving to the North in 1973, Walker and Leventhal were unable to escape community disapproval, this time not from their families or white residents, but also because Black Nationalism and Black Power rhetoric directly chal-
lenged their interracial marriage. Decades later in her own autobiography, their daughter Rebecca analyzed the influence of black identity politics on her parents’ marriage. “With the rise of Black Power, my parents’ interracial defiance…is suddenly suspect.” She continued, “Black-on-Black love is the new recipe for revolution…and being down means proving how black you are, how willing to fight, how easily you can turn your back on those who have kept black folks enslaved for so long.” Although her father worked as a Civil Rights attorney for several years, Rebecca defined him as a political outcast by the early 1970s.54

While Leventhal became ostracized from the Black community, Black Nationalism pushed Walker to reconsider her marriage to a white man. Although Walker criticized the Black Nationalist movement, her poetry and fiction reflected a firm belief in racial pride. To many of her readers, her public image consequently conflicted with her decision to remain married to a white man. In an interview decades later, Leventhal recalled their growing distance in New York during the height of Black Power. As Walker “became better known” as a Black writer, he believed that “our marriage did make her feel like a traitor.”55 Similar to the political pressure Jones experienced in the mid-1960s, Walker’s growing notoriety among the Black community further strained her intermarriage. Although Jones was directly involved in the Black Nationalist movement, both Jones and Walker contended with similar marital and relationship expectations. Walker’s marriage to a white man did not fit into her public and political image as a prominent Black writer.

As a Black woman, though, Walker grappled with more than racial politics. For Walker, her gender was just as significant as her race. Through her poetry, essays, and fiction published in the early 1970s, Walker examined the intersection of gender and racial politics. In the 1971 essay “Coretta King: Revisited,” Walker called for the politicization of Black womanhood. “Black women have been antagonistic toward women’s liberation,” she wrote. “I do not understand this because Black women among all women have been oppressed almost beyond recognition—oppressed by everyone.”56 Walker believed many Black women aligned themselves with Black politics and disapproved of “women’s liberation.” She argued, however, that both their gender and race were central elements of their identity as Black women. She consequently urged them to support women’s rights. Two years later in “Choosing to Stay at Home,” she called for Black women to toss “‘white only’ signs and ‘men only’ signs on the same trash heap,” just as Sojourner Truth, Harriet Tubman, and other Black women had in history.57 Throughout the early 1970s, Walker used her political essays to push for a Black feminist consciousness.

Walker’s novel Meridian stressed the importance of political and sexual independence for Black women. Although Walker published the
novel in 1976, she began writing the story in the early 1970s and had a full draft by 1973. 58 *Meridian* followed three main characters: Meridian Hill, a Black female activist; Meridian’s lover, Truman Held, who is a Black Nationalist; and Lynne Rabinowitz, a Jewish woman who Truman marries after leaving Meridian. Through the protagonist Meridian, Walker asserted that black women should pursue an identity independent of patriarchy. Meridian attains this independence only after she ends her relationship with Truman and reconciles with Lynne. When Meridian has an abortion and Truman returns to see her, he continues to make sexual advances towards her. Instead of reciprocating his feelings, she resists his attempts. As he calls her “beautiful” and a “stone fox,” she views herself as a stone fox that “was heavy, gray, and could not move.” 59 In order to maintain her own sexual independence, she becomes physically immobile and decides to no longer consume herself with Truman’s sexual attention. After Meridian ends her relationship with Truman, she eventually reconciles with Lynne, the white Jewish activist whom Meridian initially envies. After the death of Lynne’s daughter with Truman, Walker wrote, “The absence of the child herself was what had finally brought them together.” 60 Their shared suffering allows both to understand each other as women across racial lines.

In a 1983 article, Walker expanded on this “unspoken bond” between Black and Jewish women. She argued that Black and Jewish women shared an “awareness of oppression and injustice” that white Christian women did not have. 61 According to Walker, both experienced a “double bind” of ethnic discrimination and sexism. 62 By the end of the novel *Meridian*, Meridian forgives Lynne for sleeping with Truman and experiences an inner transformation. Describing Meridian’s revelation, Walker wrote, “She understood, finally, that the respect she owed her life has to continue, against whatever obstacles, to live it, and not to give up any particle of it without a fight to the death.” 63 Meridian finds a new meaning of life not in Truman but within herself. Through Meridian, Walker encouraged black women to seek a greater consciousness separate from men.

By the mid-1970s, Walker’s writings contributed to the birth of the Black Feminist movement. In her autobiography, her daughter Rebecca explained Walker’s significance in shaping the movement’s rhetoric. “It isn’t that my mother wasn’t feminist before,” Rebecca recalled, “but now she is surrounded by the Feminism she is helping to create.” As she advocated for Black female independence, Alice Walker gained her own independence and found “a life defined not by male desire but by female courage.” According to Rebecca, Walker’s “courage” was “exactly what it [took] to leave” her father Mel Leventhal. 64

Alice Walker strongly urged Americans to build political and social coalitions across all races and genders. Soon after she divorced Leventhal, she published her 1976 essay “Saving the Life That Is Your Own,” in which
she expanded on her beliefs in universal equality. “What is always needed in the appreciation of art, or life, is the larger perspective,” she wrote. “The straining to encompass in one’s glance at the varied world that common thread, the unifying theme through immense diversity…that enlarges the private and the public world.”

Walker believed that the views of one group or individual did not have to silence other perspectives. Specifically, she asserted that Black women should focus on how the advocacy of their own rights fit into a “common thread” and “immense diversity.” The 1977 statement of the Combahee River Collective, a group of Black feminist lesbians, also stressed the importance of adding to a “common thread.” The statement read, “We feel solidarity with progressive Black men and do not advocate the fractionalization that white women who are separatists demand.”

Despite the discrimination that they experienced as Black lesbians, they advocated for racial and gender solidarity.

Echoing the Collective’s stance against separatism, Walker’s creation of the term “womanist” supported the uplift of all Americans. In her 1979 short story “Coming Apart,” Walker first used the term but later defined it. In the preface of In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens: Womanist Prose, a 1983 collection of her essays and interviews, Walker proposed womanism as an alternative to feminism. It addressed the concerns of Black women, who were often marginalized by men and white women. To Walker, a “womanist” referred to a feminist of color but also included any men or women who were “committed to survival and wholeness of entire people.” She explicitly described a womanist as “not a separatist.”

Her beliefs contrasted with the racial separatism advocated by Leroi Jones after his divorce from Hettie. Although Walker was silenced as a Black woman during the rise of white feminism and Black Nationalism, Walker presented the “womanist” as a social advocate for all people.

As emerging Black writers during the 1960s and 1970s, Leroi Jones and Alice Walker stood in the crossfire of rising identity politics. The growth of Black Nationalism not only severed national Black-Jewish relations but also influenced the personal marital relations of both Jones and Walker. Their interfaith, interracial marriages to white Jews unraveled before family, friends, community members, and their literary audiences. In 1964, Leroi Jones divorced Hettie Jones in the face of disapproval from her family and the Black community. In 1976, Alice Walker divorced Melvyn Leventhal after years of familial and community disapproval and racial harassment. While both Jones and Walker were married to Jewish spouses, their personal decision to file for divorce was rooted in differing political ideologies. While Jones believed his marriage to a white woman conflicted with his belief in racial separatism, Walker longed for Black female indepen-
The marriages of Jones and Walker additionally blurred the line between art, life, and politics. Their written work reflected the political ideologies they were contending with in their marriages. Both Leroi and Hettie acknowledged that the *Dutchman* and *The Slave* reflected Leroi’s growing white resentment, particularly for his white wife. *Meridian*, a novel about a Black female activist who finds liberation in her friendship with a white woman, revealed Walker’s personal journey to find Black female independence as a womanist. For Jones and for Walker, art became an expression of both their political views and their personal life.
ENDNOTES:

4 Baraka, Autobiography, 146.
5 Jones, How I Became, 35.
6 Baraka, Autobiography, 141.
7 Ibid., 145.
10 McGinity, Still Jewish, 117.
12 McGinity, Still Jewish, 143.
14 Jones, How I Became, 36.
15 Ibid., 63-64
16 Jones, How I Became, 37.
17 Ibid., 36.
19 Cheryl Lynn Greenberg, Troubling the Waters: Black-Jewish Relations in the American Century, (Princeton: Princeton University, 2006), 221.
22 Baraka, Autobiography, 147.
23 Ibid., 148.
27 Baraka, Autobiography, 141.
30 Jones, How I Became, 219-220.
31 Baraka, Autobiography, 288.
32 Ibid.
34 Jones, How I Became, 226.


Ibid.


Ibid., 33.

Ibid., 156.


Ibid., 30.

Ibid., 29.


Ibid., 170.


Ibid., 161.


Ibid., 354.


Walker, *Black, Jewish & White*, 60.


MARRIAGE, ADULTERY, AND PROSTITUTION: CHANGES IN AMERICAN MISSIONARY DISCOURSE ON HAWAIIAN FEMALE SEXUALITY, 1820-1870

Introduction by Professor Estelle Freedman

My WIM seminar challenged students to inquire into the intersecting constructions of gender, race, and sexuality within specific historical settings. Jess Peterson began the course by asking how representatives of colonial powers interpreted and policed sexuality in the places they colonized. When he found a rich set of letters written by American Protestant missionaries in Hawaii from the 1820s through the 1860s, Jess had located his case study. The sources recorded American attitudes toward native sexual practices along with efforts to proselytize Christian marriage. While he hoped to understand both missionary ideas and their effects on the sexual practices of Hawaiians, Jess realized that the sources privileged the former topic. He uncovered change over time in the ways missionaries reacted to native culture, including greater reliance on the law and the growing influence of Victorian-era ideals of innate female morality. The paper places this history carefully within the context of changing Hawaiian economic and political life. It provides a highly readable narrative and a persuasive account of how race and gender mutually construct sexual ideals within intercultural encounters.
Marriage, Adultery, and Prostitution: Changes in American Missionary Discourse on Hawaiian Female Sexuality, 1820-1870

Jess Peterson

In 1832, a missionary in Hilo, Hawaii reported optimistically to his superiors in Honolulu, “We have, during the year, celebrated 120 marriages, and have not heard of a single breach of marriage covenant. Indeed, the change in the habits of the people in regard to illicit intercourse with foreigners within the last 18 months, is striking.” This statement is representative of one of the main preoccupations of American missionaries in Hawaii: the sexual activities of Hawaiians, and especially Hawaiian women. Over the first five decades of missionary activity in Hawaii, approximately 1820 to 1870, Hawaiian women and sexuality became a major theme of missionary discourse, with changes in this discourse reflecting broader changes in the colonization of Hawaii, as well as shifts in white, middle-class culture in the United States.

For several decades after their 1820 arrival, missionary leaders at each outpost sent a station report to the annual General Meeting of Protestant missionaries in Honolulu. The reports discussed matters as diverse as church construction, the number of marriages conducted, and the health of the missionary’s family, but their main purpose was to summarize the events at that station over the past year. Because these reports were consistently produced and purported to summarize all missionary activity, they offer the ability to track changing discourse among the missionary leadership in Hawaii from the 1820s to the mid-1860s. Two important qualifications are in order, however. First, the conclusions in these reports were drawn exclusively by men, whose names appeared on all signed reports. Missionary women certainly wrote about Hawaiians in their diaries and letters, but this study is limited to the several hundred missionary reports from this period, allowing us to see change over time, albeit from a specifically male point of view. Second, missionaries rarely mentioned the social status of the Hawaiian women they interacted with, unless they were of chiefly or royal status. Because of this omission, this study will assume that the Hawaiian women missionaries discussed were of some non-chiefly, though otherwise unspecified, status.

