Herodotus is a student-run publication founded in 1986 by the Stanford University Department of History and the History Undergraduate Student Association (HUGSA). It bears the name of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, the 5th century BCE historian of the Greco-Persian Wars. This journal is dedicated to preserving and showcasing the best undergraduate work of Stanford University’s Department of History. Our published pieces are selected through a process of peer review. As a final note, Herodotus’ volume numbering system erroneously begins at 1990 rather than at 1986. We have, however, chosen to retain the existing numbering system for the sake of continuity.

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Editor's Note

Our namesake declared the purpose of history “to prevent the traces of human events from being erased by time, and to preserve the fame of the important and remarkable achievements produced by both Greeks and non-Greeks.” We differ little in general sentiment, although this year’s journal is titled farther towards non-Greeks than Herodotus may have been comfortable with. The trouble with preventing the traces of human events from being erased by time, however, is that there are so many of them. Fully appreciating the smallness of our role in the project he outlined more than two thousand years ago, we nevertheless resolved to contribute all we could. To that end, taking advantage of a crop of submissions unprecedented in both volume and quality, we decided to publish two more articles than we ever have before.

The present volume also outmatches our past ones in breadth. The papers presented here span more than 2,700 years and take place across five continents. They are similarly varied in terms of discipline. We are publishing an investigation of ancient history for the first time in a decade and military history for the first time ever. The present journal also features social, colonial, medieval, religious, political, and diplomatic history. These categories are, of course, imperfect and overlapping. The writings featured below bear that out quite nicely, taking advantage of multiple interpretive angles.

It is our great honor and pleasure to declare: the study of history is thriving at Stanford.

HERODOTUS
# Table of Contents

Kevin Khadavi, The Caged Bird Sings: A Source Analysis of the 701 BCE Assyrian Failure to Capture Jerusalem  
7

Lindsay Wu, Japan’s Choice of a Southern Strategy in World War II: American Deterrence, the China Problem, and the Oil Imperative  
19

Becca De Los Santos, Inversion of the Top-Down Operation: Enslaved Voices and French Abolitionism in 1840s Senegal  
39

Ines Martin, Unveiling Gisela: Reconsidering the Life and Myths of Charlemagne’s Sister  
62

Arvind Asokan, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Bangladesh Genocide: Balancing Diplomatic Priorities against Moral Considerations  
77

Felipe Jafet, The American Civil War and Reconstruction Through the Eyes of Brazil: A Model  
90

Eric Areklett, Pillars of the Revolution: Union, Liberty, and Popular Sovereignty Debated during Ratification  
98

Anna Pikarska, Blind Fighting: Totalitarianism and the Dehumanization of Warfare  
111
The Caged Bird Sings: 
A Source Analysis of the 701 BCE Assyrian Failure to Capture Jerusalem

Kevin Khadavi

The 701 BCE siege of Jerusalem was among the most consequential battles of ancient history. Despite marching on the holy city and wreaking havoc in the Levant, the Assyrian Empire failed to capture Jerusalem. Yet, in the two and a half millennia following the attack, historians have been unable to determine whether a battle even took place. The events of 701 BCE are chronicled by both Judaean and Assyrian sources. These accounts agree on some essential facts: the Assyrian King Sennacherib arrived at Jerusalem with an army, and King Hezekiah of Judah paid him tribute to secure peace. Further, neither source claims a fight took place. Beyond these basic features, however, direct contradictions emerge. The Hebrew account found in the Old Testament’s books 2 Kings and Isiah asserts that a divine intervention delivered the city of Jerusalem to the Yahwistic Judaeans. After Sennacherib marched on the city, it explains, the angel of death struck down his troops. The far less detailed Assyrian retelling (written on the sides of Sennacherib’s Prism) points to Hezekiah’s capitulation to Sennacherib as a marker of their own, Assyrian, triumph.¹ These competing claims of victory are of particular importance considering the event’s place within the Hebrew tradition. To the Judaeans, their self-proclaimed triumph in 701 BCE cemented Yahweh as an omnipotent ruler. The victory also contributed to the ensuing spread of monotheism around the world. For centuries, historians have adopted one of the two accounts,

dismissing the other on grounds of ideological bias and, therefore, factual inaccuracy. Henry Rawlinson, commonly described as the “Father of Assyriology,” famously sided with the Judaean explanation, spurning Sennacherib’s description as an inaccurate glorification of the Assyrian throne. In the words of historian Walter Mayer, “Rawlinson's evaluation...became dogma.” When working with these Assyrian sources, Mayer claimed, early modern historians treated them as royal propaganda instead of exploring their historical value. In response, he and others have taken the counterview, challenging the accuracy of the Hebrew account because of its strong religious underpinnings.

This paper seeks to thoughtfully analyze both accounts and excavate the motivations behind each. With those motivations in mind, it crafts an argument to explain what most likely occurred in 701 BCE. In contrast to many previous historians, this paper argues that ideological motivations need not indicate historical inaccuracy. The Hebrew Bible, though containing the religiously motivated insertion of divine intervention, probably described the real events of 701 BCE. Ideology was added to an already cemented account of historical events, where the Assyrian army withdrew without securing a clear military victory. On the other hand, this paper claims that ideological motivations were the pen with which the Assyrian account was crafted. Based on its cross analysis with Assyria’s military history, it finds that the Sennacherib Prism retelling willfully manipulated events to uphold a crucial aspect of Assyrian imperialism: their culture of intimidation. The final analysis reveals two deeply flawed sources with one far more flawed than the other. Nevertheless, when taken in context and paired with a plethora of historical evidence, both accounts point to an Assyrian failure to lay siege to or capture Jerusalem.

Source Analyses
The Hebrew Bible dives deepest into the 701 BCE encounter. The story, recounted in the second book of Kings, is preceded by an account of Hezekiah’s piety: he “did what was right in the eyes of the Lord, just as his father David had done.” Explicit mentions of the king’s devotion to Yahweh appear before, during, and after the

3 2 Kings 18:3 New International Version (NIV).
retelling of the 701 BCE conflict and come to be used as justification for the apparent Judaean victory. On the other hand, previous Assyrian victories against the northern kingdom of Israel are blamed on Israel’s lack of Yahwist devotion. When King Shalmaneser of Assyria laid siege to Samaria, part of the Kingdom of Israel, the Bible presents a clear reason: “because they had not obeyed the Lord their God, but had violated his covenant...They neither listened to the commands nor carried them out.” These two examples inform the construction of a standard in which devotion to Yahweh ensured militaristic protection against enemies. The heretic Israel fell to the Assyrians while the pious Judah was victorious. The Bible establishes a religious explanation for each event. Accordingly, by the Old Testament’s retelling, Sennacherib’s march into Syro-Palestine occurred because the people of the Levant did not show proper religious devotion. Yahweh is quoted in 2 Kings, calling Assyria “the rod of my anger, in whose hand is the club of my wrath! I send him against a godless nation, I dispatch him against a people who anger me, to seize loot and snatch plunder, and to trample them down like mud in the streets.” Given the Hebrew Bible’s clearly established religious underpinnings, it is easy for the historian to dismiss its historical accuracy when trying to determine the events of the 701 BCE encounter. To do so, however, would be to conflate ideological motivation with factual inaccuracy, a general conclusion this paper argues against. More specifically, dismissing the Hebrew account as inaccurate due to religious motivation would, as explained below, misunderstand the relationship between ideology and accuracy in the 2 Kings. Rather than the inspiration for a misrepresentation of the facts, the religious elements of the biblical version were merely an afterthought added to an already essentially accurate account.

As the Assyrians marched through the Levant, wreaking havoc in every city they touched, King Hezekiah saw his impending doom. The Bible describes a letter sent to Sennacherib informing him of Hezekiah’s submission: “I have done wrong. Withdraw from me, and I will pay whatever you demand of me.” Hezekiah began his letter by admitting his fault. This fault, however, stemmed not from a lack of devotion to Yahweh but rather from staging an earlier revolt against Sennacherib: The Judean king had “rebelled against the king of Assyria and would not serve him. He attacked the Philistines as

4 2 Kings 18:12 NIV.
5 Isaiah 10:5-6 NIV.
far as Gaza and its territory, from watchtower to fortified city.”  

In doing so, Hezekiah broke a Judaean tradition of submitting to the Assyrians. His father, King Ahaz, for instance, had submitted to the Assyrian King Tiglath-Pileser III in 734 BCE.  

Hezekiah’s rebellion was unsuccessful and likely the catalyst of Sennacherib’s entry into Syro-Palestine. Historian Walter Mayer argues that Hezekiah’s rebellion started when “Sargon II died on a battlefield in Anatolia in 705.” The Assyrian king’s death gave Hezekiah cause to believe that, amidst the political uncertainty in Assyria and a similar rebellion in Babylonia, he could raise a coalition of Syro-Palestinian states to achieve economic and political independence from the empire.  

Prior to Hezekiah’s rebellion, Assyrian ventures into Syro-Palestine were rare. Tiglath-Pileser III undertook a campaign in 734 BCE, Shalmaneser V in 732-723 BCE, and Sargon II in 720 and 711 BCE. Consequently, it is likely that Hezekiah’s rebellion spurred the Assyrian advance into the area.  

The uniquely Assyrian style of imperialism, explored by the author in a previous paper, lends further credibly to this assertion of causality. Assyrian imperialism at the time of Sennacherib consisted of calculated conquest and vassalization. They conquered territories, replaced local rulers with ones sympathetic to the empire (meaning those who were unlikely to stage a rebellion), and, crucially, forced payment of an annual tribute to the empire in exchange for peace. While the Assyrians gave near full autonomy to their vassals, if those rulers failed to comply with Assyrian demands (e.g., tribute), they would be brutally “impaled” and replaced. The Assyrians leveraged fear to their advantage. Word of impalings spread to the point where the Assyrian Empire was able to vassalize territory through intimidation alone, avoiding the need to lay siege to the land. One of the primary goals of the empire, therefore, was to maintain its reputation for ruthlessness. If a transgression was made against the empire by a vassal state, it was the responsibility of the king to publicly brutalize, maim, and replace the local ruler lest the empire risk further rebellions and acts of insubordination. With

6 2 Kings 18:7-8 NIV.
10 Paper on file with author, kkhadavi@stanford.edu.
11 Ian Morris, “Ancient Empires: The Near East” (class lecture, Stanford University, Stanford, October 17, 2022).
the launch of Hezekiah’s rebellion, the Judean king had, in the eyes of Sennacherib, signed his own death warrant. His impaling became the Assyrian king’s top priority: Sennacherib launched a full-scale war against the region without regard for its economic or logistical feasibility. In fact, the Assyrian account on Sennacherib’s Prism discusses the punishment of rebellion as the purpose and strategy of the king’s war in the Levant: “I drew near to Ekron and slew the governors and nobles who had committed sin (that is, rebelled), and hung their bodies on stakes around the city.”

Despite the Hebrew Bible’s assertion that Sennacherib’s advance was Yahweh’s punishment for the Judaeans’ irreverence, the historical record, paired with prior examples of Assyrian imperialism and militarism provides a far more compelling and historically sound account. Sennacherib likely marched on Jerusalem in 701 BCE in imperial retribution for rebellion.

Hezekiah expected Assyrian retaliation against the rebellious states, but he initially had full faith that he could stave off the attack. He dug a 1700-foot-long tunnel under the city of Jerusalem, cutting through bedrock, and built a fortified wall around the city. Hezekiah’s preparation clearly indicates his expectation—some may say invitation—of war with the Assyrians. As historian Karen Armstrong observed, “He was clearly proud of his military capability.” The question remains, however, of what prompted Hezekiah to negotiate for peace before the fighting even began. As his allied states started to fall to the Assyrian Empire (first Babylon and Mesopotamia, then Transjordan and Phoenicia), Hezekiah likely came to realize his impending doom.

Here, another biblical contradiction is revealed. Hezekiah’s fortifications indicate that he intended to put up a fight against the enemy. If that enemy was, as the Bible proclaims, a punishment from God, the king’s resistance would be the ultimate act of impiety. To think then that, in the end, the city survived by the hand of God would be to ignore one of Hezekiah’s crucial transgressions against Him.

Another point of religious and historical contradiction arises from a later part of 2 Kings in which Hezekiah is said to have raised

14 Egypt, too, had not given its promised military assistance to the Judean king. Armstrong, Jerusalem: One City, 89.
the tribute necessary for Sennacherib by taking “all the silver that was found in the temple of the Lord and in the treasuries of the royal palace.” He also “stripped off the gold with which he had covered the doors and doorposts of the temple of the Lord, and gave it to the king of Assyria.”\[^{15}\] Hezekiah defaced a temple to his God to save himself. His actions almost seem like an evocation of another, earlier Israelite king, who the Bible portrays as a heretic for putting up statues of Ba’al in the same temple.\[^{16}\] In the Old Testament’s account, Sennacherib himself acknowledged this contradiction. The Assyrian king allegedly told the Jerusalemites: “But if you say to me, ‘We are depending on the Lord our God’—isn’t he the one whose high places and altars Hezekiah removed, saying to Judah and Jerusalem, ‘You must worship before this altar in Jerusalem’?”\[^{17}\] Hezekiah’s iconoclasm and subsequent victory lend further credibility to the theory that the Hebrew account merely incorporated religious elements into an already fully developed story.

Hezekiah’s last-minute prayer to Yahweh fails to resolve the Hebrew account’s tensions. Upon receiving the news that Sennacherib was marching on the city along with the king of Cush, Hezekiah “prayed to the Lord: ‘Lord, the God of Israel, enthroned between the cherubim, you alone are God over all the kingdoms of the earth. Open your eyes, Lord, and see; listen to the words Sennacherib has sent to ridicule the living God…Now, Lord our God, deliver us from his hand, so that all the kingdoms of the earth may know that you alone, Lord, are God.’”\[^{18}\] Some may argue that this prayer served as a repentance for the king’s previous sin, thereby allowing Jerusalem to stay in the hands of the previously-blasphemous Judaeans without religious contradiction. This explanation, however, fails under a broader biblical analysis. The 32nd chapter of the book of Exodus provides precedent of Yahweh’s policy toward those who have sinned: a final act of devotion cannot wash those sins away. As Moses ascended Mount Sinai to be delivered the commandments of God, the Yahwists below him committed idolatry, forging and subsequently deifying a golden calf. When given the opportunity to atone, the Levites drew the blood of their brothers to demonstrate their repentance to the Lord. Moses pleaded to Him for mercy: “Oh, what a great sin

\[^{15}\] 2 Kings 18:15-16 NIV.
\[^{16}\] 1 Kings 16:32 NIV.
\[^{17}\] 2 Kings 18:22 NIV.
\[^{18}\] 2 Kings 19:14-19 NIV.
these people have committed! They have made themselves gods of gold. But now, please forgive their sin.”¹⁹ Nevertheless, “the Lord struck the people with a plague because of what they did with the calf Aaron had made.”²⁰ The Levites, despite carrying out one of the largest acts of devotion to Yahweh shown in the Bible, were not cleansed of sin. Their act was reminiscent of Abraham’s potential filicide, though the Levites truly did commit fratricide. It is foolish to assume that Yahweh would keep Jerusalem in the hands of the iconoclastic Hezekiah merely after his utterance of a prayer to Yahweh, supporting the charge of religiously motivated historical revisionism. The Old Testament’s authors evidently tried to use the 701 BCE encounter at Jerusalem as a means to glorify Yahweh even though their account was clearly at odds with historical events.

In the biblical account, the attack ended with the divine destruction of the Assyrian forces outside Jerusalem: “That night the angel of the Lord went out and put to death a hundred and eighty-five thousand in the Assyrian camp. When the people got up the next morning—there were all the dead bodies! So Sennacherib king of Assyria broke camp and withdrew. He returned to Nineveh and stayed there.”²¹ The withdrawal of the Assyrian troops is described in both the Judaean and Assyrian accounts. Considering the Bible’s penchant for using God’s intervention to explain historical events and the factual improbability of this proposed account, this divine explanation should be discarded. Historians, in turn, have looked to Herodotus, the fifth-century Greek historian, for an answer. Although he did not specifically chronicle the 701 BCE siege, he did discuss the contemporaneous Assyrian advancement into Egypt with an uncannily similar story: “thousands of field-mice swarmed over the Assyrians during the night, and ate their quivers, their bow-strings, and the leather handles of their shields, so that on the following day, having no arms to fight with, they abandoned their position and suffered severe losses during their retreat.”²² Historians theorize that Herodotus, almost certainly writing off second-hand knowledge, conflated the Assyrian attack on Egypt with the empire’s efforts at Jerusalem. They also believe his account to be indicative of a zoonotic plague, with the rats’ hunger serving to explain disease in a

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¹⁹ Exodus 32:31-32 NIV.
²⁰ Exodus 32:35 NIV.
²¹ 2 Kings 19:35-36 NIV.
pre-scientific era. Considering the improbability of the destruction and retreat of two full Assyrian armies in the same campaign, their theory that Herodotus mistook the regions holds some, if not much, validity. While recognizing the lack of further evidence to support this theory, Herodotus’ account could still offer additional credence to the idea that the Assyrians withdrew against their will.

**A Discussion of Assyrian Sources**

One cannot, in good faith, analyze the 701 BCE siege of Jerusalem without paying particular attention to the Assyrian account on Sennacherib’s Prism. To begin, one must examine how the Assyrian ruler wrote of himself, asserting that he was “the powerful one who consumes the insubmissive, who strikes the wicked with the thunderbolt.” Sennacherib’s subsequent failure to kill the insubmissive and, in his eyes, wicked Hezekiah is at odds with the image of a consuming and striking Sennacherib of which he wrote. In short, it is decidedly un-Sennacheribian and arguably un-Assyrian of him to have failed to do so. For the Assyrian king to leave Syro-Palestine without spilling the blood of the traitorous Hezekiah demands a legitimate reason and delegitimizes his account, which ultimately claims victory over Jerusalem. That Hezekiah did not meet the same fate as other rebellious leaders speaks volumes about the true historical outcome. Sennacherib’s decision to leave the Judean king alive could not have been by his own accord.

The most famous excerpt From Sennacherib’s Prism is a line asserting the Assyrian ruler’s victory over Hezekiah: “Himself [Hezekiah], like a caged bird I shut up in Jerusalem his royal city… The cities of his, which I had despoiled, I cut off from his land and to Mitinti, king of Ashdod, Padi, king of Ekron, and Silli-Mi.” This excerpt, however, contains peculiar language. Sennacherib’s choice word of “eseru” (translated by Luckenbill as “shut up” and by Mayer as “enclosed”) was the Akkadian word historically used in Assyrian text to refer to a blockade rather than a siege. A subsequent portion

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of the Prism features Sennacherib’s assertion that he “laid out forts against Hezekiah.” The historical use of Sennacherib’s Akkadian word for “fort” was for siege walls, which were used to blockade cities.\(^{27}\) Finally comes Sennacherib’s claim that Hezekiah sent tribute “after him to Nineveh.” While most historians have analyzed this line as Sennacherib’s admission of defeat, Mayer argues that the Assyrian military formation demanded that Sennacherib travel while leaving a large portion of his army at Jerusalem.\(^{28}\) Thus, he argues that Sennacherib does not admit defeat and that there was no siege at Jerusalem but rather a blockade that proved successful for the Assyrians. Having achieved economic success with Hezekiah’s tribute, exsanguinating the city such that even the gold of the temple was stripped away, there was no economic reason to continue the siege. Hezekiah submitted, and tribute payments would continue. This, he argues, is unlike the Assyrian siege of Lachish, where the economic viability was clear. Mayer writes, “evident is Assyria's success. With Hezekiah chastised, Jerusalem returned to its vassal status intact.”\(^{29}\) There is little reason to dispute Mayer’s textual analysis of the Prism. It was, in all likelihood, Sennacherib’s intention to narrate a story of a successful blockade rather than a siege. This retelling, too, is consistent with the biblical account. What cannot, however, be accepted is the reliability of Sennacherib’s narrative. The conglomeration of evidence points not to an Assyrian victory at Jerusalem concluding a successful campaign against Hezekiah and his allies, but rather an Assyrian failure, forcing the premature end of this campaign.

Sennacherib was simply unable to capture Jerusalem—either, as Herodotus suggested, by pestilence or perhaps by the might of Hezekiah’s fortifications.\(^{30}\) Wall reliefs, the primary Assyrian method of glorification, were absent for the campaign against Jerusalem. By contrast, the fall of Lachish is vividly depicted in these artforms.\(^{31}\) Upon his return to Nineveh, Sennacherib commissioned the creation of his prisms. A military victory, however, could not conceivably be written up considering the continuation of Hezekiah’s reign over Jerusalem. A blockade paired with a healthy tribute, however, was perhaps the only semi-believable story conceivable to Sennacherib

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30 Likely the former given that Hezekiah negotiated for peace.
31 “The Sennacherib Prism.”
and the Assyrians short of full conciliation to Hezekiah. Sennacherib was unsuccessful, and the lack of Hezekiah’s untimely death did not bode well for the public image of the Assyrians. The Prism, then, must be seen as Sennacherib’s attempt at damage control, desperately trying to exaggerate a victory out of a loss, but not so far as to arouse suspicion from his people or future historians (i.e., a wall relief displaying a successful siege). His writings can only be used in the context of a ruler trying to maintain some semblance of the public image that his empire strove for centuries to preserve.