Using this corpus of missionary reports, it is clear that there were several shifts in how American missionaries perceived Hawaiian female sexuality and how they hoped to influence it. First, the way American missionaries perceived the receptiveness of Hawaiians to missionary messages
Missionary Discourse on Hawaiian Female Sexuality

changed gradually but perceptibly over the period covered by the reports. While missionaries in the 1830s were cautiously optimistic about Hawaiian’s receptiveness to Protestant morality, by the 1860s they were much more pessimistic about the effect of missionary work and the general moral state of Hawaiian society. This change in general missionary perception of Hawaiians accompanied a move by American missionaries into commercial activities previously held only by foreign merchants, suggesting that the new, expanded goals of missionaries changed their perceptions of Hawaiians. The second shift appeared in missionaries’ opinion of and reliance on the law to regulate Hawaiian sexuality. As American missionaries became more pessimistic about their ability to change Hawaiian society, they also became increasingly reliant on the legislation and prosecution to impose their moral reforms. This change also mirrored the development of Hawaiian colonization, which involved the importation of Anglo-American legal models during this same period. Third, the way American missionary men described Hawaiian women’s sexual agency in their reports clearly changed after 1850. While reports before 1850 generally described Hawaiian women in similar terms to Hawaiian men in discussions of adultery and illicit sex, later reports differentiated their discourse on men and women. Reflecting changing notions of female sexuality in the Eastern United States, missionaries began to ignore female sexual desire and to hold Hawaiian women to a higher moral standard than Hawaiian men. All of these changes demonstrate the ways factors like different economic and legal conditions in the islands, as well as new ideologies in the United States, could quickly change how American missionaries perceived their work and the people they were trying to convert.

Historical Context

From the first arrival of Europeans in Hawaii, the sexual behavior of Hawaiian women was one of the primary topics of attention. In 1778, Captain James Cook became the first European to visit the islands. His officers claimed that Hawaiian women seemed eager to sleep with British sailors, with women swimming out nightly to the anchored British ships to sleep with their “husbands.”2 After Cook’s visit, the islands quickly gained a reputation as a sexual paradise for European sailors, making Hawaii a popular stop for merchant and whaling ships. Hawaiian women gained a reputation among Europeans and Americans for what they considered to be “prostitution,” “promiscuity,” and “licentiousness.”3

This reputation had a strong effect on American Protestants in New England, who were forming their first foreign missions in the early decades of the nineteenth century. After the 1810 establishment of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in Massachusetts, Hawaii
became one of several targets of American missionary work. In 1819, the Board dispatched its first missionaries to the Hawaiian Islands with the goal of spreading Christianity of the Protestant, New-England variety. Mostly hailing from the northeastern United States, the Calvinist missionaries established outposts in the most populated areas of the five islands within the next few decades. By establishing churches and schools at these outposts, missionaries hoped to remold Hawaiian society in the image of a Protestant ideal. Men formally led the missionary stations engaged in a broad attempt at transforming Hawaiian society, but historian Patricia Grimshaw shows that the “women of the mission,” the missionaries’ wives, “took as their special portion of this ambitious brief the ‘transformation’ of Hawaiian girls and women to concepts of American femininity.”

The sexual practices of Hawaiians, especially Hawaiian women, were a particular source of obsession for the missionaries. Missionaries continuously expressed shock that Hawaiian society did not privilege lifelong, monogamous marriages over other sexual relationships. As anthropologist Jocelyn Linnekin demonstrates, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Hawaiians routinely switched sexual partners and accepted the existence of polygamous households with multiple men or women. Linnekin also argues that missionaries in the mid-nineteenth century were never able to completely stamp these norms out. Regarding prostitution, historian Caroline Ralston explains that Hawaiian women’s perceived “promiscuity” and “prostitution” with European sailors was continuous with the Hawaiian practice of seeking status and influence through sexual liaisons, a practice which did not carry nearly the same negative connotations for Hawaiians as it did for nineteenth century Europeans and Americans. With the dramatic increase in the number of sailors visiting the islands, Hawaiian women’s motivations for engaging in “prostitution” became more complicated during the missionary period, but the comparative lack of social stigma continued. Missionaries hoped to teach Hawaiians, especially women, to avoid what they labeled adultery and prostitution and to privilege marriage as the only legitimate context for sexual intimacy. Instead of the relatively loose Hawaiian conception of marriage, Hawaiian women were supposed to hew to the Protestant mold of having sex only within monogamous, life-long marriages.

Missionaries were not the only resident foreigners on the islands during the first half of the nineteenth century. From the 1820s, European and American merchants were also a major presence on the islands. Historian Jennifer Kashay explains that the missionaries initially developed an antagonistic relationship with these foreign merchants, who accused them of monopolizing Hawaiians’ time on religious and educational activities instead of economically productive tasks. Missionaries, in turn, accused merchants of perpetuating Hawaiians’ “degradation and bondage” because of
their encouragement of prostitution and disinterest in spreading Christianity and Western education. Over time, however, the interests of these groups became more aligned. In the 1840s, many missionaries began to engage in trade and acquired agricultural holdings. By the 1860s, the antagonism between these two groups had all but disappeared, as missionaries had essentially become a religious commercial class. This change in activities almost certainly affected the way missionaries perceived Hawaiians, with religious goals increasingly competing with commercial, often extractive, ones. The Hawaiian legal system also transformed dramatically during the second quarter of the nineteenth century as part of the project of colonization. By the middle of the century, Hawaii had become a model of Anglo-American common law traditions with a constitution, court system, and legislative process perfectly suited to police sexuality. In order to understand how missionaries’ perceptions changed over time, it is essential to recognize the increasing importance of these other non-Hawaiian forces, which became increasingly intertwined with missionaries in the 1840s and 1850s.

Missionary Sentiment on Hawaiian Morality and Ability to Affect Change

In contrast to later reports, American missionaries in the 1830s and early 1840s expressed optimism about their ability to affect Hawaiian morality. Only a decade after their arrival, missionaries remained hopeful about Hawaiians’ receptiveness to Protestant sexual morality, especially with regards to marriage. Marriage was the primary vehicle via which missionaries hoped to bring Hawaiians’ sexual practices in line with missionary ideals. The importance of marriage makes missionary opinions about Hawaiians’ respect of the “marriage covenant” particularly helpful in understanding how missionaries thought about Hawaiian sexual morality in this early period.

In general, missionaries in the 1830s were cautiously optimistic about Hawaiians’ adherence to Protestant sexual mores and, by extension, the effectiveness of missionary work. In addition to the missionary in Hilo who in 1832 celebrated that he had “not heard of a single breach of marriage covenant,” a Waimea missionary in the same year praised “public sentiment against” breaches of the marriage contract. These same missionaries continued the same guarded optimism for the next few years. One remarked in 1835, for example, that “violations of the [marriage] contract have not apparently been more frequent than formerly.” By positively judging the spread of Protestant morality, missionaries were also justifying their own presence by showing how much they had accomplished. One missionary in Waialua remarked that, in the face of widespread “gambling, adultery, & idleness,” “the influence of the [church] members at this station has been
obviously very good.” In their estimation, the station was effectively serving as an outpost of Protestantism, and the first Hawaiian converts demonstrated “the moral influence of good native teachers.” To be sure, during the early 1830s, some reports still lamented the fact that “the 7th commandment had been entirely disregarded” in their districts. Overall, though, missionaries expressed optimism about the sexual morality of their first groups of converts and the effect these converts would have on the morality of the rest of the population.

The generally positive sentiment of the 1830s shifted gradually, and by the 1850s and 1860s missionaries’ assessments of Hawaiian morality had become considerably more negative. The quantity of negative comments about Hawaiian morality increased, but so too did the belief that things were worse than before. In 1856, a missionary in Waialua complained that “many things […] are far from what they should be” and singled out adultery, stealing, and debt among other sins. In his opinion, “these evils [were] much more noticeable [sic] now than they were 20 years ago.” This kind of negative assessment became increasingly common at the end of the 1850s. Reports stated that hulas were again becoming common in some places. In Hilo “cases of conjugal infidelity” were “numerous and the forsaking of husbands & wives seems not to be diminishing.” Some missionaries targeted women specifically as part of their complaints. A report from Hana stated that “as a whole, women impress me with a disproportionate inferiority to the men” in the areas of “knowledge, sense and moral character.” In the missionary’s opinion, “the most pressing social work” was “to elevate the character of woman.”

An even more specific complaint, but one that multiple missionaries discussed, was the practice of some Hawaiian families to “prostitute” their daughters. In the estimation of a missionary in Kohala, “to this day, no practice is more common.” While he admitted that these were “serious charges indeed,” the missionary claimed that nothing “would excite more universal or unaffected astonishment, in circles purely Hawaiian than the refusal by any parent to share in the lewd daughters’ acquisitions,” meaning her profits from what the missionary called prostitution. What shocked the missionary about this practice was the “parental embraces” that these daughters received when they returned home. Missionaries found the acceptance of prostitution in “circles purely Hawaiian” astonishing and disappointing. Regardless of whether any of these individual claims were true or what exactly constituted “prostitution,” it is clear that missionaries generally perceived the moral state of Hawaiian society to be worse in the 1850s and ‘60s than it had been in in the 1830s and 1840s.

A trope of the later missionary discourse on morality was that of “external morality,” or public comportment, which missionaries contrasted with immoral acts that continued to be committed in secret. References to
external morality, which missionaries often used to describe Hawaiian society, served to undercut claims that Hawaiians adhered more to Protestant morals than they had previously. Instead, missionaries judged that their new efforts had merely driven disapproved acts into hiding. A missionary in Hilo praised the “external morality,” explaining that “few acts of transgression have come to our knowledge.” Although he acknowledged that “much sin has doubtless been committed,” he praised the fact that it had been driven “into dark places.” Another missionary from Kohala reported that “looking beneath the surface of Society,” the “further the digging, the greater the abominations.” Missionaries did not necessarily view this supposed secrecy as a completely negative development. Many echoed the sentiment expresses in an 1860 report from Hilo, which stated “that nowhere on Earth is there more quiet & a more constant sense of security to life with all its blessings than on Hawaii.”

To some extent, the reduction of external immorality marked a success. However, in 1864 a missionary in Lahaina expressed a more nuanced and ultimately more balanced opinion. Although there was “a public sentiment […] which keeps the external of society decent,” in his opinion vice was “rampant.” “Outward decency will never save the nation,” he claimed, “if the fires of sin are allowed to burn at its vitals.” In other words, even though Hawaiian society might appear more “decent,” immoral activity continued unabated, creating a challenge for missionaries who wanted to influence private as well as public behavior.