A Digression on Assyrian Religion

Assyrian imperialism under Sennacherib had deep religious underpinnings that lend credibility to the theory that Sennacherib was unable to achieve his goal at Jerusalem. Assyrian kings derived a divine mission from their god, Ashur, to allow his influence to reign supreme throughout the entire world. The world was seen as Ashur’s “hunting ground,” and it was the monarch’s job to make sure every earthly being prayed to this god. When compared with the outcome at Jerusalem in 701 BCE, this religious tenant is damning. The Jerusalemites left convinced of the superiority of Yahweh, with his omnipotent presence crushing the oppressive Assyrians. It must then be considered that Sennacherib left Jerusalem having failed to achieve one of his major goals: to force Ashur upon the uncivilized and Yahwistic Judaeans. His repeated failures continue to point to an outcome in which Sennacherib did not have the means to capture the city and impose his will.

Conclusion

A thorough analysis of both the Hebrew and Assyrian accounts reveals far more nuance than previously thought. The historical precedent of discounting the validity of sources based purely on their ideological motivations fails under the test of contextualization. To discount the entire Hebrew Bible’s account of the 701 BCE Jerusalem encounter

32 Morris, “Ancient Empires.”
based on religious bias is to ignore likely the most accurate account of the true events. If this account had been crafted solely to glorify Yahweh, it likely would have done so without historical contradictions. Yet, unlike stories of pure fiction, the narrative is not without plot holes. Thus, each time a contradiction is found, evidence of that section’s validity is uncovered as well. Likewise, in contrast to Rawlinson, this paper stresses that Sennacherib’s Prism must be explored for its historical worth. In that case, the evidence does point to an ideological motivation being used to craft the story. Nevertheless, the way in which that story was crafted in contrast to how it could have been crafted speaks to the true events of the encounter. The fact that Sennacherib did not flaunt a successful siege of Jerusalem but rather crafted a narrative around Hezekiah’s subduction and surrender indicates what Sennacherib thought his people would believe. His ideological motivation is what gives the work its meaning, not a reason to discard it.

These examples, paired with Sennacherib’s motivations for launching the campaign and his blatant failure to achieve his goals, paint a clearer picture of what happened at Jerusalem in 701 BCE: Hezekiah, overzealous and overambitious, formed a Syro-Palestinian coalition and launched an unsuccessful rebellion against Assyria, attempting to cast off the economic burden posed by the empire’s demanded tributes. Sennacherib, aware of the danger that Hezekiah’s uprising posed to his legacy and the foundations of Assyrian imperialism, launched a massive campaign against the rebellious region. Sennacherib did not set out for the sake of plunder or the acquisition of glory. He launched a war to save the empire, and that would entail making an example of each and every leader involved in the rebellion. The overwhelming might of Assyria was far too much for any state to handle, and the Assyrian war machine leveled cities as it made its way to Jerusalem. There, King Hezekiah, aware of his near-certain defeat, sent an apology and submission to the Assyrian king. Sennacherib, given his motivation to make an example of Hezekiah, marched on Jerusalem anyway. Here remains the last major point of uncertainty. Either plague or fear or leather-hungry rats forced the hasty retreat of Sennacherib and his troops. Hezekiah returned to being a vassal of Sennacherib without any personal consequence for his rebellion. As a result of the Assyrian
encounter, Yahwism gained enormous prominence in Judaean society, which held that the city was delivered to them by Yahweh Himself. This result would be yet another deviation from Sennacherib’s goals. The Assyrian king would have failed to extend the yoke of Ashur to Jerusalem, allowing an illegitimate god to reign supreme over a traitorous region.

In the larger historical framework, it matters little what drove the Assyrians away from Jerusalem. Significance does lie, however, in whether Sennacherib launched a successful campaign and whether Hezekiah launched a successful resistance. In that regard, the 701 BCE encounter frames the fall of the Assyrian Empire, the rise of Judaism, and two and a half millennia of monotheistic tradition. It speaks to how narratives spread and how those narratives can be determined by or interwoven with ideological motivations. There is little doubt that Sennacherib shut up Hezekiah like a bird in a cage, though he would much rather have seen him dead. Even then, though, the caged bird sings. Hezekiah’s hold on Jerusalem became Jewish legend, enshrining the Hebrew king as a pious leader who was rewarded for his deeds. He served as a moral framework for untold Yahwists and Jews. Few adversarial encounters in the history of the world have had such consequences as in 701 BCE at Jerusalem. The process by which we can understand what happened and that understanding itself allows for a more fruitful investigation of the past. Beyond that, it allows us to comprehend, identify, and apply the factors that led to a pivotal moment in global history.
Japan’s Choice of a Southern Strategy in World War II: American Deterrence, the China Problem, and the Oil Imperative

Lindsay Wu

By 1941, despite making large territorial gains, a militaristic Japan was mired in its campaign to conquer China. In its search for a way forward, Japan faced a major strategic choice: expansion in either the North or the South. The northern strategy, which had historical roots in Japan’s earlier imperialistic wars, aimed to seize Soviet territory in Siberia in order to augment Japanese holdings in Manchuria and China. The southern strategy, by contrast, was a newer approach. It involved taking French Indochina, Thailand, and the oil-rich Dutch East Indies over the opposition of US forces based in the Philippines and British forces based in Singapore. Japan’s army had long advocated the northern option whereas the navy had more recently promoted the southern course.

Japan’s preference for the southern strategy was based on military considerations, a desire to achieve a final victory in China, and the need for a secure oil supply. The 1939 Nomonhan Incident, persistently high Soviet force levels, and a non-aggression pact strongly deterred Japan from expanding to the North while an inadequate Anglo-American military presence made an advance feasible in the South. A southern advance also promised to interdict China’s major foreign supply route through Burma. US economic sanctions also did not deter Japanese aggression, as President Franklin Roosevelt’s July 1941 asset freeze and consequent moratorium on oil sales solidified rather than weakened Japan’s determination to seize the East Indies. Furthermore, both the military situation and US
economic sanctions paradoxically accelerated Japanese actions due to their long-term potency and short-term inefficacy. The US attempt at deterrence ultimately prompted staunch Japanese imperialists to embark on the southern strategy forthwith rather than surrender their holdings in China and Manchuria. Thus, instead of merely enlarging its commitments in World War II by opening an Asian front against the USSR, Japan ultimately globalized the conflict by provoking US entry.

**Japanese Imperialism in Asia**

Building upon a process that had begun almost fifty years earlier, a fascist and increasingly aggressive Japan sought to dominate all of Asia in 1941. During the Meiji Era, which ended in 1912, Japan rapidly modernized. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 marked the turning point in the country’s transformation into an imperializing power. By defeating the Ching Empire, Japan gained control over Formosa, Korea, and the Liaotung Peninsula of southern Manchuria. However, the Russian Empire, Germany, and France forced Japan renounce the latter territory. Russia then established control over all of Manchuria during China’s 1899-1901 Boxer Rebellion. In the subsequent Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Japan soundly defeated Russia both on land and at sea. In this conflict, Japan’s success relied on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, which discouraged any other European power from assisting Russia.¹ Through the ensuing Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia ceded control of both southern Manchuria and southern Sakhalin Island to Japan. While Manchuria remained formally part of the Ching Empire, Japan was awarded the vital South Manchurian Railway, through which it exerted economic influence on the region.²

During and after World War I, Japan broadened its imperialistic activities, confronting resistance not only from China but also the United States and various European nations. First, Japan seized German colonial possessions in China’s Shandong province and in the Caroline, Mariana, and Marshall Islands of the Pacific Ocean. Next, it attempted to exert political hegemony over all of China with the Twenty-One Demands of 1915. These policies, however, sparked


widespread Chinese boycotts of Japanese products and were subsequently attenuated under pressure from the United States and Britain.\(^3\) Then, during the 1918 Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War, Japan sent a large contingent of troops to occupy portions of southeastern Siberia, including the prized port of Vladivostok. These efforts were again resisted, and an increasingly powerful Soviet Red Army forced Japan to withdraw in 1922.\(^4\)

The 1920s saw a political shift in Japan. In the latter part of the Taisho period and the early years of the Showa period, the government turned to espousing liberal democracy and international collective security. Domestically, administrations under the short-lived Kenseikai Party reduced the military’s influence, albeit temporarily.\(^5\) In international affairs, Japan became a founding member of the League of Nations and one of four permanent members of the League Council. In a series of negotiations following the 1921 Four-Power Treaty, Japan returned Shandong to China in exchange for US and British promises to not upgrade naval bases in the Philippines and Hong Kong respectively.\(^6\) Then, in the 1922 Nine-Power Treaty, Japan agreed to uphold China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as the Open Door policy of equal trade access in China. In this context, the two-party Anglo-Japanese Alliance expired in 1923.\(^7\)

In the 1930’s, however, Japan became increasingly fascist in its domestic politics, renewed its imperialism abroad, and significantly enlarged its expansionist visions. This shift came in response to tumultuous worldwide events. Specifically, as economist Takahashi Kamekichi explains, the Great Depression led Japan to discard democratic liberalism:

... a new reawakening came to pervade the country, and as a result, national agitations were launched to build a new political structure compatible with the national ideologies and traditions ... Now a national single-dimensional politics and a one-way administrative system have been organized based on the principle of

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5 Tooze, *The Deluge*, 364.


After 1932, military governments predominated, and Japanese imperialism reasserted itself as the aspirations of Japanese expansionists reached new heights. This process began with Japan’s 1931 invasion and conquest of Manchuria. The League of Nations condemned this action, leading to Japan’s withdrawal from the body in 1933. Unrepentant, the Japanese proceeded to rename Manchuria as Manchukuo, install the deposed Ching Emperor Puyi as its ruler, and assert the territory’s formal independence from China. Meanwhile, the concept of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere arose. The idea sought to eliminate European and American influence in Asia, a sentiment reflected in a Navy Ministry position paper:

One of the essentials of Imperial defence and the national structure is to establish an autonomous defence sphere or economic sphere embracing Greater East Asia … generally understood to include … the Kuriles in the North, East Siberia, Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, China, Tibet in the West … It will exclude non-Asiatic invading powers and will eschew dependence on Europe and America …. In the distant future, completion … might require the solution of the problems of Northern Sakhalin and the Maritime Provinces, etc. But it will be wise not to say anything about this for the time being.  