The perceived continuance, or even increase, in immoral activity also changed how missionaries viewed the effect of their own work and may have justified missionaries’ increased participation in Hawaii’s extractive and exploitative plantation economy. Just as positive sentiment in the 1830s caused missionaries to be optimistic about their role in Hawaii, negative perceptions of Hawaiian morality led to pessimism on the effects of missionary work. In 1856, a missionary in Waialua worried “it will long remain the Hawaiians crying sin, unless some more strenuous & efficient measures are taken to controll [sic]” Hawaiian youth and teach them Protestant morality. While it is difficult to determine what measures he had in mind, the missionary implies that church and missionary education, which had been in place for several decades, were not “efficient” enough tools. Perhaps labor on a missionary-owned plantation would have qualified. Unlike early missionaries, who relied on support sent from Massachusetts and provided by their Hawaiian congregations, missionaries in the 1850s had become very involved in Hawaii’s plantation-based export economy. Even though missionaries rarely made the explicit connection between morality and labor in the reports, it is likely that the goal of profitably running a plantation using Hawaiian labor affected missionaries’ perceptions of Hawaiians morals. Jennifer Kashay argues that missionary discourse in newspapers became increasingly similar to merchants’ racialized language justifying the
exploitation of Hawaiians during this period. It is conceivable then, if not probable, that missionaries’ more pessimistic view of Hawaiians’ morality would also serve to justify Hawaiians’ participation in difficult plantation labor. In this sense, it is likely that pessimism in the 1850s and ‘60s reflected missionaries’ attempts to align the goals of salvation and cultivation of a workforce for plantation labor. When a missionary from Kohala desperately proclaimed, “surely it is not the work of a single generation to educate a nation’s conscience,” his negativity would also have legitimized missionaries’ turn towards more profitable activities. After all, if one generation of missionaries could not “educate a nation’s conscience” even with their full effort, there was certainly time to engage in other more economically fruitful activities. These kinds of negative, and even fatalistic, statements reflected a rising belief among missionaries that their evangelist work, on its own, would not successfully change Hawaiians’ morality, especially their sexual practices. It also coincided with, and perhaps justified, missionaries’ increasing participation in Hawaii’s extractive plantation economy, which required the labor of “sinful” Hawaiians.

Legislation & Prosecution of Sexual Morality

Coinciding with, and perhaps because of, the rise in pessimism, American missionaries turned towards the law as a way to govern sexuality. Before 1850, missionaries largely expected to impose moral reforms on their congregations through their own religious activities, namely church services, schooling, and prayer meetings. While missionaries certainly advised Hawaiian leaders to change laws to reflect Protestant morality, especially with regard to prostitution and marriage, their reports show that they did not rely heavily on enforcement to impose morality on their own congregations. In fact, they sometimes saw law enforcement and administration as an impediment to their goals. In the 1850s however, missionaries began to see enforcement of moral legislation as an important tool to govern Hawaiian sexuality. They frequently complained that the law was not adequately enforced, even as the number of prosecutions related to adultery and fornication filled court records of the period.

In the first decades of missionary activity, American missionaries relied mostly on their own religious and educational activities to impose their sexual morality on Hawaiians. This self-reliance is evident in missionary reports from the period. In them, they emphasized the importance of meetings and the threat of excommunication in spreading and enforcing Protestant sexual mores. In the 1830s and 1840s, almost all missionary reports mentioned regular meetings with congregants, especially women. In addition to reading scriptures, missionaries led discussions on sexual and family practices at weekly meetings, making these gatherings a key tool...
in the spread of missionary doctrines. In one 1846 report from Lahaina, a missionary talked about attending meetings in “a part of the place most notorious for wickedness.” In attendance were many “abandoned females” who promised to “forsake their vile mode of living,” namely prostitution, and accept the missionaries’ teachings on sexual purity. For the Lahaina missionary, meetings were the key way to reach women living immorally and change their sexual practices. A missionary reporting from Waimea in 1837 demonstrated a similar reliance on meetings to transfer Protestant moral practices to Hawaiians. He devoted half of his Wednesday meetings to teaching Hawaiians about “the marriage state - the duties of parents & children - husband & wives.” If church members deviated from Protestant sexual practices, they were required to repent or they faced excommunication. In 1835, for example, missionaries excommunicated an unrepentant princess from the church for her sexual “excesses.” In their reports, missionaries rarely discussed legal means of governing marriage or reducing adultery and prostitution. Instead, their discourse demonstrated the importance of internal church activity, not legal structures, to achieve these goals.

To be sure, Protestant missionaries never completely removed themselves from the legislative process. From their arrival in the 1820s, missionaries allied themselves with the Hawaiian leadership and attempted to attack prostitution and adultery via these relationships. In the 1820s and 30s, Governor Hoapili and Queen Ka‘ahumanu were sympathetic to the missionaries’ goals and, with their encouragement, imposed bans on prostitution. Laws governing marriage and adultery had also existed at least since the early 1830s, although it is difficult to find data on enforcement and prosecution in the early period. After early efforts, mostly ineffectual, to limit prostitution legislation, Missionaries quickly moved to focus on church activities to increase the number and quality of Protestant marriages and to reduce adultery.

One notable exception to the relative unimportance of legislation in governing sexuality in this early period occurred on Maui in 1835. Governor Hoapili, a Hawaiian supporter of Christian missionary activities, passed a marriage law requiring literacy as a precondition to marriage. The 1835 law seemed to govern sexuality simply because it limited marriage, but its purpose had just as much to do with encouraging education. By forbidding marriage for those who had not attended school, the Governor hoped to encourage Hawaiians of all social statuses to become literate. Hiram Bingham, a prominent early missionary, described Hoapili’s “zeal for general education” as the primary motivator for the law. Missionary reports at the time described the law in similar terms, reflecting a frequent, though often implicit, connection between marriage and education. Missionaries, along with the Protestant Governor Hoapili, hoped to encourage an ideal of
chastity and education in youth, followed by marriage between two educated, Protestant adults.

Although the 1835 law attempted to regulate the marriage age, Hawaiian courts did not begin to prosecute cases on missionaries’ greatest obsessions - fornication and adultery - until the 1840s, and evidence from the early 1840s suggests that missionaries initially viewed the increasing legal regulation of marriage with trepidation. In 1841, a missionary in Hana cautiously praised “certain laws” that related to the “moral and religious interests of the people,” even as he viewed the accompanying increase of taxation as an “oppressive” burden on his parishioners. The increasing legal apparatus governing morality could also be contentious however. For example, a missionary in Kau complained about the Governor’s means of disseminating marriage certificates, which had become “intolerable & oppressive to the people” because of bureaucratic inefficiencies. Clearly, the incorporation of Protestant morality in legal structures was not always positive and, even when the laws themselves aligned with missionaries’ goals, their application could be harmful to missionary objectives. One missionary in Kaluaaha expressed a more fundamental problem with legislation itself. In 1840, he observed that the laws “formed so great a part of the subject of thought and conversation” that people did not consider other reasons, even religious ones, to be as important. In other words, the missionary in Kaluaaha believed that legislation of morality had distracted from the original purpose of the moral rules, which was religious salvation.

This hesitancy to rely on legislation and prosecution all but disappeared by the mid 1850s. In contrast to earlier American missionaries, who saw Hawaiian sexual practices as mostly their own responsibility to change, missionaries in the 1850s and 1860s demonstrated a much greater reliance on the legal system to regulate marriage and adultery. Although it is difficult to determine enforcement of laws before the 1840s, by the 1850s authorities enforced laws on sexuality and marriage by prosecuting increasing numbers of Hawaiians for fornication and adultery. Nevertheless, the most frequent way missionaries expressed their increasing reliance on these laws was in complaints about the ineffectiveness or non-enforcement of laws on adultery and marriage. One missionary reporting from Waimea in 1852 complained that laws making girls marriageable at 14 and boys taxable at 15 reduced attendance at his school. Children left as soon as they reached these legally mandated ages, “before they have acquired much knowledge.” The missionary ended his comment by calling for “some change in the law about marriage & taxation,” reflecting the interconnectedness of marriage and education. While his comment was mainly aimed at improving the level of education among Hawaiians, the fact that law was such an important component of his discussion of the problem marked a clear differentiation from earlier discourse. Complaints about the “non-execution of laws
against immorality” were most common in this period. In 1864, a missionary in Lahaina worried that “the bad examples of some in high places” were causing low enforcement of laws on sexuality, presumably referring to supposedly immoral public officials. An 1862 report from Hau‘ula was more blunt. The missionary reports that, “the number, who are suspected of living in adultery is alarmingly great.” “But,” he goes on, “if the judge, the lawyer, & the constaple [sic]” are known to live in adultery, “it is not an easy matter to get laws executed.” This kind of focus on law enforcement, especially in regards to adultery, was new. Although there were a few mentions of laws on adultery and marriage in the 1830s and early 1840s, they were never as explicit or central to discussions as they were in the later period. Clearly, missionaries began to see law enforcement as an important mechanism to impose their moral reforms on the Hawaiian population.

The increase in missionary discourse related to laws on marriage, adultery, and fornication coincided with an increase in legal cases related to these crimes in Hawaiian courts. For several decades, Westerners and certain Hawaiian collaborators had worked to import Anglo-American legal structures to the Hawaiian Islands. William Lee, a young lawyer from New York, arrived in Hawaii in 1846 and, within ten years, had drafted a new constitution and was appointed chief justice of the Superior Court in Honolulu. In her study of legal cases related to adultery and prostitution, anthropologist Sally Engle Merry finds that the number of cases related to adultery and fornication peaked in the 1850s and 1860s, along with the Americanization of Hawaii’s legal system. During this period, prosecutions for adultery almost exclusively targeted native Hawaiians. In short, as the means to prosecute Hawaiians for sexual deviancy increased, so too did missionary expectations that Hawaiian sexuality could be controlled through the legal system.

**Missionary Perspectives on Women’s Agency and Sexuality**

The last shift in the missionary reports of this period relates to male missionaries’ attitudes towards the sexuality of Hawaiian women. A clear chronological difference emerges from the period of 1820 to 1860. Before 1850, missionaries writing reports from their stations described Hawaiian women as similar to Hawaiian men in their pursuit of adultery and illicit sex. Furthermore, anecdotes in the reports from the 1830s and 1840s create an image of Hawaiian women willing to forgo church membership for the pursuit of sensual pleasures. After 1850, these representations shifted perceptibly. Missionaries no longer relayed stories of Hawaiian women leaving the church in a way that acknowledged their sexual desire. Instead, male missionaries began to apply a different and higher moral standard for Hawaiian women, reflecting changing cultural perceptions in the United States.
The shift in missionary representations of Hawaiian women occurred at the same time that cultural ideas about female sexuality were changing in the United States. In the nineteenth century, American culture increasingly held white, middle-class American women to a different standard in the arenas of adultery and sexual purity. Previously, American culture treated adultery committed by women as similar to adultery by men. It was essential for women to repent for their sin, but they could be rehabilitated in the same way men could. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, British and American moralists began to see women as having less innate sexual desire than men. White women were supposed to be sexually pure, and any woman who acted on sexual desire outside of marriage assumed the label of “fallen woman,” never to be rehabilitated. These ideas became increasingly popular during the nineteenth-century, and it is likely that American missionaries increasingly expected Hawaiian women to exhibit the same sexual purity they expected from white, middle-class women.

While missionaries’ early representations of Hawaiian women were surprisingly similar to those of men in the domains of sexuality and independence, it is important to note that in many ways, missionary activities remained highly gendered. The best example of this gendered separation appeared in women’s meetings. For missionaries, the pre-1850 period was notable for the popularity of women’s meetings as part of Protestant missionary activities. Usually the wife of a married missionary couple would lead one or multiple meetings a week of female church members. As one 1839 report from Molokai put it, “The exercises at the meetings are reading the scriptures and conversation by the sisters on such subjects as [are] most necessary to be presented to Hawaiian females.” These necessary subjects usually involved childrearing and lessons on how to run a family household, information that missionaries deemed more useful to women. Even in this early period, Protestant missionaries imposed a gendered view of Hawaiian women’s responsibilities in a family setting.