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laly at the Soviet-supported Whampoa Military Academy.\textsuperscript{10} By the 1920’s, however, the KMT and the CCP controlled only a limited portion of China. Local warlords, who lacked loyalty to any national party, ruled over most areas.\textsuperscript{11}

In a turn of events between 1927 and 1928, Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT Generalissimo and Whampoa Commandant, asserted his leadership over China. He successfully carried out the Northern Expedition, violently purging the CCP while generally steering clear of the militarily superior Japanese. In a series of campaigns, Chiang extended power from his base in Canton and established a capital in Nanking, located in central China. Subsequently, he allied with northern Chinese warlords to exert control over the region around Peking.\textsuperscript{12} Chiang also cracked down on the CCP in Shanghai and Ki-angsi, nearly eliminating their forces. Only 7000 CCP members survived the Mao Tse-tung-led Long March, which, between 1934 and 1935, took his followers to the remote Shensi province in northwest China.\textsuperscript{13} Chiang’s purge of the CCP enraged USSR General Secretary Josef Stalin, who shifted to supporting an independent CCP Red Army.\textsuperscript{14} Still, Chiang preferred to fight the CCP rather than Japan, which had moved its forces from Manchuria across the Great Wall and into northern China.\textsuperscript{15} The 1932 Shanghai Incident was the exception to Chiang’s general policy. There, he sent troops to battle a Japanese incursion that threatened important KMT commercial interests and spilled over to the International Zone.\textsuperscript{16}

In 1936, Chiang’s acceptance of the Chinese Second United Front compounded Japan’s difficulties in China. This development came in response to three factors. First, Japan’s progressive territorial incursions in northern China between 1933 and 1936 inflamed the public, which vehemently protested Chiang’s conciliatory stance toward Japan.\textsuperscript{17} Second, the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 prompted Stalin to order the CCP to set aside hostilities and

\textsuperscript{11} Willmott, \textit{Empires in the Balance}, 47.
\textsuperscript{12} Paine, \textit{The Wars for Asia}, 56.
\textsuperscript{13} Paine, \textit{The Wars for Asia}, 74.
\textsuperscript{14} Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, \textit{The Unknown Story of Mao} (New York: Anchor Books, 2006), 49.
\textsuperscript{15} Paine, \textit{The Wars for Asia}, 126.
\textsuperscript{16} Paine, \textit{The Wars for Asia}, 94.
\textsuperscript{17} Paine, \textit{The Wars for Asia}, 94.
realign with Chiang against the Japanese. Chiang’s kidnapping at Sian by CCP-allied warlord Chang Tso-lin decisively pushed the KMT leader to accept the agreement. The new KMT-CCP alliance was then sealed by promises of renewed Soviet military support.

Concerted KMT resistance to Japan began with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 1937, which opened the Second Sino-Japanese War. During subsequent large-scale Japanese offensives southward into the Yangtze River Valley, Chinese forces deployed asymmetric tactics which increased costs for the invaders. Though supplied with Soviet weapons after 1936, Chiang’s armies remained militarily inferior to the Japanese. Therefore, he adopted an approach of strategic withdrawal into the interior coupled with support from local insurgencies. In doing so, Chiang sought to whittle away Japan’s forces. As described by analyst S.C.M. Paine:

The Chinese, rather than capitulate … traded space for time … a protracted war of attrition fought deep inland to force Japanese overextension and impose unsustainable costs. As the Japanese pursued even farther from the sea and from China’s limited rail network, they extended their logistical lines and expanded the territory to garrison. While the Chinese could not defeat Japan, they could deny Japan victory.

CCP forces, even less suited to conventional warfare than Chiang’s armies, also limited themselves to insurgent tactics. The brutal Japanese repression that followed, including the Rape of Nanking, the repeated use of poison gas, and multiple instances of germ warfare, further escalated popular Chinese resistance and drew in even more Japanese forces. By 1938, 1.5 million Japanese troops were stationed in China. By 1941, Japan had suffered 600,000 casualties.

The Northern and Southern Options

In 1941, the northern strategic option brought together traditional Japanese grand strategy and the fervent anti-Communism of the Showa-era military governments. Since its initial attempts to establish a mainland Asian empire in the 1890’s, Japan had been guided by a land-based expansion strategy promulgated by the Imperial

18 Paine, The Wars for Asia, 102.
19 Paine, The Wars for Asia, 104.
20 Paine, The Wars for Asia, 133.
21 Paine, The Wars for Asia, 127.
22 Paine, The Wars for Asia, 134.
23 Wilmott, Empires in the Balance, 55.
24 Paine, The Wars for Asia, 185.
This strategy rested on the idea that Russian power was the principal security threat to Japan and its dominions. Operationally, the northern strategy assigned the principal role to the army and a supporting role to the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). The IJA’s 1937 battleplans called for an initial holding action against Soviet forces along the northern and western borders of Manchuria while an offensive was launched eastward across the Ussuri River into the USSR’s Maritime Provinces. After the capture of Vladivostok and its invaluable naval and air bases, which were regarded as direct threats to the Japanese homeland, IJA forces planned to turn west and overrun all Soviet territory between Manchuria and Lake Baikal.

The northern strategy was also consistent with fascist Japan’s desire to extinguish Communism domestically and on the Asian mainland. In the 1930’s, anti-Communist military figures exerted a steadily growing political influence, specifically through their prerogative to bring down Cabinets by resigning from the service-only positions of Army Minister and Navy Minister. New administrations took office only upon the consent of the military. Thus, these governments maintained a high level of vigilance against Communism, severely repressing trade unions and other left-wing movements. Furthermore, in China, Japanese forces particularly loathed the CCP. Initially, they even sought an alliance with Chiang and Chinese warlords against Chinese Communists.

Unlike the longstanding northern strategy, the southern strategy was a comparatively recent approach sponsored by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). The promotion of this option followed the IJN’s evolution from a localized, coal-era force allied with the British to a more expansive, aggressive, oil-era organization that opposed both the Anglo-Americans and naval arms limitations. Prior to its expiration in 1923, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had encouraged Japan to pursue ambitions in the North against the Russians rather than in the South against the Western powers. In the early years of

26 Alvin Coox, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 89.
27 Coox, Nomonhan, 89.
28 Wilmott, Empires in the Balance, 45.
30 Paine, The Wars for Asia, 53-5.
the alliance, warships were still coal-powered, and oil had not yet become a strategic commodity. With World War I and the concurrent shift to oil-powered vessels, however, the IJN’s ambitions grew. Japan constructed a naval base at formerly German-controlled Truk Island in the Carolines, more than 2500 miles east of the Japanese home islands and about 4000 miles west of Hawaii. Additionally, the IJN chafed at the restrictions imposed by the 1921 Washington Naval Conference, which allocated Japan 60% of the US and British limits on capital ships. Despite signing the 1930 London Naval Treaty, Japan renounced its terms in 1934. Subsequently, Japan walked out of the 1935-1936 London Naval Conference, refused to sign the treaty, and commenced unrestrained naval building shortly thereafter.

The southern strategy emphasized control of French Indochina, Thailand, and the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. Given these aims, officials predicted that this option would lead to direct conflict with the United States and Great Britain. The East Indies lay 3000 to 4000 miles southwest of Japan. An invasion force would need to sail through the South China Sea and past the US-controlled Philippines, which lay roughly at the midpoint of the journey. In addition, British-controlled Malaya lay in close proximity to the oil fields of Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. As US and British forces were expected to support the Dutch, the IJN planned to attack and subdue both Manila Bay and Singapore. While the former was approachable from Japanese bases in the home islands and Formosa, the latter required bases in French Indochina. After the June 1940 fall of France, though, Indochina fell under the Vichy regime and was no longer considered hostile towards Japan.

Effective and Ineffective Deterrence
A combination of effective Soviet deterrence of the northern strategy and ineffective US and British deterrence of the southern strategy shaped Japan’s December 1941 offensive. The USSR’s effective deterrence stemmed from the 1939 Nomonhan Incident. The presence of strong Soviet forces in Siberia and a formal non-aggression pact then maintained this incentive to avoid pushing North. In contrast, ineffective deterrence by the Anglo-Americans resulted from their weak military presence in the Far East. While the US had commenced an immense naval building program, substantial reinforcements were not expected until 1942 to 1943.

Willmott, Empires in the Balance, 51.
The USSR’s deterrence of Japan resulted primarily from the Nomonhan Incident, a three-month campaign fought between the Japanese Kwantung Army (KA) and the Soviet Far Eastern Army (FEA) between July and September of 1939. The KA was led by General Ueda Kenkichi, and the FEA was commanded by General Grigori Shtern. In 1939, the KA was comprised of eight divisions, while the FEA had roughly thirty. The conflict occurred at a disputed border between Japanese-controlled Manchukuo and the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR), a Soviet client. Japan and Manchukuo claimed that a portion of the border coincided with the northerly-flowing Khalka River, while the USSR and the MPR asserted that the line paralleled the river but ran about ten miles to its east along a line of shallow hills and the small village of Nomonhan.

In a series of three battles, the Soviets first held off and then inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Japanese. An initial battle in May 1939 involved about two thousand men on each side. The confrontation resulted in a Soviet victory after they successfully threw back an attacking Japanese detachment before it could cross the Khalka. A subsequent exchange of air raids led to reinforcements and the arrival of General Georgy Zhukov, at the time a deputy district commander in Minsk who was dispatched by Moscow to manage the situation. In a second battle in July 1939 involving about fifteen thousand men on each side, the Soviets used their large advantage in tanks and artillery to repel a Japanese assault that had initially succeeded in crossing the river. The arrival of more reinforcements by August 1939 enabled Zhukov to build up a force of six divisions against a forward Japanese position of just less than two. He also widened his advantages in tanks and artillery.

In the third and final battle, which took place in September 1939, Zhukov defeated the KA in a manner that both sides recognized as decisive. His forces used a double-envelopment plan to surround the KA 23rd Division just east of the Khalka, leading Ueda to commit the KA 7th Division to a rescue attempt. After the relief force was beaten back, the Soviets annihilated the KA 23rd. Given Ueda’s limited reserves, the FEA could have advanced deeply and threat-

ened Japan’s entire position in Manchuria. Instead, Zhukov chose to abide by the prior Soviet border and went no further. Japan then sought a truce, to which the USSR agreed. In the aftermath of the battle, Ueda was relieved of command, while Zhukov was promoted to General of the Army and appointed commander of the prestigious Kiev Military District. When informed of this battle’s outcome, Stalin remarked, “that is the only language these Asiatics understand. After all, I am an Asiatic too, so I ought to know.”

The impact of the Soviet victory against Japan was magnified by the willingness of the USSR to absorb casualties and by the striking superiority of its equipment. While the Soviets clearly triumphed on the battlefield at Nomonhan, the casualty figures of the two sides were roughly comparable. The most recent tabulation of Soviet losses showed 7,974 killed and 15,925 total casualties among 69,101 total participants. The Japanese recorded 7,306 deaths and 19,714 total casualties among their 58,925 total participants. Historian Alvin Cox attributes the high Soviet casualty rate in victory to Zhukov’s approach of prioritizing objectives over lives lost. For example, the Soviet general repeatedly employed frontal attacks during the final battle, which absorbed a great deal of damage but enabled flanking forces to encircle the enemy. The Japanese, having won relatively easy triumphs in the campaigns in Manchuria and China, were not accustomed to such a high level of resistance on the battlefield.

Nomonhan also demonstrated to Japan that its forces faced huge disadvantages in heavy weaponry and transportation on the Far Eastern Front. According to Cox, “IJA armor—at its peak—was outnumbered by about 7:1 at Nomonhan, was unable to slug it out for more than a few intense days, and incurred 40 percent tank losses.” In addition, by 1939, the Soviets produced about three thousand tanks annually while the Japanese had built a total of only 573 since 1929. The Soviets were also far superior in artillery, as shown by historian Stuart Goldman’s analysis of the conflict’s major

40 Cox, *Nomonhan*, 916.
41 Cox, *Nomonhan*, 918.
43 Cox, *Nomonhan*, 1024.
artillery duel, which took place in July 1939:

The Kwangtung Army allocated 70 percent of its entire artillery ammunition stock to this operation. Two-thirds of this was expended in the first two days. As the Japanese rate of fire slackened, Soviet fire intensified. Zhukov had more ammunition, more guns, and better guns. The Japanese gunners were not trained to fire artillery much beyond 6000 yards … But the Soviet heavy guns were deployed in several lines, the closest 8,000-10,000 yards away. Beyond this line were other guns that the Japanese guns could not even attempt to engage but which were able to hit the Japanese gun lines at 14,000-15,000 yards.\(^{44}\)

Logistically, Japan was also far inferior to the USSR in mechanized transport. According to Goldman, “Since the Kwangtung Army had only 800 trucks available to it in all of Manchuria in 1939, the massive Soviet effort [involving 4,200 trucks to supply Zhukov before the final battle] … was almost unimaginable.”\(^{45}\)

The Soviets maintained the deterrence they established at Nomonhan by continuously deploying strong forces on the Far Eastern Front both before and after Germany’s June 1941 invasion. During the Nomonhan battles, Germany and the USSR had signed the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in response to events in Europe, to the consternation of the Japanese. Until Operation Barbarossa’s launch, the USSR maintained stable troop numbers of about 700,000 on the Far Eastern Front against the KA’s 350,000 men.\(^{46}\) By September 1941, both Japan and the USSR had called up reserves and the number of troops on each side was about 750,000.\(^{47}\) Taking advantage of its large population, the USSR was able to maintain its overall troop numbers on the Far Eastern Front while shifting more experienced units to the Eastern Front to fight against Germany.\(^{48}\) Thus, despite German pleas to open a second front against the USSR, the Japanese did not find the conditions to be suitable.\(^{49}\)

The USSR and Japan formally agreed to peaceful relations in the April 1941 Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact. This treaty alleviated Japanese concerns of attack on Manchuria by the militarily stronger USSR. It also contained a clause specifying neutrality

\(^{44}\) Goldman, *Nomonhan, 1939*, 129.
\(^{45}\) Goldman, *Nomonhan, 1939*, 133.
\(^{46}\) Coox, *Nomonhan*, 1036.
\(^{48}\) Coox, *Nomonhan*, 1044-1045.
if either nation became engaged in hostilities with a third power. Together, these provisions provided the Japanese with a measure of security if they were to embark on a campaign against the Western powers to their south.

In contrast to the USSR’s potent deterrence of the northern strategy, the United States and Great Britain were ineffective at deterring the southern strategy. This failure was the result of insufficient Anglo-American military strength in Far Eastern naval bases. The nearest major US naval base was Pearl Harbor, home to the US Pacific Fleet. Located in the eastern Pacific, this base was more than seven thousand miles from the East Indies. The United States also maintained some closer bases, specifically Manila Bay in the Philippines, home to the US Asiatic Fleet, and Guam in the Mariana Islands. However, these two sites were only lightly fortified due to the restrictions imposed by the Washington Naval Treaties. After those treaties lapsed, the US remained reluctant to militarily upgrade the Philippines, in part because the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act had promised independence to the islands by 1944. The British had maintained a naval base in Singapore since 1921, but its defenses in terms of troops and warplanes were very weak.

Overall Anglo-American naval strength in the Pacific was inferior to that of Japan as both the United States and Great Britain faced two widely separated theaters of operations, and the ambitious US naval building program had yet to provide reinforcements. By early 1941, the British essentially fought alone against Nazi Germany following France’s capitulation. They had withstood the Battle of Britain, but this successful defense did not translate to strength in the Pacific. The priority for Great Britain’s strained naval resources was to protect the home islands and critical Atlantic shipping routes. According to historian H.P. Willmott, initial British plans called for a total of seven battleships, two to three carriers, and supporting ships to be sent to the Far East upon the commencement of hostilities with Japan. However, this force was ultimately reduced to two battleships and four destroyers as the demands of the Atlantic theater increased. These ships joined the seventeen British cruisers and two

51 Willmott, Empires in the Balance, 110.
52 Willmott, Empires in the Balance, 105.
54 Willmott, Empires in the Balance, 127-128.
destroyers already in the Far East.\textsuperscript{55} On average, however, British ships were older and of lesser quality than their US and Japanese counterparts.\textsuperscript{56}

The United States also needed to allocate ships on two separate fronts. Consequently, its forces in the Pacific were outnumbered by Japan’s, although massive reinforcements were expected between 1942 and 1945. After the expiration of naval limitations in 1936, the United States was free to build up its navy, but it did so only gradually. In 1941, the US Pacific and Asiatic Fleets possessed a total of 3 fleet aircraft carriers, 8 battleships, 49 cruisers, 80 destroyers, and 56 submarines.\textsuperscript{57} Of these, only 3 cruisers, 13 destroyers, and 29 submarines were based in the Philippines. By comparison, Japan had 6 fleet carriers, 4 light fleet carriers, 10 battleships, 38 cruisers, 112 destroyers, and 65 submarines.\textsuperscript{58} According to Willmott, in terms of quality, US and Japanese forces were superior to other navies of the era and comparable to each other.\textsuperscript{59} Crucially, though, Japan had a clear advantage in the number of aircraft carriers, the importance of which would soon be demonstrated. Also, in 1941, most of Japan’s warships could be concentrated in the Far East while the absence of a suitable base made it difficult for the US Pacific Fleet to operate there.

However, a full-scale US naval construction program was underway and was expected to provide a decisive edge over Japan beginning between 1942 and 1943. The US Two-Ocean Naval Expansion Act of June 1940 provided funding for 23 fleet carriers, 11 light fleet carriers, 83 escort carriers, 10 battleships, 42 cruisers, 334 destroyers, and 206 submarines to be delivered by the end of 1945.\textsuperscript{60} In comparison, Japan’s Circle Four program called for 1 fleet carrier, 6 light carriers, 2 battleships, 6 cruisers, 22 destroyers, and 25 submarines.\textsuperscript{61} Thus, US Chief of Naval Operations H.R. Stark said to Japan’s Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura, himself also a naval officer: While you may have your initial successes due to timing and sur-

\textsuperscript{55} Willmott, Empires in the Balance, 116.
\textsuperscript{56} Willmott, Empires in the Balance, 99.
\textsuperscript{57} Willmott, Empires in the Balance, 116.
\textsuperscript{58} Willmott, Empires in the Balance, 76.
\textsuperscript{59} Willmott, Empires in the Balance, 82, 106.
\textsuperscript{60} Willmott, Empires in the Balance, 98.
prise, the time will come when you too will have your losses, but there will be this great difference. You will not only be unable to make up your losses but will grow weaker as time goes on; while on the other hand we will not only make up our losses but will grow stronger as time goes on. It is inevitable that we shall crush you before we are through with you.\textsuperscript{62}

Consequently, the Anglo-American forces were both an ineffective short-term and a potent long-term deterrent against a Japanese naval-based offensive to the south. Therefore, if Japan were to decide that war was inevitable, an attack in the short-term followed by a shift to the defensive in the long-term would be more feasible than a delayed attack. In the view of IJN strategists, Japan had a one-to-two-year period from mid-1941 where its chances of victory were the greatest.\textsuperscript{63} In the western Pacific, pre-1941 Japanese plans had called for the conquest of the Philippines and Guam. They also pushed for the establishment of a defense perimeter about 2500 miles west of Hawaii with its eastern border in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands. Here, the IJN planned to defeat the US Pacific Fleet. Their campaign would not seek to secure an unconditional surrender, but rather an erosion of American resolve and an acceptance of Japanese gains in China, Indochina, and the East Indies.\textsuperscript{64} In early 1941, however, plans shifted as Marshal Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku advanced the idea of a preemptive attack on Pearl Harbor and set the stage for Japan’s future strike.\textsuperscript{65}

\textbf{Resolving the China Problem}

In addition to these military considerations, Japan’s assessment of the situation in China influenced its decision to move south. Faced with the Second United Front’s resistance, Japan focused on eliminating the KMT and CCP access to foreign military aid. Ongoing Japanese aggression led foreign countries to make sorely needed supplies available to China. By 1939, Japan occupied the bulk of China’s productive areas, including most of its eastern seaboard, its industrial northeast, and its lower Yangtze River Valley. Collectively these regions represented 92% of China’s modern industry and 40% of its agriculture. In November 1938, Japanese Prime Minister Fumi-

\textsuperscript{63} Willmott, \textit{Empires in the Balance}, 61.
\textsuperscript{64} Willmott, \textit{Empires in the Balance}, 74.
\textsuperscript{65} Evans and Peattie, \textit{Kaigun}, 472.
maro Konoe proclaimed a new Japanese economic order in China. By S.C.M. Paine’s analysis, Konoe’s speech:

… put the old order in Asia on death ground, attracting the attention of all the colonial powers as well as the United States, which had strong vested interests in the international legal and institutional status quo. As a result, Chiang’s pleas for their aid no longer fell on deaf ears—very bad news for Japan.66

In 1939, Japan declared a puppet regime in Shanghai headed by Wang Jing-wei, a former top KMT official who had fallen out with Chiang. Then, in 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, further compounding global political dangers in the eyes of the West.