Nevertheless, in the domains of sexuality and independence, American missionaries were initially remarkably gender-neutral and gender-inclusive in the language they used to discuss adultery and other sexual activity. Male missionaries often wrote abstractly about moral deviance without singling out Hawaiian men or women specifically. For example, a missionary in Lahaina, reflecting the language used by many of his peers, complained of the frequency of “violation of the marriage contract & laws of chastity.” Gender inclusive language was also the norm in this period. Male pronouns did not stand in for a supposed universal. Rather, preachers used both male and female pronouns when discussing adultery. In one typical passage, a missionary in his 1840 report from Kaumakapili criticized those who “forsake their husbands & their wives.” This kind of gender
neutrality and gender inclusivity when discussing adultery and sexual deviance is particularly notable in the pre-1850 period because there were so few mentions of only men or only women being the primary instigators of immorality. The missionaries were egalitarian in their criticism.

Another hallmark of the discourse in the early missionary reports was the depiction of Hawaiian women as independent and possessing sexual agency. These representations are most clear in the missionaries’ reports about specific women who left the church or their husbands as a result of immoral actions. In an 1835 report from Lahaina, “the case of the Princess” occupies several paragraphs of discussion. The report discussed “her fall in July last” when she descended into “wicked conduct.” A pastor visited her and, temporarily, she agreed to rejoin the church. However, after multiple promises and instructions forbidding “every kind of immorality” in her female servants, “she again plunged into her former excesses,” though “in a more private manner than before.” She was subsequently excommunicated from the church. Sexuality is never explicitly mentioned in this narrative, but it is unlikely that alcohol consumption, the only other frequent target of missionary criticism, was the sole source of her “wicked conduct.” Missionaries would not have used language like “her fall” to describe the event and alcohol consumption, while disapproved of, would not have merited multiple pages of narrative. Other reports frequently criticized chiefly men and women for publicly flouting missionary-imposed sexual mores. More importantly, if we accept that the princess’s “wicked conduct” involved disapproved sexual activities, then it is clear that missionaries tacitly acknowledged the princess’s sexual desire.

This acknowledgement of female sexual desire is even clearer in the case of the excommunication of a female church member in Kailua in 1833. According to the report, she “is a person of uncommon talents; who learned to read in two weeks.” Initially, the school’s teachers thought “she was sincere in the commencement of her religious course.” However, after some time the missionaries discovered that she had been secretly living in opposition to the church’s teachings. “Suffice it to say, that the power of gin, and the doctrine that adultery was no sin if it could be concealed, overcame the scruples of three other women,” the report explained. Again, we see a case where a woman chose to ignore the church’s teachings on sexuality and induced several other women to do the same. Missionaries thus placed blame, and therefore agency, squarely on the women. They never mentioned the presumed men with whom the women had committed this “adultery.” In these narratives, of which there are many more in the pre-1850 period, missionaries often depicted women as “wicked” influences on their parishes congregations, but in doing so they made women’s sexual agency and independence undeniable.
The female sexuality evident in the early period contrasts markedly with similar anecdotes several decades later, when missionaries reported sexual encounters involving females without any sense of agency. The encounters simply happened to women or involved women, but the actors were men, reflecting a growing American view that women had less innate sexual desire. The best example of this difference appeared in an 1863 report from Hana. The report contains an account of a wife travelling with her husband’s brother to Lahaina, where they became “habitual paramours.” When the husband found out, he forbade his brother from entering his house and engaged him in a fight. Nowhere did the account discuss the wife’s sexuality. She was simply a character in a story about a fight between two brothers. In the same report, the missionary discovered one of his Hawaiian male teachers sneaking into the missionary’s house to visit the teacher’s “betrothed girl.” When the missionary caught him, the teacher was “profligate and importunate in his penitence and self-reproach.” Nowhere was the “betrothed” girl’s apology discussed or solicited by the preacher. These kinds of male-centered accounts of sexual deviance were rare before 1850, and the female-centered accounts all but disappeared in the later missionary reports.

In fact, missionary accounts after 1850 reflected a new and higher moral standard for Hawaiian women. One missionary in a report from Kohala in 1859 discussed the moral state of Hawaii, but when discussing sexual practices, he singled out women almost entirely. He lamented the fact that “there does not exist a Hawaiian girl above the age of puberty who has not fallen. Few, I am sure, if any get beyond the period of school attendance with unsoiled honor.” The virginity of Hawaiian girls was clearly much more of a concern than the sexual practices of males, given that he did not even discuss them in his report. Female virginity was his sole concern. Similarly, in an 1860 report from Waimea, a missionary devoted an entire section to “Doubts & fears & anxieties.” In the section, he asked, “Besides what have all past efforts to educate & civilize & christianize accomplished? especially for young females?” He continued, “Has it not been asserted that they have utterly failed to make them virtuous?” Again, the specific concern over female sexuality and purity is apparent. It is also clear that the missionaries’ concern is no longer directed equally at men and women as it was before 1850. Echoing ideas of female sexual purity in the United States and the theme of the fallen woman, missionaries expected Hawaiian women to exhibit less sexual desire than men and, when describing sexual events, focused almost exclusively on male sexuality.
Conclusion

It is clear that there were several clear changes in how American missionaries perceived Hawaiian female sexuality and how they hoped to influence it. The way American missionaries perceived Hawaiians changed gradually but noticeably, with cautious optimism in the 1830s about Hawaiians’ receptiveness to Protestant morality shifting to pessimism in the 1860s about the ineffectiveness of missionary work and the moral decay of Hawaiian society. The change in missionary perception of Hawaiians accompanied a move by American missionaries into commercial activities previously held only by foreign merchants, suggesting that the new, profit-oriented goals of missionaries influenced their perceptions of Hawaiians. As missionaries became increasingly involved in Hawaii’s plantation-based export economy, their perceptions of the morals of Hawaiians, who would be their laborers, became more consistently negative.

Missionaries’ opinion of and reliance on the law to regulate Hawaiian sexuality also shifted during these same decades. As American missionaries became more pessimistic about their ability to change Hawaiian society, they also became increasingly reliant on the legislation and prosecution to impose their moral reforms. As the project of Hawaiian colonization progressed, an Anglo-American legal system supplanted previous systems of law, enabling missionaries and other foreigners to better influence Hawaiian legislation and prosecution.

The last clear change was in the way American missionary men described Hawaiian women’s sexual agency in their reports. While reports before 1850 generally described Hawaiian women in similar terms to Hawaiians’ men with regards to adultery and fornication, later reports made a clear differentiation between men and women. Reflecting changing ideas in the United States about women’s sexuality and sexual purity, missionaries began to ignore Hawaiian women’s sexual desire and to hold them to a higher moral standard than Hawaiian men. All of these changes in discourse demonstrate the ways economic and legal conditions in the islands, as well as ideas from the United States, could have a real effect on American missionaries’ perception of their work and the people they hoped to convert.
ENDNOTES:

1 Report from Hilo, 1832, Missionary Letters and Mission Station Reports, 1822-1865, Hawaiian Mission Children’s Society Archives. Hawaii Mission Children’s Society, Honolulu, HI. (will be referred to as MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives)
3 Ibid., 47.
7 Ralston, “Changes in the Lives.”
8 Kashay, “Agents of Imperialism.”
10 Report from Hilo, 1832 and Report from Waimea, 1832, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
11 Report from Waimea, 1835, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
12 Report from Waialua, 1833, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
13 Report from Ewa, 1836, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
14 Report from Waialua, 1856, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
15 Report from Kaneohe, 1858-1859, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
16 Report from Hilo, 1861, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
17 Report from Hana, 1863, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
18 Report from Kohala, 1860-1, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
19 Report from Hilo, 1856, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
20 Report from Kohala, 1859, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
21 Report from Hilo, 1860, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
22 Report from Lahaina, 1864, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
23 Report from Waialua, 1856, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
25 Ibid.
26 Report from Kohala,1860-1, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
27 Merry, Colonizing Hawaii, 221.
28 Report from Lahaina, 1846, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
29 Report from Waimea, 1837, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.
30 Report from Lahaina, 1835, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives. For more on the princess, see the following section.
31 Kashay, “Agents of Imperialism.”
32 Merry, Colonizing Hawaii, 242.
Missionary Discourse on Hawaiian Female Sexuality

33 Ibid., 246-51. Merry’s study lacks data on the number of prosecutions for adultery before the 1850s. Even when data starts to become available about prosecutions, it is clear that the ban on prostitution had limited impact. Merry reports that the earliest court figures from 1838 show surprisingly few cases on prostitution. Even in Honolulu in the 1844 and 1845 when prostitution was common, there were only twenty prostitution cases in court records. In the same period, 83 cases of adultery were recorded in Honolulu. Merry’s study suggests that prostitution was always a relatively under-prosecuted crime in Hawaii’s Anglo-American legal system, even as adultery and fornication prosecutions increased. Ibid., 226.


35 For legal statistics, see Merry, Colonizing Hawai‘i, 226-8.

36 Report from Hana, 1841, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.

37 Report from Kau, 1846, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.

38 Report from Kaluahaa, 1840, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.

39 Merry, Colonizing Hawai‘i, 246-51. Merry’s study lacks data on the number of prosecutions for adultery before the 1850s.

40 Report from Waimea, 1852, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.

41 Report from Lahaina, 1851, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.

42 Report from Lahaina, 1864, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.

43 Report from Hau‘ula, 1862, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.

44 Ibid., 225-7.


46 Report from Molokai, 1839, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.

47 Report from Lahaina, 1837, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.

48 Report from Kaumakapili, 1840, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.

49 Report from Lahaina, 1835, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.

50 Report from Kailua, 1833, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.

51 Report from Hana, 1863, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.

52 Report from Kohala, 1859, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.

53 Report from Waimea, 1860, MLMS Reports, HMCS Archives.

54 Also consulted:


Most of us have never seen or tasted quince. It is virtually obsolete in the infinite spectrum of contemporary food. Peter Johnston’s essay on quince, written for my class on “Coffee, Sugar, and Chocolate: Commodities and Consumption in World History, 1200-1800,” marvelously restores quince to the historical palate by describing its role in medieval and early modern cooking, where food and medicine were not readily distinguishable. He treats the cookbook as a historical artifact in which ingredients appear and disappear over time, and our understanding of the purpose of eating also changes. We still eat to feel healthy and we continue to calibrate the varied effects of different ingredients on the body. At the same time, our understanding of the body itself has changed. We do not inhabit humoral bodies with their concerns about an excess of one humor or another in need of rebalancing through diet. However, Johnston’s coda on current research on the antioxidant properties of quince serves as a reminder that somewhere between experience, commonsense, and modern medical science lie some interesting truths that potentially bind a diet we have discarded, filled with quaintly obsolete foodstuffs, and the more unusual ingredients in today’s pharmacopeia. This project makes you want to taste the past.
Quince:
The “Drugification” of Medicine
and the Decline of Commodities

Peter Johnston

Medieval and Renaissance cookbooks provide an excellent reference point with which to compare the culinary standards of today with those of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The product is quite different: early modern Europeans prepared all sorts of amorphous blended dishes – jellies, pottages, gruels, sauces – from ingredients like goat kids’ feet and capon wings, and early modern Europeans put quite literally everything into pies. However, nearly all of the non-meat ingredients in common use at the time are very recognizable to the modern cook–Gaia created precious few new plant and animal species for use in gastronomy in the last five hundred years. A few oft-mentioned ingredients like verjuice, the highly acidic juice from unripe grapes and other sour fruit, are not nearly as common today as they once were; in contrast, these cookbooks also feature what may appear to be thoroughly “modern” goods like almond milk–called “Creme de Almaundys” in a fifteenth century English cookbook.¹

In the formidable treatise of Master Chiquart, the head cook for the Duke of Savoy, only a few non-meat² names in recipes are unfamiliar, such as galangal, hyssop, quince, rosewater, sandalwood, and sorrel. What traits do these ingredients share? Why are these ingredients so rare today when their companion ingredients, like pomegranate or apple, are commonplace? In particular, why did the quince, a fruit that appears as a peer to the apple and the pear, decline to its present status as a niche fruit? In this paper, I focus on the story of the quince to argue that these once-common goods fell from popularity as the Galenic understanding of medicine declined. Since these ingredients derived most of their value from their Galenic properties, their other properties were not sufficiently compelling to ensure their continued popularity.