The United States and Great Britain responded by sending military aid to China through a variety of routes, which changed between 1939 and 1941. In 1940, according to Paine, Japanese figures showed that the Chinese Nationalists were receiving “… 1000 tons of aid per month from Russia via Sinkiang, 9000 tons per month via South China, 3000 to 4000 tons per month via Burma, and 25,000 to 30,000 tons per month via French Indochina.”67 Most US aid flowed through ports in Indochina and South China while the British used the Burma Road into China’s southwest.68 However, the supply situation changed in 1940. The Vichy regime closed the Indochina route, and Japan overran the ports of South China. Then, in April 1941, supplies from the USSR ceased with the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact, leaving the Burma Road as China’s only remaining foreign supply line.69

In July 1941, Japanese leaders made the fateful decision to advance into Southern Indochina, primarily for reasons related to the China campaign. Erroneously, they believed that the United States and Great Britain would tolerate this move. Japan’s July 2nd Imperial Staff Conference adopted the “Outline of National Policies in View of the Changing Situation,” which included the statement: “Our Empire will continue its efforts to effect a settlement of the China Incident ... This will involve taking steps to advance south ... Pressure applied from the southern regions will be increased in order to force

67 Paine, The Wars in Asia, 181.
Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama provided the reasoning behind this strategy, stating:

Under present circumstances, I believe that in order to hasten the settlement of the [China] Incident, it will be absolutely necessary … to move southward and sever the links between the [Chiang] regime and the British and American powers which support it from behind and strengthen its will to resist. The movement of our troops into southern French Indochina at this time is based on these considerations.

Presumably, Sugiyama was concerned that Anglo-American agents were working to circumvent Vichy Indochina’s ban on supplying Chiang. He continued, “at present … the intrigues of Great Britain and the United States in Thailand and Indochina have increased steadily, and we cannot tell what will happen in the future.” Furthermore, Sugiyama and others did not believe that the planned action would provoke the United States. He testified:

I do not believe that the United States will go to war if Japan moves into French Indochina. Of course, we wish to do this peacefully. We also wish to take action in Thailand; but that might have serious consequences, since Thailand is near Malaya. This time we will go only as far as Indochina.

Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke agreed, saying, “a war against Great Britain and the United States is unlikely to occur if we proceed with great caution.” While Sugiyama and Matsuoka correctly assessed the risk of an actual war, they did not anticipate Roosevelt’s immediate institution of an asset freeze, which dramatically accelerated hostilities between the United States and Japan.

The Oil Imperative

Japan’s oil imperative supplied an additional reason for a southern advance in 1941. Recognizing its dependence on the hostile United States for oil, Japan built up a strategic reserve. After Roosevelt’s July 1941 asset freeze, though, the country faced an impasse. Like its military power in the Pacific, the United States’ economic sanctions were ineffective in the short-term but overwhelming in the long-

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70 Nobutaka, *Japan’s Decision for War*, 78.
71 Nobutaka, *Japan’s Decision for War*, 80-81.
72 Nobutaka, *Japan’s Decision for War*, 88.
73 Nobutaka, *Japan’s Decision for War*, 88.
74 Nobutaka, *Japan’s Decision for War*, 87.
term. As a result, the sanctions prompted Japanese imperialists to not only commit to the southern strategy but also to embark on it immediately. They decided their empire would not be surrendered.

Japan had a near total dependence on the United States for energy supplies. In June 1941, Japan’s military estimated that the nation and its armed forces required 35 million barrels of oil annually. By comparison, Japanese production had peaked at 3 million barrels per year back in 1915, as the few domestic sources had since become depleted and Manchurian ventures proved largely unsuccessful. A combined total of about 3 million barrels yearly were imported from the East Indies and from leases held by Japanese companies in Soviet-controlled northern Sakhalin. Nevertheless, more than 80% of Japan’s total oil came from the United States. Japan had also launched a synthetic fuels program to convert coal to oil, but in contrast to Nazi Germany’s efforts, theirs was unproductive.

Japan was aware that this dependence on a rival power posed considerable risks. Consequently, the country used excess importation to build a large oil reserve by 1941. Beginning with the start of the China campaign in 1937, Japan imposed tight rationing policies that reduced civilian consumption from 22 million to 13 million barrels yearly. Simultaneously, the country used aggressive importation to accumulate a reserve of 58 million barrels. Japan bought as much gasoline as possible from the United States, skirting a July 1940 restriction on 87 octane aviation fuel by purchasing lower grades that could be refined after importation. Japan also sought alternative sources of crude oil, which were very few at the time. According to historian and economist Edward Miller, in 1941:

… the United States dominated the global petroleum industry. In 1940, it lifted 1.35 billion barrels of crude oil, 63 percent of world output. Venezuela, Mexico, and lesser producers in the Caribbean and South America lifted 14 percent of the world’s crude oil … Rumania and Russia together pumped 12 percent of world supply.
The Persian Gulf was sparsely developed. British companies produced 6 percent of the world’s petroleum in Iran and Iraq, but US operations in Saudi Arabia had barely started, accounting for 0.25 percent.\textsuperscript{83}

None of the aforementioned areas outside the United States were easily accessible to Japan. The East Indies, however, were available and produced an annual output of 61 million barrels, or 3 percent of the world supply.\textsuperscript{84} In 1940, Japan pressured the Dutch to sign a contract for 22 million barrels yearly for a term of five years. Japan settled, though, for 12.5 million barrels annually on a 6-month renewable basis.\textsuperscript{85}

A July 1941 asset freeze, however, gutted Japan’s ability to purchase oil from both the United States and the East Indies. Roosevelt’s Executive Order 8832 added Japan to Executive Order 8785, which froze the assets of Germany, Italy, and those nations conquered by the Axis Powers one month prior. An accompanying statement to EO 8832 explained:

This measure, in effect, brings all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Japanese interests are involved under the control of the Government, and imposes criminal penalties for violation of the Order. This Executive Order … is designed among other things to prevent the use of the financial facilities of the United States, and trade between Japan and the United States, in ways harmful to national defense and American interests…\textsuperscript{86}

This measure meant that the use of Japanese funds for any purpose required the issuance of a specific license by the Export Control Administration, an entity staffed by the US Departments of State and Treasury. Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a noted opponent of Japanese aggression, took the lead in fashioning an unconditional freeze by denying essentially all applications for licenses.\textsuperscript{87} This move made it impossible for Japan to purchase oil and other strategic commodities from the United States.\textsuperscript{88} Britain and the Dutch government-in-exile in London, followed with similar asset

\textsuperscript{83} Miller, \textit{Bankrupting the Enemy}, 157.
\textsuperscript{84} Miller, \textit{Bankrupting the Enemy}, 158.
\textsuperscript{85} Miller, \textit{Bankrupting the Enemy}, 159.
\textsuperscript{87} Miller, \textit{Bankrupting the Enemy}, 204-205.
\textsuperscript{88} Miller, \textit{Bankrupting the Enemy}, 219.
freezes. Japan was thus cut off from East Indies oil as well.  

Because of its accumulated oil reserve, Japan was not deterred by the freeze in the short-term, even though its long-term prospects were dire. At the Imperial Conference of September 6, 1941, the director of Japan’s Planning Board stated, “our liquid fuel stockpile, which is the most important, will reach bottom by June or July of next year.” At the Imperial Conference of November 5, 1941, Prime Minister Tojo Hideki added, “two years from now, we will have no petroleum for military use. Ships will stop moving.”

Known as “the Razor” for his hardline imperialist stance, Tojo predicted that Japan’s military would be crippled, though his time window for this disaster was longer than the Planning Board’s. The depletion of oil stocks would affect not only the IJN, but also the IJA in China and Manchuria as well as the forces responsible for the defense of Japan’s home islands. Should Japan’s oil reserves run dry, both its imperialism and its sovereignty would be critically threatened.

Japan’s strongly imperialistic rulers found the sole alternative, accepting US conditions for the resumption of trade, too onerous to bear. On November 26, 1941, the United States demanded that Japan evacuate Indochina, China, and Manchuria, as well as renounce support for the Wang puppet regime. For Tojo and his colleagues, this option was impossible. It meant relinquishing the empire that Japan had built over almost fifty years after it completed two major wars and while fighting the much larger and costlier Second Sino-Japanese War. As Tojo stated, even war with the United was preferable to “being ground down without doing anything.”

Conclusion

Faced with these considerations, Japan embarked on a southern strategy in December 1941, departing from its prior focus on continental expansion and going to war with the United States and Great Britain. For Japan, effective Soviet deterrence in the North and a

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89 Miller, Bankrupting the Enemy, 219; Yergin, The Prize, 302.
90 Nobutaka, Japan’s Decision for War, 148.
91 Yergin, The Prize, 306.
weak Anglo-American presence in the South rendered this option more militarily feasible. Japan also hoped to bolster its bogged-down campaign in China by severing Chiang’s last remaining supply link through Burma. In its rapid execution of the southern option, Japan chose to operate in a limited time window during which it both held a military advantage and possessed sufficient stocks of oil. This strategy was an unwise choice for Japan made by authoritarian leaders who rejected the alternative of surrendering their empire in China, Manchuria, and Indochina. Their decision rendered World War II a global conflict and set the stage for Japan’s defeat at the hands of the Allied Powers in 1945.

During World War II, all of Japan’s worst fears were realized. Though the Japanese managed to cut off the Burma Road in 1942, the United States continued to supply the KMT by temporarily shifting to an air route, miring Japan’s efforts to overrun China. Crucially, the United States used its overwhelming industrial and naval power to dominate the central and south Pacific, liberate the Philippines, and destroy Japan’s merchant shipping. Without the latter, Japanese stocks, which had been built up with East Indies oil after the successful 1941-1942 campaign, were once again emptied. Japanese forces ran out of oil between 1944 and 1945, just as was feared in 1941. Japan’s militaristic leaders did not foresee US firebombing or the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They were well aware, however, of the dangers posed by the USSR. Amidst the two US atomic attacks, 1.5 million of Stalin’s troops invaded Manchuria and decimated a KA that had been hollowed out to fight the United States in the Pacific, the Second United Front in China, and the British in Burma. Japan’s defeat was absolute, as it was vanquished in the north, the south, and the home islands.
Inversion of the Top-Down Operation: Enslaved Voices and French Abolitionism in 1840s Senegal

Becca De Los Santos

Les travaux de la domesticité n’ont rien de pénible; ils constituent même, pour une partie de la population, et surtout pour beaucoup de captifs, une sorte de privilège d’oisiveté.¹

Commission Instituted for the Examination of Questions Relative to Slavery and the Political Constitution of the Colonies, 1842

In 1842, a French commission evaluated slavery and the possibility of its abolition in Saint-Louis and Gorée, two colonial towns in Senegal. They resolved their examination as follows: “there is nothing difficult about servitude; this work even constitutes, for a part of the population, and especially for many captives, a sort of privilege of idleness.”² This euphemistic description conveniently substitutes the phrase “travaux de la domesticité,” or “domestic work,” for slavery and “captives” for slaves. The commissioners held that for most “captives,” their status was a gift. Slavery was kind to those who were indolent, like Senegal’s enslaved population.

While we cannot take colonial documents like these as neutral descriptions of historical fact, neither should we disregard them. In fact, if preceded by proper contextualization, their value extends well beyond the text itself. The 1842 report’s depiction of a contented and idle enslaved population, though false, grants us access to a philosophy shared by many French policymakers who sought abo-

² “Annexe au Procès Verbal.”
lition in the first half of the nineteenth century. They believed that the enslaved population did not seek manumission because they enjoyed the “privilège d'oisiveté,” or privilege of idleness. Therefore, there was no need for the government to take drastic measures towards emancipation.

Yet, just six years after this evaluation, the French colonial government decreed the immediate abolition of slavery across its colonies. What, within this short span of time, prompted the move from gradual to immediate abolition? I argue that the events of the early 1840s were the turning point for the colonial administration and the abolitionist agenda in Senegal. Specifically, a survey of the indigenous population, conducted from 1842 to 1844, marked the colonial government’s prise de conscience. Its results revealed that the Senegalese people understood “freedom” and “unfreedom” as meaning more than just enslaved and free. By beginning its evaluation of Senegal with the Senegalese people, this survey inverted the top-down operation of French abolition. For the first time, it was not French metropolitan ideals that dictated Senegalese lives through the colonial administration. Instead, the indigenous population informed the colonial administration, who reported back to the metropole.

The 1840s are often cited as a crucial decade for French abolitionism because of the anti-slavery legislation promulgated in the decade’s latter half. While the second half of the 1840s was indeed significant and cumulated in the 1848 abolition of slavery, generalizing this significance to the entire decade presents a limited view. Most accounts of abolition overlook both the results of the 1842-1844 survey and the 1844 colonial commission instituted to address emancipation in Senegal. Two previous commissions, approved in 1840 and 1842, had considered the same question: what are the best means to emancipate the colony’s slaves, if they even desire liberation? These earlier projects, however, did not transform France’s approach to slavery in Senegal. Unlike the 1844 commission, they merely reiterated and reformulated the previous decade’s policies of gradual abolitionism instead of proposing immediate emancipation.

Considered together, the survey’s questions, indigenous peoples’ responses, and the 1844 commission’s final observations provide insight into the different perceptions of Senegalese society and the institution of slavery. In analyzing this colonial survey, I consider how French colonial sources do and do not represent indigenous narratives—both free and enslaved—in the period of abolition.
From adopting this critical mode of reading, I ask how accurately did French colonial administrators present the surveyed individuals’ opinions, and how much of this information was subject to revision in favor of the commission’s agenda? I also situate Senegal within early nineteenth-century labor politics and the French colonial empire. In particular, I examine the dissonance between that period’s gradual abolitionist ideals and Senegalese reality. With this historical background, I analyze the 1844 survey and consider how it contested the previous discourse, which insisted upon the enslaved population’s contentment and indifference towards emancipation.

**Senegal and Slavery within the French Colonial Empire**

In Senegal, the question of abolition from the top-down was twofold. French officials weighed the effectiveness of anti-slavery policy and the colonial administration’s ability to implement said policy without economic loss. Colonial officials argued that Senegal differed from the plantation economies in the Caribbean because it was a colony dominated by commerce rather than the plantation-based production of commodities. Slavery in Senegal provided labor and sustained the colony’s long-distance trade. Prior to the prohibition of the Atlantic slave trade in 1818, enslaved Africans were an abundant and profitable export for traders along the Senegalese coast, enriching the colony’s economy. These enslaved people came primarily from the Sudan, a belt of grassland that covers the West African continent. Slavery had existed in Senegal and the surrounding regions prior to nineteenth-century colonization, but most enslaved people lived in or near their owners’ households. Historian Sean Stilwell offers a succinct summary: “for numerous Africans, slavery became the central method to mobilize labor, acquire status, govern states, and/or ensure household-level reproduction. Slavery was a common response to the need for people to work longer, harder, or in innovative ways as Africans developed new social structures, permanent settled communities, militarized states, or new kinds of economies.”

Most French accounts categorized enslaved people as either “captifs de traite, acquired by purchase or capture, and captifs

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Colonial administrators also characterized slavery in France’s African colonies as much more forgiving than chattel and plantation slavery in the Americas. Julien Penel, chief of a comprehensive study of indigenous law in 1892 Mali, offered the following description:

In entering a house, a stranger could not distinguish between captifs and owners, living among the others in an affectionate familiarity. It is not rare for a captif de case to become a trusted advisor and a counselor to his master. He often conducts commerce on behalf of his master and shares the profits. He can serve, on occasion, as an agent of his master and even as a tutor. Taken together, all that the captif lacks is the abstract right to freedom so that he has nothing to envy the free man.

Scholars such as Suzanne Miers and Igor Koptyoff in 1977 conceptualized slavery in Senegal as a series of relationships similar to marriage. Within this view, the further an enslaved person was from their originally enslaved ancestor, the more mobility they had to move towards acceptance as quasi-kin within their owners’ communities.

It is true that enslaved people in Senegal played significant commercial roles that greatly differed from those played by enslaved people in the Americas, including within the French Empire. This discrepancy points to a major difference between Senegal and the French colonies in the Caribbean. Unlike in Martinique and Saint-Domingue, where the French exploited enslaved people to work profitable sugar and coffee plantations, in Senegal, enslaved people, their trade, and their labor strengthened an already profitable economy. This economic benefit first and foremost attracted the French.

The question of abolition in Senegal, however, reveals that enslaved people did experience a “kinlessness” that could not be resolved through integration into their owners’ communities. In fact, contrary to Miers and Koptyoff’s theory, the alienation of enslaved people was further exacerbated by this integration. Because

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slavery assured at least some form of financial security and housing, enslaved people often preferred an amelioration of their work to manumission and escape. As Trevor Getz explains, “the skilled, wage-earning slaves of St. Louis, especially, relied on their masters for housing, which was not otherwise easily obtainable except on the nearby mainland.” If an enslaved person demonstrated diplomatic or commercial skills and maintained the trust of their owner, they could assume some of the most essential roles within society, such as an interpreter (maître de langues) or ship captain (patron de rivière). In these positions of counsel, enslaved individuals could accumulate wealth. However, this wealth did not translate into financial independence; their incomes and shelter still depended on the employment or rather, domination by their owners. Flight exposed runaways to re-capture in surrounding polities like Waalo and Kajoor, where slave-traders were abundant. Thus, an enslaved person was only granted security by the very institution that undermined their autonomy.

Slave-Owners in 1830s Senegal

On September 7, 1831, the governor of Senegal, Thomas Renault de Saint-Germain, wrote a report to the Minister of the Navy, Henri Gauthier, about the colony’s newest project: a census of all its inhabitants. In conducting this project, the colonial administration faced considerable resistance from the people of Senegal, who strenuously opposed being recorded. As Saint-Germain described, “the superstition of the indigenous people is such that they will undoubtedly attribute the deaths during this winter to this measure [the census].” The persistence of colonial officials in the face of this resistance indicates the census was, above all, for the French administration’s benefit.


9 Getz, Slavery and Reform, 84.

One of the census’s motivations was to define the function of enslaved people in Senegal. By the 1830s, the captive population of Saint-Louis and Gorée well outnumbered their free indigenous populations. In 1838, Senegal’s entire population floated around 17,000, of whom 10,010 were enslaved (6,137 in Saint-Louis and 3,873 in Gorée). For comparison, excluding the troops at garrisons and the civil servants throughout the colony, all of Senegal contained merely 5,020 free indigenous individuals and 133 Europeans.\footnote{11 “Annexe au Procès Verbal.”}

As represented in the census, most of the slave-owners came from West Africa. Slavery provided a reservoir of laborers with manual, domestic, governmental, and trade skills. Enslaved individuals were hired out to European residents and colonial residents. Slave-owners secured passive income from this work, claiming half of their slaves’ wages. They also had a guardianship claim over the children born to any of the enslaved women within their household, regardless of whether a child was born to two enslaved parents or an enslaved woman and her owner. These children of slave status often spent their entire lives within the same household, enabling generations-long genealogies of enslavement. Often, young enslaved girls were raised to be their owner’s wives or concubines.\footnote{12 Paul E. Lovejoy, “Concubinage and the Status of Women Slaves in Early Colonial Northern Nigeria,” \textit{The Journal of African History} 29, no. 2 (1988): 246.}

Moreover, the majority of slave owners in Saint-Louis and Gorée were members of the \textit{métis} community, which is estimated to have been around 1,200 individuals in 1830.\footnote{13 Léon d’Anfreville de La Salle, \textit{Notre Vieux Sénégal: Son Histoire, Son État Actuel, Ce Qu’il Peut Devenir} (Paris: Augustin Challamel, 1909), 102, \url{https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k57844453}.} Composed of individuals with Euro-African descent, the \textit{métis} population was influential in multiple spheres. Their unique heritage granted them access to both European and African social and commercial networks. It also gave them childhood immunity to diseases such as yellow fever, enabling them to resist common dangers of the tropical environment. Slave labor sustained their agricultural pursuits, notably in the commerce and trade of gum Arabic and domestic work within their households.\footnote{14 Hilary Jones, \textit{The Métis of Senegal: Urban Life and Politics in French West Africa} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013, 40-41.)} These households were large; many members of the \textit{métis} population owned a significant amount of land and slaves.
Some of the most remarkable members of this population were the signares (derived from the Portuguese, “senhora”), métis and African women who married European men and drew their influence from property ownership in land and in slaves. The signares used kinship ties to strengthen and organize their networks, expanding into “the mercantile company and the trade systems of the island [and] to acquire gold and slaves from upriver expeditions.”