Before investigating these curious ingredients, I first pause to examine the broader context of these cookbooks and medicine in early modern Europe. I hesitate to use the word “cookbook,” for the late medieval and early modern cookbook is a much different beast than contemporary cookbooks. The primary audience for a familiar cookbook of our time is the prototypical householder, to serve as a guide for essentially amateur cooking. The medieval or early modern cookbook, on the other hand, was not even written for a cook. Instead, the professional cook in service of a member of the aristocracy learned his repertoire in an apprenticeship and later
Quince wrote down a collection of recipes for archival purposes. These archives form the basis for the cookbooks here investigated. As a result, these cookbooks only offer a view into the culinary practices of Europe’s élite – in fact, one of their important roles was to serve as evidence of the resident lord’s lavish and decadent lifestyle for the benefit of posterity. The fare of commoners largely escaped documentation. The common diet consisted primarily of dishes such as pottage—a thick, homogenous vegetable slop prepared, stewed over an open flame, and eaten over the course of several days, with new additions of ingredients constantly changing the nature of the stew. Commoner cooking was mostly the simple matter of making raw ingredients edible, not an artistic endeavor; it needed no guides.

The main users of these “cookbooks” were instead the household steward and kitchen clerk, if the lord’s house was wealthy and large enough to possess a clerk. The cookbook served as a compendium to assist the steward in planning meals and ordering food to stock the larder. Given the steward’s role in promoting the well-being of the house’s lord, it is perhaps no surprise to find these authors frequently discussing the humoral qualities of their ingredients and product so often. “Food” and “drug” as two separate entities is a relatively recent development in Western intellectual tradition. As an indigestible, food was understood in the early modern period to affect health and well-being in a very medical sense. As such, the cooks of the time period worked closely with house doctors and pharmacists to ensure that the food on the table preserved the well being of the lord and his guests.

In the second book of his treatise On Right Pleasure and Good Health, the Italian Renaissance authority Platina discusses the culinary and medicinal properties of various contemporary foodstuffs. In his discourse, Platina makes no distinction between food and medicine; rather, he writes assuming every food behaves like medicine, since every food has humoral qualities that affect the well-being of the body. Thus, his guide takes care to discuss every ingredient’s and every dish’s Galenic properties in order to prevent an inauspicious concoction. For instance, Platina suggested serving sweet pears as a first course, “since they are juice [sic] and tasty, and balanced between coolness and warmth.” Acidic and astringent pears, for contrast, are to be reserved for the second course “because they are binding if eaten as a first course, which is contrary to good health.” Platina also discusses a more unambiguously pharmacological use of pear: “the seeds of pears, however, when ground up with honey and given on an empty stomach, relieve pain in the liver.”

Two entries later, after pomegranates but before peaches and dates, Platina discusses the quince, the Cydonia apple, reflected in its taxonomic name *cydonia oblonga*. Platina mentions that raw quince is used to treat those with dysentery, the choleric, and those who are spitting blood. When cooked and eaten as a first course, “they constipate the bowel and remove
digestion and lubrication from the stomach unless they are cut in half...after a meal, they seal the stomach and help digestion. They move the bowels, if they have been eaten too greedily”.

Other authors similarly discuss the medical properties of their products. Master Chiquart devotes an entire section of his *Cookery* to dishes for the sick. In a recipe for a cullis\(^{10}\), Master Chiquart calls for a mortar “that doesn’t smell in the slightest of garlic” and enjoins the cook to “[not] put in any spices unless it is by the order of the doctor.”\(^{11}\) In a recipe for a white dish of capons, he also warns the cook to be “very careful about the salt, and not put any spice into it without the doctor’s orders.”\(^{12}\) Master Chiquart, like other accomplished professional cooks, knows that spices are primarily pharmaceutical in nature despite their ubiquity in the culinary arts.

Spices thus neatly fit into this Galenic framework. Most spices commonly used during this period—mustard, pepper, cinnamon, cloves, or nutmeg, to name a few—were thought to be warm and dry. They were thus ideally suited to accompany cold and moist foodstuffs, like animal livers.\(^{13}\) Indeed, in a pastry recipe calling for poultry gizzards and livers, Master Chiquart calls for a good deal of spices without mentioning particular spices—such specificity is unnecessary so long as a competent cook is preparing the pastry, since any decent cook has the sense to pick warm and dry spices.\(^{14}\)

This Galenic approach extended to process as well as product. In order to avoid humoral imbalances, cooks needed to use cooking techniques that tended to neutralize the inherent imbalances in the product. For instance, cold and moist meats like fish ought to be fried or oven baked, hot and moist meats like pork were to be roasted, and hot and dry meats like beef should be boiled.\(^{15}\) This tempered the humoral qualities of the ingredients, ensuring that the boarders ended the meal well-balanced and in good health.

As a result, early modern Europeans could very easily and naturally treat food as a medicinal agent. Since an imbalance of humors causes illness, a deliberately imbalanced food preparation could serve as a remedy. Cookbooks announce some of their recipes or goods as particularly suitable to patients afflicted with certain illnesses of individuals of particular temperaments. For instance, Platina calls for tart cherries to “cut phlegm, repress yellow bile, quench thirst, and stimulate the appetite”.\(^{16}\) Tart cherries, thus, are useful for treating situations indicative of an excess of the choleric, warm and dry yellow bile, like impatience and irritability.

In addition to the prevalence of humoral theory in these medieval cookbooks, examining what sorts of commodities appear in the books yields interesting insights. Since most of these books either predate 1492 or soon follow Columbus’s voyages to the Western Hemisphere, these books largely lack American culinary goods—*capsicum* peppers, chocolate, avocado, potatoes, squash, maize, tomatoes, and the like. In terms of meats, we see a much broader variety of product: early modern Europeans ate swans, game birds,
goat, rabbit, porcupine, lamprey, doves, or peacock in addition to twenty-first century culinary staples like pork, beef, or fish.\textsuperscript{17} Pork is particularly prevalent in these cookbooks, since pigs, which happily forage on organic garbage and require very little attention, were very easy and cheap to raise. Beef, by contrast, was comparatively rare, since cattle were much more labor intensive to raise and had much better uses as draught animals and milk producers. Early modern Europeans could also be described as opportunistic environmentalists, consuming quite literally the whole animal—ears, lungs, brain, marrow, liver, tongue, testicles—leaving only the bones.\textsuperscript{18}

These Europeans also evidently had very strong digestive systems: copious amounts of spices, like pepper, ginger, cloves, garlic, cinnamon, verjuice, and vinegar, appear in all sorts of dishes. One English cookery book has a cinnamon soup recipe.\textsuperscript{19} We also see goods that are presently experiencing a renaissance, like ground almonds made into almond milk.\textsuperscript{20}

The cookbooks offer a murkier view into the use of herbivorous products. As discussed previously, the cookbooks here examined were all products of upper class households; the types of recipes found in these books reflect the diet of the top echelons of society. In addition, many of the books were written for house stewards and agents purchasing goods for the larder; simple recipes that any chef worth his salt would know do not appear. As such, these books are lacking in vegetable-centric recipes, considered inferior to meats by the gentry served by these cookbooks, as well as the simple common fare consumed by house staff.\textsuperscript{21}

Nonetheless, there are enough vegetables in the recipes to give a good sense of the sorts of vegetables late medieval cooks used. Unlike the great diversity of meats and the parts thereof, the list of common vegetables would be quite familiar to the modern cook: onions and its relatives (garlic, leeks, chives), parsley, peas, beans, spinach, turnips, barley, oats, wheat, almonds, apples, grapes, pears, plums, pomegranate, cinnamon, cloves, nutmeg and mace, pepper, sugar, etc.\textsuperscript{22} To take his book as a generally representative example of similar contemporary cookbooks, in Master Chiquart’s listing of edible ingredients, only a few stand out as unfamiliar: hyssop, sorrel, quince, and chicory. What are these goods?

Hyssop is a minty, bitter herb native to the Cilician and Pamphylian mountains of southern Turkey. It has a long history as a medicinal herb to treat cough and chest pain; Platina mentions it for such uses in a list of medicines in his third book.\textsuperscript{23} Hyssop also finds use by perfumers, apiarists, and distillers of absinthe.\textsuperscript{24} Sorrel is a sharply acidic, sour green leafy vegetable related to rhubarb and buckwheat. Sorrel is similar to rhubarb in many ways, sharing a very tart stalk, poisonous oxalic acid, and a long history as a medicinal agent. Sorrel is relatively obscure in the Anglophone world, but enjoys greater popularity in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Scandinavia,
Hungary, and Russia. La Varenne, a French cook, used sorrel in many of his lean pottages alongside more familiar names like lettuce and chard.

Quince is a strongly aromatic relative of the pear and apple native to Iran and the Caspian region, bearing its fruit from summer to late autumn. Notably, raw quince is all but unpalatable; its astringent properties due to its high tannin content induce a powerful arid mouthfeel. When cooked, however, quince develops a rich flavor and turns a delightful shade of pale apricot to carnelian. Quince, too, has a long use in medicine and is also very hardy, capable of surviving cultivation in climates as frigid as Scotland. Indeed, quince appears in a fifteenth century English cookery, indicating local cultivation. Lastly, chicory, *Cichorium intybus*, is a group of plants native to the Mediterranean region, related to lettuce. It includes the food-stuffs known as escarole, endive, radicchio, and Witloof. Its textured, bitter leaves with pointy edges are very common in grocery arrangements of salad greens. Chicory appears in Pliny’s writings as a purgative agent.

These plants (and rhubarb, incidentally) all have two qualities in common: they have medicinal value in the Galenic framework, their raw state is “less approachable” (bitter, unpalatable, unfriendly, etc) than similar goods, and they have all declined to niche culinary goods, on par with cardoon, feijoa, shishito peppers, epazote, kohlrabi, and other produce in the specialty section of the grocery store. Even chicory, though popular in salad greens, enjoys its status in relative anonymity; its identity diluted by its presentation in salad green packages and not as its own vegetable. I argue that their decline to obscurity is a result of the rise of medicine as a category distinct from food.

Quince is an excellent, illustrative example. To a society operating in the Galenic medical framework, the quince stands apart from other Eurasian fruit for its medical properties. The medical profession held a longstanding apprehension about the medicinal safety of fruit considered moist, which comprises most common fruit. Platina, for instance, says the following about grapes: “It is agreed by all authors that figs and well-matured grapes are less unhealthy than other fruits which are eaten raw, and eaten as a first course, they cause almost no harm.” Note that Platina says that the *safest* of fruits causes almost no harm. By contrast, nuts, dried fruit, and bitter or sour fruit – like bitter orange or quince—were useful in antiseptic, astringent, andidiarrœtic, or hydrating therapy. Indeed, in his listing of 218 different recipes for the sick, Bartolmeo Scappi, the papal cook, devotes six to quince, noting its utility as an astringent agent. Similarly, Master Chiquart describes two preparations of quince in his own listing of preparations for the sick. As mentioned above, Platina prescribes them for diarrhea, the choleric, and those with dysentery. Quince thus saw quite a bit of use as a medicine.
Unlike rhubarb, quince’s horticultural properties place it in a position to be a pan-European fruit. Though it is native to Iran and the Caspian area, it is successfully cultivated from the warm, pleasant Mediterranean to cold, frigid Scotland. However, like rhubarb, quince fruit is very sensitive to its growing conditions. The wild quince still found in its native habitat of Iran produce a “moderately edible fruit with a sweetish flavor.” By contrast, in other areas like Mediterranean Europe, horticulturalists have been utterly unable to cultivate quince that is edible fresh; instead, the quince must be cooked for several hours before it can be tolerably eaten.

Due to its difficulty as a fruit compared to its peers—apples, pears, pomegranates, pears, and other easy-to-eat fruit—the quince only maintained its culinary status as a result of its medicinal value. Thus, as attitudes towards medicine shifted over the next several centuries and as medicine became a separate category of “thing” from food, the quince and similar foods found themselves in a vulnerable position.

Interestingly, the segregation of things into food and medicine had already begun by this time. After discussing the various medicinal properties of foodstuffs, Platina makes an offhanded yet revealing remark when discussing milk: “The same milk, however, is not given by all animals. I omit woman’s milk, which we use only in medicine.” Thus, even in a world where cooks took extreme pains to arrange meals in a salubrious manner and philosophers wrote treatises on the medicinal properties of foodstuffs, some goods—namely human breast milk—had a clear and unambiguous role as medicine alone.

As the centuries wore on, this separation deepened. Monahan’s essay on rhubarb provides an excellent case study of the fate of a one-time wonder drug. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, rhubarb was one of the most important international trade goods. In Europe, it was a medical panacea; apothecaries prescribed hundreds of thousands of tons of the stuff. Its medicinal value was such that the Russian crown monopolized, carefully regulated, and greatly profited from the rhubarb trade for over a century. Yet since the twentieth century, rhubarb is little known except in pies and in other select desserts, earning it the rather sad nickname “pie plant”. True, rhubarb still found use as a laxative as late as the nineteenth century—the Chinese emperor even threatened to halt rhubarb exports to Britain to discourage British opium smuggling around the time of the Opium Wars—but its reign as an international trade good had faded.

Though rhubarb was almost exclusively medicinal while quince was primarily culinary, in other ways, quince and rhubarb are remarkably alike: they both found widespread use as medicinal agents, they both originate from the East, and they both are intimidating for cooks, owing to rhubarb’s toxicity and quince’s unpalatable raw state. These goods share these qualities with the aforementioned hyssop and sorrel, both of which appear
in primarily medical contexts in these cookbooks and both of which are relatively bitter and unpleasant in their raw state.

In the late nineteenth century, as Pasteur’s germ theory of disease displaced humoral and miasma theory and the field of epidemiology was born, quince, rhubarb, and similar goods found themselves increasingly marginalized. Given their general difficulty as ingredients in the kitchen compared to their friendlier substitutes—apples and pears for quince, lettuce and chard for sorrel and chicory, mint and pseudoephedrine for hyssop, to take some examples—I argue that their diminished popularity today is a direct result of the shift in Western medicine to pharmaceuticals. These goods’ primary perceived value derived from the medicinal value, so when pharmaceuticals made these herbal goods obsolete as medicine, their culinary value could not sustain their popularity.

Their obscurity, however, may yield delayed benefits in the form of a cornucopia of compounds for modern medical science to investigate. Current medical research, including a study on the antioxidant properties of quince, examines the pharmokinetics of compounds found in these goods. Quince and other goods of bygone popularity may just contain compounds and properties that prove useful in modern Western medicine. Early modern Europeans certainly found medicinal use in these goods; perhaps we may be as fortunate.
ENDNOTES

2 An entire book could be devoted to the diversity of meats found in these cookbooks.
4 Ibid.
5 Galenic medicine is a holistic approach to medicine, treating maladies as the result of an imbalance of four bodily “humors”.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 143, 145.
10 coyleys: a liquid preparation that retains the qualities of its ingredients in an easily digestible form. Its closest modern analogue would be the smoothie.
12 Ibid., 265–266.
14 Scully, Du fait de cuisine, 216–218.
15 Ibid., 44–46.
16 Milham, Platina: On Right Pleasure and Good Health, 123.
17 Scully, Du fait de cuisine, 304.
18 Scully, The Opera of Bartolomeo Scappi, 3–7.
19 Austin, Two Fifteenth-Century Cookery-Books, 59.
20 Ibid., 71.
22 Scully, Du fait de cuisine, 304.
23 Milham, Platina: On Right Pleasure and Good Health, 207.
28 Austin, Two Fifteenth-Century Cookery-Books.
30 Milham, Platina: On Right Pleasure and Good Health, 139.
31 Scully, Du fait de cuisine, 258.
32 Scully, The Opera of Bartolomeo Scappi, 603–605, 607.
33 Milham, Platina: On Right Pleasure and Good Health, 143.
37 Monahan, “Locating rhubarb: early modernity’s relevant obscurity.”
38 Ibid., 243.
Introduction by Professor Steven Zipperstein

Cole Manley’s paper is a masterful exercise in historical reconstruction, a meticulously sketched portrait of the drama — political, interpersonal, and otherwise — of the making of the “March on Washington” so linked in the popular imagination with Martin Luther King but whose organizer was the lavishly talented, now little known Bayard Rustin. Manley knows well how to fill in the rooms in which the March was planned without sidelining King, certainly, but while also including vivid, persuasive portraits, based on extensive archival research, of the other, crucial historical actors. The picture he paints of Rustin reveals that Manley has all the skills of a first-rate, budding historian: Rustin is never reduced to a simple, discrete cluster of characteristics (Gay, erstwhile Communist, etc) but, rather, he emerges as a brilliant strategist, at once impulsive and cautious, idealistic and practical, a figure of great talent pushed into the shadows because of the bigotries that inflected even the progressive circles at the forefront the Civil Rights movement.
On the cover of the September 6, 1963 edition of *Life* magazine, Bayard Rustin stands next to his life-long friend and mentor, A. Philip Randolph. The two civil rights leaders pose with the Lincoln Monument looming behind them just nine days after 250,000 people listened to Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom. The March is celebrated as a defining moment of the Civil Rights movement, and Rustin achieves national recognition as the organizer behind its success. For the March’s 50th anniversary in 2013, CNN recalled it as “momentous,” “historic,” and “pivotal.” The March has become an almost mythic event, a spontaneous convergence of blacks and whites upon Washington, DC. Most commonly, we remember it as the day King shared with us his Dream.

While the March is now almost exclusively immortalized as the day of King’s speech, it was the byproduct of exhaustive planning which was mostly in the hands of an unsung hero: Bayard Rustin. An openly homosexual African-American with former Communist ties, Rustin was an unlikely choice to organize the March. At the time, homosexuality was taboo and went unmentioned in African-American circles and American society at large. Moreover, given this was the height of the Cold War, the nation and its leadership had a residual and sometimes virulent distrust of communism. Rustin faced acrimony and critique from not only Southern segregationists—who assumed he was organizing a Communist takeover of America—but also from fellow civil rights leaders uncomfortable with his sexual orientation and wary of the effects his leadership would have on the movement.

In the decades since the March, King’s dream eclipsed the day-to-day realities that allowed his words to take shape, and little was written about Rustin. In the late 90s and early 2000s, the biographies of Rustin by Jervis Anderson (1997) and John D’Emilio (2003), and the documentary film, *Brother Outsider*, led historians to rethink the March and Rustin’s role in its success. Yet even recent scholarship has overlooked how Rustin managed to organize the March while he also balanced the demands of competing civil rights organizations and personal attacks on his character—all within eight weeks. The broad brushstrokes Anderson and D’Emilio have used in painting Rustin’s life give us an important overview of his 60 years
of activism, but they do little to help us understand why he deserves recognition for the March when he was so politically marginalized for his sexual orientation and political ties.

This paper is an attempt to hone our understanding of Rustin and the March, and, in turn, the Civil Rights movement, by moving from the conception of the March, in December of 1962, to its consummation, on August 28, 1963. The existing body of literature on Rustin does not consider with enough specificity the organizational minutes and record for the March, leaving up for debate the dynamics of his organizing. With a finer lens and narrower scope, I will analyze the writings, correspondence, and personal interviews of Rustin, in conversation with secondary scholarship—including biographies, films, and articles—in order to grasp how exactly he organized the March.

What made Rustin nationally memorialized on the cover of Life? I argue that in the lead up to August 28, Rustin’s greatest achievements as Mr. March on Washington were twofold. First, Rustin balanced the diverse political goals and competitiveness of the various civil rights organizations and leaders involved. Second, with the help of his great ally, A. Philip Randolph, he challenged attacks on his personal character and ability from some of the very same leaders, as well as from outsiders to the movement.
Dreaming up the March: From Radicalism to Compromise

In the early planning for the March, Rustin and Randolph conceived of an event which would highlight the economic plight of African-Americans and civil disobedience rather than civil rights. The idea for the March had emerged out of conversations between the two men in December of 1962. With unemployment rampant among African-Americans, both agreed that the March should be centered on economic justice and jobs. Soon thereafter, Rustin devised a “Washington Action Program,” a radical framework which called for civil disobedience and petitioning within the US Capitol. These early plans changed as Rustin and Randolph established a broader coalition of supportive civil rights organizations.

In order to broaden their outreach, Rustin and Randolph emphasized more moderate goals and ideological flexibility. In the spring of 1963, Randolph unveiled their proposals to the National Urban League and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), while Rustin spoke with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE), and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The outcome of these talks was decidedly mixed. Randolph failed to receive the support of the Urban League’s Whitney Young and the NAACP’s Roy Wilkins. These organizations and their leaders, despite being large and well-funded, were historically conservative, relying on litigation instead of protest to advance the cause of civil and economic rights for African-Americans. Thus, Randolph faced organizations which at first proved unwilling to support the direct action he and Rustin advocated, favoring instead a more moderate approach by resorting to the legal system.

Rustin, on the other hand, secured the support of the SNCC’s John Lewis and the CORE’s James Farmer in the spring of ’63, while the SCLC hesitated. This was partly due to the nature of the organizations Rustin spoke to as compared to Randolph. SNCC and CORE, as opposed to the NAACP and the Urban League, emphasized direct action and preferred protest to politics. In 1960, the two organizations had spearheaded the “Freedom Rides,” which desegregated interstate highways in the South through civil disobedience. SNCC and CORE had a history of supporting initiatives like the March, which aimed to galvanize attention through nonviolent resistance. It was thus easier for Rustin to persuade them to join the March.

Still, by modifying and moderating the objective of the March to convince the remaining organizations to sign on, Rustin showed his skill as an organizer. As late as May 22, just three months before the March, the NAACP, the Urban League, and the SCLC remained noncommittal. But by changing its title to the “March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom”—and
Mr. March on Washington: Bayard Rustin

broadening its focus to include civil, as well as economic, rights—Rustin succeeded in having King and the SCLC sign on. The March would no longer highlight economic injustice alone, and plans for civil disobedience were shelved, but Rustin realized that these were necessary changes in order to compromise with organizations with much different politics and histories. After Rustin widened the message, Randolph managed to persuade the NAACP and the Urban League to support the March as well, creating the “Big Six” coalition in late spring 1963.

At a July 2 meeting with the “Big Six,” A. Philip Randolph named Rustin deputy director, a position fraught with political danger. While the post came with great freedom for Rustin, it also came with great risk, as Rustin had to avoid permanently offending any of the ten major leaders of the civil rights, labor, and religious organizations sponsoring the March. As John D’Emilio noted, “he had to craft a coalition that would hang together despite organizational competition, personal animosities, and often antagonistic politics.” Building a coalition of supporters for the March meant Rustin had to balance competing political demands from various civil rights organizations without sacrificing his vision for the event. Even though these organizations were on board with the March, they remained politically cautious, uncertain as to how exactly their individual goals would mesh with those of the March.

Structuring the March’s Leadership: Rustin’s Political Acumen

Rustin structured the March’s leadership hierarchy to ensure that each civil rights organization had a say in the planning, and that no organization could contend that it was formally unrecognized or that Rustin was acting without its support or oversight. By placating civil rights leaders’ desires to be involved while maintaining his direct control over the day to day planning, Rustin showed political savvy. In a July 2 document to the “Big Six,” Rustin outlined the leadership structure. The “Big Six” would be chairmen, with vice chairmen from religious and labor groups, and each organization would contribute volunteers to coordinate various committees. Such a structure allowed Wilkin’s NAACP and Young’s Urban League to help plan the March through their chairmen and volunteers, instead of granting Rustin absolute discretion, something the two men undoubtedly would have found problematic given Rustin’s homosexuality and former Communist ties.

This structure enabled Rustin to appease the egos of the leaders of the various organizations. As D’Emilio points out, Rustin “had to contend with big egos: those of the ten civil rights, labor, and religious leaders who wanted a say in the arrangements.” If Rustin had attempted to structure the planning committees without adequate representation from the NAACP or the Urban League, these already cautious and moderate organizations may
have renounced their support for the March, greatly weakening the coalition
Rustin and Randolph had woven together. Instead, Rustin recognized that,
formally at least, all of the civil rights organizations would have oversight.
Consequently, he sated the big egos of Wilkins and Young by ensuring that
the civil rights leaders felt respected. Moreover, while modeling a more in-
clusive structure for the leadership, Rustin retained the title of deputy direc-
tor and maintained his organizational authority.

By including other civil rights leaders and organizations as part of
the organizational structure, Rustin made each of them more personally and
institutionally invested in the March. The NAACP and Wilkins, which had
previously been slow to support the March, began funding it much more in
July and August. D’Emilio explains that “[w]hatever his reservations about
Rustin… Wilkins knew that the credibility of the movement was now riding
on the success of the march.” Wilkins recognized that as part of the lead-
ership he had better support Rustin, or else a poorly-attended event would
reflect badly on the NAACP. Rustin’s statement to the “Big Six” on July 2
specifying the leadership hierarchy reflected his ability to balance the egos
of the civil rights leaders and organizations involved.

A Rainbow Coalition: Making the March Nonpartisan

Having won over the major civil rights organizations nationwide,
Rustin next outlined the details of the March itself. In mid-July, he drafted
preliminary memorandums and organizer’s handbooks. From the outset,
he designed these materials to be nonpartisan, which emphasized the mes-
serve of the March—jobs and freedom, not Democrats or Republicans. When
John Sexton of the Young Democratic Club of DC contacted Rustin in early
August about Democrats formally sponsoring the March, Rustin rebuffed
his request by explaining that no political parties were to be listed as offi-
cial partners, and political banners of any stripe were unacceptable. Rustin
further clarified this nonpartisan message with the first official manual for
the March, “Organizing Manual 1,” which was sent to supportive organi-
zations nationwide. In the manual, Rustin reiterated that the March would
emphasize two goals, jobs and freedom, not endorse one party over another.
He wrote that “[a]ll placards to be used on the March will be provided by
the National Office. No other slogans will be permitted.” In taking such a
stance, Rustin connected the March to universal human rights to jobs and
freedom—things that both Democrats and Republicans would support. With
this emphasis, Rustin expanded its purpose and message beyond support for
President John F. Kennedy’s pending civil rights legislation. This was not a
March geared towards passing legislation; it was a March for human rights
and values.
Rustin’s framing of the details of the March, such as disallowing any political slogans, also enabled more organizations to participate without restrictions on political leanings. On August 2, 1963, Dr. Joachim Prinz, president of the liberal American Jewish Congress, alerted Rustin that the Congress would officially sponsor the March, one of the first religious groups to do so. More conservative organizations also signed on. By early August, Rustin had garnered representatives from the six major civil rights groups, the three major faith groups, Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant, and Walter Reuther of labor. The politics of these groups ranged considerably, from the conservatism of the Catholics and the Urban League to the liberalism of the Jewish Congress and SCLC. Yet in structuring the March around human values instead of political parties, Rustin focused on a greater purpose and galvanized more supporters.

**Rustin as Politician: Defining Support for the March**

In personal letters, Rustin convinced more organizations and leaders to sign onto the March by emphasizing that support did not mean one had to endorse every single demand. In an August 7 letter to Barbara Moffett of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Rustin assuaged Moffett’s concerns that her organization would not be able to support the March because of its stance on minimum wage legislation. Though in her August 2 letter she recognized the relationship between civil rights, jobs, and economic injustice, Moffett explained that for the AFSC “the addition of a specific proposal for a minimum wage poses a problem when it comes to making a public statement” in support of such legislation. Supporting such a proposal would have required the AFSC to reach consensus about specific details, a lengthy process which might have prevented their formal support of the March. However, Rustin reassured Moffett that:

> several organizations have shared your concern over the need to differentiate between the broad objectives of the March and the specific demands which may be presented on August 28th…. You should know, and we plan to reiterate, that in general, support of the March on Washington does not necessarily mean support of all of the specific demands of the which have been expressed by the founding organizations. Rather, it means support for the broad objectives and purposes of the March.

This was an important clarification by Rustin, as it reiterated that the March was a call for the broad aims of jobs and freedom, not specific legislation. For Moffett and the AFSC, defending jobs and freedom for African-Amer-
icans would not be problematic. Thus, in framing support as general agreement with the purpose of the March, Rustin empowered more organizations to sign on. After Moffett received his explanation, the AFSC quickly supported the March.23

Across the nation, other groups voiced similar concerns. Rustin’s response so placated these qualms that by August 7 over one-hundred organizations had formally signed on in support of the March.24 Rustin’s ability to define support in a politically nonpartisan way with an emphasis on human rights helped the March tally such impressive figures only several weeks after he was named deputy director.

A second organizing manual prepared by Rustin later in August re-emphasized that the March would unite people behind the call for jobs and freedom, not behind a particular civil rights organization or person. It specified that the “[m]archers will be identifiable by arm bands, lapel pins, or other devices. They will carry only signs that have been approved by the organizing group. No slogans will be chanted and the only song to be sung will be ‘We Shall Overcome.’”25 This ensured that no single group or party would co-opt the March, and that nonpartisan values would take center stage. These mandates also reinforced the message of the March while uniting organizations and people by physical appearance. Rustin rejected more specific, regional messages such as “Michigan needs fair housing law.”26 By favoring more universal, national appeals, Rustin ensured that no one state would overshadow any other.

Rustin’s attention to detail even extended to messages praising its most visible leader, Martin Luther King. In revising the list of approved slo-
gans, Rustin rejected “Labor Supports Dr. Martin Luther King In the Fight for Human Rights.” This was a true test of Rustin’s organizational skill. Rustin quite easily could have allowed labor unions to herald the movement’s leader without acknowledging John Lewis of SNCC or Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, particularly since this specific message held up values over politics. However, this would likely have angered SNCC and the NAACP due to their leaders’ egos. Instead, by enforcing a universal standard that no one, regardless of stature, could be singled out by the marchers, Rustin strengthened the underlying message behind the March and avoided political attacks from the groups involved. When Rustin placed King last in the list of speakers for the March, this was not a political misstep. He did this because “every one of these top ten who were speaking had called me and said, ‘I want you to see to it that I don’t have to follow King.’” In this regard, everyone knew that King deserved the final word. The luminary of the 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott, the 1957 Prayer Pilgrimage, and the 1963 protests in Birmingham, King was the most respected black leader in the nation, and no one wanted to follow his oratory, Rustin included.

**Personal Courage: Balancing Attacks on Rustin’s Character, Skills, and Politics**

While balancing the competing egos and demands of organizations and leaders as varied as Martin Luther King and Barbara Moffett, Rustin also faced constant attacks on his character and leadership. Rustin succeeded in countering these challenges by referencing his record and the facts of his organizing, while also benefiting from the steadfast loyalty of his supporters, especially his closest friend, A. Philip Randolph.

While King emerged as the unanimous choice for closing speaker at the March, the decision to appoint Rustin as its organizer triggered a hotly contested debate. When the “Big Six” met on July 2 to plan for the March, the first question they had to answer was who was going to organize it. Leading off the meeting, NAACP president Roy Wilkins “announced his opposition to Rustin… claiming that he had ‘too many scars,’” a possible reference to Rustin’s homosexuality or his prior Communist ties, or both. Though the African-American community, including the NAACP, was highly homophobic at the time, homosexuality in African-American circles was taboo and was hardly ever spoken about. Wilkins was not alone in his vehement opposition to Rustin. As James Haskins explains, Whitney Young of the Urban League was also “adamantly against Rustin’s holding any public position. His past communist ties, his socialism, his conscientious-objector status during World War II, and his known homosexuality would be used against the march.” King and Farmer, meanwhile, though they knew of
Rustin’s organizational skills, agreed with Wilkins and Young.\textsuperscript{32} In an April 3, 1985 interview with Ed Ewin, Rustin recounted that:

Mr. Wilkins turned to Martin King and said, ‘Martin, what do you think?’ Well one of the problems—as I must have told you or will tell you later—is that one of the defects of Dr. King was that he simply could not function in a meeting where Roy Wilkins was present. Therefore Martin, instead of speaking up says, “Well, I don’t know. I’d like to hear what the rest of you think.”\textsuperscript{33}

In this recollection, Rustin thought King’s inability to defend him as an organizer stemmed not from any personal animosity or doubts about Rustin’s skill, but from some sort of paralysis whenever King was in a meeting with Wilkins. Though there is some discrepancy as to exactly how King agreed with Wilkins and Young, and if he did in fact,\textsuperscript{34} most sources agree that at the very least King was “noncommittal” about Rustin.\textsuperscript{35} Most likely, King, like Wilkins, saw Rustin as too politically dangerous to run the March.

Opposition to Rustin proved intense. However, Randolph showed his lifelong trust in Rustin by refusing to cede to Wilkins’ and Young’s demands. Instead, when someone suggested Randolph as the director of the March, he agreed on one condition: that Rustin serve as his deputy director. Rustin thereby became the de facto organizer of the March. Wilkins admitted that he had been outmaneuvered, but, privately, the leaders still mistrusted Rustin, and King “expressed ongoing reservations about Rustin’s assuming such a public role.”\textsuperscript{36} King did not think that Rustin could handle the political attacks he would face as deputy director, and he was also slightly homophobic and distrustful of Rustin. These reservations surfaced in a conversation between King and his legal advisor Clarence Jones secretly recorded by the FBI in early August, during which the two men joked:

‘I hope Bayard don’t take a drink before the march,’ Jones stated… ‘Yes,’ King replied. ‘And grab one little brother. ‘Cause he will grab one when he has a drink.’\textsuperscript{37}

Formally, Rustin had the support of the “Big Six.” But informally, some remained skeptical of his character and professionalism.

The July 2 meeting of leaders showcased some of the ongoing questions about his communist past and his sexual orientation that would continue to haunt Rustin. In the meeting, these questions were probably never voiced, but instead took the form of unacknowledged understandings, such as Wilkins’ reference to Rustin’s scars. Yet the meeting also revealed his greatest defender, Randolph. Since Rustin was not present during this
July 2 meeting, Randolph had to speak up for him. As someone the “Big Six” respected for his long career as a civil rights organizer, Randolph had the moral and political capital necessary to defend his choice as deputy director. A more public attack on Rustin came two weeks before the March and would not be left unchallenged.

When the segregationist Senator Strom Thurmond took to the Senate floor in early August and alleged that Rustin was a Communist infiltrator planning a takeover of the United States, Rustin was prepared. In response, Rustin used the March literature he wrote and his organizational pedigree to convince the public of his character and standing. In a public statement from August 14, Rustin dismissed Thurmond’s accusations of his Communist sympathies, highlighting that he was:

not now and never have been a member of the Communist Party. More than twenty years ago, while a student at the City College of New York, I was a member of the Young Communist League [YCL]... [then] the League instructed me to stop agitating for integration of the Armed Forces on the grounds that this impaired the war effort. I have never been willing to subordinate the just demands of my people to the foreign or domestic policy of any nation. I did not then, and I do not now... Accordingly, I left the YCL in 1941.

Rustin delegitimized Thurmond’s claim by citing the fundamental reason he left the organization: the YCL subordinated the demands of African-Americans, and the March was about raising up these demands. Thus, in contrast to the YCL, Rustin showed how his organizing of the March underscored his belief in justice for African-Americans, not in communism. Rustin further denied Thurmond’s charge and noted his organizational record by highlighting that:

[i]n recent years, I have served as Executive Secretary of the War Resisters League [WRL]... [and] an editor of a monthly magazine, Liberation... [and] in both positions I have given abundant and public demonstration of my opposition to totalitarianism and undemocratic elements everywhere.

By revealing his involvement in the WRL and Liberation, Rustin referenced the organizational experience he had in mobilizing the masses. This experience came not from communist organizing, but from anti-totalitarian and anti-war activism.
Rustin further buttressed these claims to the “Big Six” in an August 16 memorandum to Randolph when he considered the charge of communism an “insult” to his leadership. On Thurmond’s charge that the March would lead to communism, Rustin responded that “our March does have implications transcending the immediate questions of race and jobs, but there is nothing underhanded or dishonest about this.” Instead of reacting with outrage and emotion, Rustin calmly denied Thurmond’s claim without minimizing the scope of the March. Rustin simply reiterated that one of the March’s goals was to address economic injustice facing African-Americans. This was not a Communist plot, nor was this a change in direction. This was in all of the literature Rustin had distributed nationwide, and, indeed, in the title of the March itself. While Rustin acknowledged that the March’s broad ideals of social justice and human freedom were shared by communists, the event would not be a Communist coup. He pointed out that “the question of Communist infiltration has been raised in connection with every massive mobilization for Civil Rights which has been attempted over the years.” Rustin was a veteran in handling these attacks, drawing on his experience organizing marches and the constant charges against him about his past. Rustin was experienced in rebutting these charges by speaking to his record and attracted the support of the media. In an August 15 editorial from the historically conservative New York Post, the editors wrote:

Strom Thurmond’s “latest ‘exhibit’ is Bayard Rustin, a Negro, whom he denounces as a former Communist and draft resister. Rustin is A. Philip Randolph’s deputy in organizing the March, and his participation in that affair, charges Thurmond, proves Communist involvement. It proves just the opposite. In 1941, Rustin was in the Young Communist League, in which he candidly acknowledges past membership. That the Post would so strongly support Rustin reveals the effect of Rustin’s statement. Even conservative media sided with Rustin over Thurmond.

The one charge of moral degeneration that Rustin refused to address actually revealed his political intelligence as well as the trust and support of those around him. In the August 14 public statement, Rustin wrote:

[w]ith regard to Senator Thurmond’s attack on my morality, I have no comment. By religious training and fundamental philosophy, I am disinclined to put myself in the position of having to defend my own moral character. Questions in this area should properly be directed to those who have entrusted me with my present responsibilities.
Rustin knew that others would speak up for his character given his long history in the civil rights movement, and their response was decisive. Randolph’s August 12 statement was probably the most vehement in its defense. In it, Randolph explained that he had known Rustin for around 30 years and had “complete confidence” in his character and ability. Randolph referenced Rustin’s organizational record, recounting that he had already successfully organized three marches on Washington prior to August 28. On Thurmond’s charge that Rustin lacked moral character, Randolph wrote:

[that Mr. Rustin was on one occasion arrested in another connexion [sic] has long been a matter of public record, and not an object of concealment. There are those who contend that this incident, which took place many years ago, voids or overwhelms Mr. Rustin’s ongoing contribution to the struggle for human rights. I hold otherwise.]

That this arrest took place nearly 30 years before the March when Rustin was just 29 held little weight when compared to the credibility and respect he enjoyed in the following decades. In defending Rustin from Thurmond, Randolph also identified the Senator’s motive as not solely an attempt to publicly humiliate Rustin, but a ploy to “discredit the Movement and to emasculate its leadership.” Randolph brought to public view Thurmond’s plot to undermine a march which he feared would mobilize whites and blacks in pursuit of racial and economic justice.

Other March leaders also buttressed Rustin’s argument and helped him maintain his credibility as deputy director. Tom Khan, a white organizer who worked out of Rustin’s New York headquarters, wrote that he spoke “for the combined Negro leadership in voicing my complete confidence in Bayard Rustin’s character, integrity, and extraordinary ability.” Khan’s defense reveals that by August the “Big Six” had united behind Rustin far more strongly than they were on July 2. Khan also stated that “we are not in any way going to be influenced by corrupt efforts on the part of undemocratic elements to deprive our movement of so capable a leader.” Khan’s emphasis on “we” shows how the March leadership presented a united front in their opposition to Thurmond and support of Rustin. By allowing leaders such as Randolph and Khan to speak up for him, Rustin likely convinced more of the public that he did have great moral character and standing in contrast to Thurmond.

The reaction in favor of Rustin is also born out in personal letters. In an August 19 letter to Jane Tembridge, a white organizer for SNCC, Khan quipped that “Thurmond’s attack seems to have done us more good than harm. All kinds of people who were formerly shaky have rallied to Bayard’s
defense. The top leadership is absolutely solid, surprisingly enough.\textsuperscript{54} Thurmond’s attacks publicized the March and increased its support across the nation. Countless letters defending Rustin poured into the New York City headquarters following Thurmond’s performance, evidence that he had actually raised the profile of the March nationwide. John Hallford, a civil rights organizer, most humorously summed up the incident by writing to Rustin on August 20: “Congratulations on making an ass out of Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. What a so-and-so he is!”\textsuperscript{55} Rustin’s defense combined with the unity of support from the March’s leadership completely disarmed Thurmond’s attack at a critical juncture, since the March was just two weeks away.\textsuperscript{56}

**Rustin Remembered: Concluding Thoughts**

Rustin was a kind of mediator \textit{extraordinaire}. His balancing of the competing goals, demands, and politics of the civil rights organizations and leaders ensured that the March reached as many Americans as possible. Rustin managed this feat while facing assaults on his character and doubts about his competence as an organizer from people within and outside the civil rights movement. These charges mainly focused on Rustin’s sexual orientation—something he could not change—and his communist politics in 1941—something he moved away from immediately. Nevertheless, throughout his life, before, during, and after the March, Rustin was attacked from all sides of the movement and from US society at large. Rustin was not alone in his defense of his leadership. His life-long friend and ally, A. Philip Randolph, as well as Tom Khan, used their credibility to protect Rustin from some criticism, particularly at the July 2 meeting of the “Big Six.” Randolph, in particular, deserves credit for his stance. He saw what King, Wilkins, and Young overlooked because of their focus on his homosexuality and former Communist ties: that Rustin deserved the position of deputy director of the March more so than perhaps anyone else.

In this narrative of how Rustin so skillfully navigated the politics of the Civil Rights movement and his critics, it is important to also consider that his story is in many ways symbolic of the broader challenges that the movement faced as a whole. The Civil Rights movement was a coalition of people and groups with variegated politics and divergent goals. Attempting to unite these organizations and their leaders proved an enduring challenge for the movement, not just in the lead up to August 28, but in the years before and after the March. As a homosexual man with former Communist ties, Rustin brought to the surface some of the political tensions lying beneath the movement. Even as it challenged segregation in the pursuit of jobs and freedom, the movement was not immune to the homophobia and anti-Communism which plagued American society as a whole. In fact, at times...
the attempt to unite civil rights leaders showcased in stark relief just how embedded some of these societal injustices remained in the movement itself.

Nevertheless, the story of the March on Washington and Rustin is about unity more than division, and in the past decade Rustin has re-claimed some of the recognition he so rightly deserves. Even Rustin’s critics have acknowledged his importance. As Roy Wilkins wrote years after the March, “[h]istory has attached the name of the Reverend King to the march, but I suspect it would be more accurate to call it Randolph’s march—and Rustin’s.”57 This was Rustin’s march more than it was King’s. As historian Jerald Podair summarizes the March, “[w]hat America saw on August 28, 1963, was, thanks largely to Rustin, a public display of unity and single-ness of purpose unmatched in the history of the American civil rights move-ment.”58 When we look upon the cover of that Life magazine 50 years after the March, we should note with greater appreciation who Bayard Rustin was and what he accomplished, not just because of his skill as an organizer, but also because of the divisiveness of the movement into which he stepped. If only for one brilliant day, Rustin united a movement which was homophobic towards him and wary of his politics, and this is perhaps his greatest legacy.
ENDNOTES:

5 Randolph called Rustin “Mr. March on Washington.”
6 D’Emilio, 327.
7 *I Must Resist*, 254.
9 Anderson, 240.
10 The “Big Six” refers to A. Philip Randolph of the Negro American Labor Council (NALC), Martin Luther King of the SCLC, James Farmer of CORE, Whitney Young of the Urban League, Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, and John Lewis of SNCC.
11 D’Emilio, 338.
12 Ibid., 340.
15 D’Emilio, 342.
20 Reuther represented the United Auto Workers (UAW), one of the largest labor unions in the country.
27 Ibid., “Slogans,” Late August.
29 It turned out that the ten leaders and Rustin were absolutely right in bowing to King. King delivered what Rustin remarked in a 1985 interview as “one of the greatest speeches ever made in this country.”
30 *I Must Resist*, 262.
31 Haskins, 78.
32 Ibid., 78.
34 In *I Must Resist*, Rustin does not remember King expressing an opinion about the matter,
though this may have been a sign that he did, in fact, agree with Wilkins and Young.


36 *I Must Resist*, 262.

37 Ibid.

38 Ed Edwin, April 3, 1985. In this interview, Rustin described Randolph: “Mr. Randolph had a very peculiar thing about him: he was a very, very good man, and I learned something from Mr. Randolph, and that is, truly good people… are very seldom willing to believe ill about others… so that when Mr. Randolph was confronted with a group of blacks saying that he should not work with me, because of all the things I was telling you earlier, that came up, Mr. Randolph’s attitude is, “My, my! Why, I simply can’t believe that Bayard would do anything wrong. But, if the fact is, he is homosexual, maybe we need more of them; he’s so talented!”


40 Ibid.


42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.


46 For further background about his some 60 years of activism, consider Jervis Anderson and John D'Emilio’s biographies of Rustin.


48 Ibid.

49 The incident Randolph refers to was when Rustin was arrested as a young man for public indecency for engaging in sexual acts with two other men in California in 1941.

50 Privately, as I have highlighted earlier, Rustin’s homosexuality did raise concerns for King and the “Big Six,” though they never publicly expressed their sentiments.


53 Ibid.


56 This did not mean the March leaders completely trusted Rustin. Wilkins, Young, and King probably still distrusted him for his homosexuality but recognized that he was a skilled organizer, and that it would be politically suicidal for the March if they remained silent in the face of Thurmond’s critique.

57 Anderson, 264.

58 Podair, 61.
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