Being of Afro-European descent, members of the métis community were the offspring of unions between Frenchmen and signares. The “marriage” of a Frenchman was expected upon arrival in Senegal, even if he was already married. French wives usually did not accompany their husbands on their travels. To European men, African women—whether enslaved or free—represented comfort, sexual intimacy and fulfillment, and companionship. These women were to tend to them when ill and act as trading partners in a foreign land. Since concubinage was not common practice in Europe, an indigenous woman could become an already-married European man’s wife through marriage contracts under indigenous Senegalese law.

French men could effectively have two wives under two different legal systems. This politically and economically advantageous marriage offered access to education and financial stability to the signare’s children. Signares accumulated property and inherited wealth from their European husbands when they died in Senegal. They also accumulated passive incomes by renting enslaved persons and property to European merchants. Enslaved people worked for signares as skilled laborers and as a part of their entourage.

**Enslaved Population in Senegal**

The location of Saint-Louis at the mouth of the Senegal River and the Atlantic Ocean guaranteed economic opportunity and skill acquisition for both enslaved and free members of Senegalese society. Access to the river promoted the influx and outflux of merchants, sailors, vendors, and traders. Afro-European interaction increased in both Saint-Louis and Gorée after the Napoleonic Wars. During

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these wars, the British seized both ports. Although they had promised to return Saint-Louis and Gorée in the condition they had found them, the economic conditions had drastically changed by that time. The decline of the slave trade prompted the French to look for other sources of revenue. When the French resumed occupation of Senegal in 1817 and essentially abandoned the Atlantic slave trade in 1818, merchants from Bordeaux invested in the Senegalese market. The influx of French merchants shifted the commercial landscape towards wholesale and retail. Colonial administrators identified cotton and gum Arabic as meaningful commodities to encourage agricultural production. The expansion of the French textile industry led to a demand for imported cotton, the production of which was new to the colonial agenda. Like gum Arabic, guinée, a blue cloth from India over which French merchants held a monopoly, acted as a means of payment for raw cotton. However, unlike for gum Arabic, Africans showed little interest in cotton cloth. French colonialists experimented with cotton plantations, but they failed. In the 1830s, the exportation of peanuts increased. Through the export of raw materials, the colonial government sought to control the Senegalese market and diverted investments away from local small trade of tropical fruits, Wolof fine gold jewelry, iron, salt, cattle, and cloth.

While engaging in commerce, tradesmen and merchants were often accompanied by their captives. Captives also came into the colony and worked on behalf of their owners. By virtue of this commercial activity, “many of the enslaved people were highly mobile, moving freely in and out of the city in the service of their owners [...] Life in Saint-Louis was probably more secure, and even for slaves, probably better than their options elsewhere.”

Demand for enslaved people in the tiny French colony of Senegal remained strong. An enslaved person’s price depended upon age and sex. The price at which women were sold decreased by age, indicating the value placed upon fertility and sexual availability. Girls under fourteen years of age were valued at 400 francs, 50 francs more than boys under fourteen. Once a woman reached maturity, her price rose to 490 francs. Then, after forty, it fell to 320 francs.

21 Sene et al., New Orleans, Louisiana, 40.
francs, around the time of menopause and at-risk pregnancies. For men, however, the price skyrocketed from 350 francs to 580 francs after fourteen years of age, speaking to the value placed upon enslaved men’s capacity for manual work. In the census, the price of men sixty years old and older is stricken out. After this age, men were presumably physically worn out and close enough to the end of their lives that they lost all value.

An enslaved person’s profession also influenced the price at which they were valued. According to the census from 1836 to 1842, carpenters were valued on average at 823 francs, caulkers at 867 francs, masons at 644 francs, textile workers at 370 francs, sailors at 410 francs, cooks at 500 francs, and ship captains at 1,500 francs. These positions were the most common professions of enslaved men. Sailors were most likely less valued because they were plentiful and transient. On the other hand, skilled artisans, like carpenters and caulkers, or experienced rivermen, like ship captains, were costly and harder to come by. An enslaved person was an economic instrument that could be acquired, and their range of skills was an important consideration in their sale. They were an investment that contributed to their owner’s commercial assets and activity.

Crisis Brewing
In the 1830s, Senegal was in crisis. In 1830, its urban areas experienced a significant increase in cases of yellow fever and malaria. Transmitted by mosquitoes, yellow fever thrives in tropical climates with adequate rainfall. It was coined the “white man’s disease,” as it disproportionately infected European arrivals. Senegal’s European population was composed of adults who came to the colony without any previous exposure to these diseases. They therefore lacked the antibodies that enabled more of the indigenous population to survive infection. Europeans in Saint-Louis and Gorée, the two most important colonial posts, suffered the most. The death rate amongst these

civilians was over fifty percent.\textsuperscript{24}

The 1830s also saw a crisis in commerce. From the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, the textile industry’s demand for gum Arabic grew as Europe underwent a gradual process of industrialization.\textsuperscript{25} The price of this stiffening substance doubled between the 1780s and 1830s, resulting in prices more than twenty times what they had been a hundred years prior. As Senegalese merchants invested more and more into the gum Arabic trade over the nineteenth century, the colonial government began to fear excessive competition. As early as the 1820s and as late as the mid-1830s, the Moors’ control over the gum trade along the upper Senegal River resulted in conflict with the French, who saw this control as a preventative to free trade. Their concern grew to the point that the French and Moors did, from time to time, engage in warfare over the gum trade.\textsuperscript{26} In the early 1830s, the French colonial government declared a minimum price floor for \textit{guinée}. Similar to cotton, \textit{guinée} was equally used as a form of deferred payment, lent “out for the course of the gum season in return for a set quantity of gum per piece payable at the end.”\textsuperscript{27} What the French had perceived as excessive competition led to a crisis in the latter half of the decade, when harvests began to fail and Senegalese merchants overinvested.\textsuperscript{28}

\textbf{Rachat and Engagés à Temps}

When France ceased its legal activity in the Atlantic slave trade in 1818, the Restauration government looked for ways to expand agricultural opportunities in Senegal. After centuries of selling human beings to labor on New World plantations, “Africa… was now assigned a fresh function: to sell raw produce, and only to indus-


\textsuperscript{25} Roberts, \textit{Two Worlds of Cotton}, 1.


\textsuperscript{28} Nigro, “Trading for Empire,” 11.
trial Europe.”Governor Julien Schmaltz and his successor, Baron Jacques-François Roger, were given the task of making Senegal profitable again. Roger, the colony’s civilian governor, was particularly entrusted with finding laborers for cotton, indigo, and gum plantations. The two of them would transform the region. In fact, “Roger dedicated his entire career in the colony to overhauling French colonial practices, particularly through abolishing slaving, refocusing the center of the French empire from the Caribbean to West Africa, and transforming Senegal from a trading entrepôt to a productive agricultural colony.”

In the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, Schmaltz appealed to Senegal’s indigenous population to assist him in his agricultural project. He depended upon them to identify an ideal location where he could develop cash-crop plantations. The most important aspects about a location were the availability of cheap labor, land, and easy transportation. The kingdom of Waalo was his target location since it was near Saint-Louis and relatively fertile. In 1819, he asked Saint Louis’ mayor to negotiate a treaty with the brak, or king, of Waalo, who agreed “because he saw the French as an ally against the Trarza Moors who persisted in raiding Waalo for slaves and booty.”

When Roger came to power, he continued the economic transformation that Schmaltz began. As both an abolitionist and a governor, Roger saw an opportunity for a new labor system. Termed engagement à temps, this institution which would provide indentured laborers for further agricultural exploitation in the Senegal River Valley. In addition, engagement would act as a means of gradual abolition and offer a more amiable substitute to slavery. Sanctioned by ordinance in 1823, engagement was a system of indenture that would be targeted towards enslaved individuals rescued from the trade and formerly enslaved individuals from Saint-Louis and Gorée. They


31 Getz, Slavery and Reform, 84.

would be emancipated after working for at least a fourteen-year period to pay off their *rachat* ("redemption").

Indenture was not a new phenomenon within the contemporary Atlantic world. Over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, indentured servitude was the widespread response in British North America to a lack of laborers. In nineteenth-century Senegal, the *engagement* system nurtured the vision for increased plantation agriculture, for which *engagés à temps* would be the coercible labor force. The Minister of the Navy posited *engagement* as a form of apprenticeship that fit into a cultural civilizing mission. To Roger specifically, it was a sort of mercy to be offered rather than brutal enslavement by "uncivilized" Africans.

In the late 1830s, the gum industry proved to be insufficiently profitable to facilitate the economic transition that the government had envisioned in 1817. Unlike in Haiti, where the warm and humid climate made for fertile planting grounds, Senegal’s climate was not suited to intensive agriculture. In Richard-Toll, a town in northern Senegal where Roger focused his efforts, annual rainfall averaged a mere twelve to fourteen inches. Moreover, *engagement* did not provide enough workers at a high enough rate for such a strenuous manual operation. In 1829, gum Arabic plantations in Richard-Toll were abandoned. Other crops, like cotton and indigo, also succumbed to environmental factors and competition in the global market.

Given these agricultural difficulties, *engagement* was increasingly attached to the civilizing mission as opposed to the procurement of new laborers for agriculture. In 1831, King Louis Philippe I stressed the criminality of slave-trading across his colonial empire. Enslaved individuals who were seized from the trade would enter into *engagement* in order to reduce trading. In Senegal, the French ideal looked like this: enslaved individuals from the interior would learn a new skill, become proficient in it, work in an economic center such as Saint-Louis, and then return to their indigenous communities where they would spread civilized practices from people more civilized than them. Even if they remained in the employment of *engagistes* (owner-like figures) instead of returning to their indigenous

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34 Brignac, “Free and Bound,” 40.
36 Zuccarelli, “Le Régime des Engagés.”
communities, at least they escaped the clutches of slavery. This was enough to satisfy French abolitionists.

The *engagement* system supplied labor in response to the decreasing influx and trade of enslaved people in economic centers. It followed a similar model to slavery’s generational perpetuation. Just as “slave status” was inherited by the children of enslaved women, “[c]hildren born of former female slaves who became indentured servants also had obligations. Though free, they had to work for their mother’s employers until the age of twenty-one. In return, they were fed.” As such, *engagement* also resembled the 1833 British abolitionist policies of apprenticeship and compensation. Formerly enslaved people continued to work under *engagistes* and paid off the price of their emancipation with more work. *Engagement à temps* was such a convenient means of supplying free labor and compensating former slave owners that, in 1836, Senegal’s *ordonnateur*, Louis Laurent-Auguste Guillet, suggested that France should abolish slavery with an indemnity of 300 francs for each enslaved person. Slavery would then be replaced by *engagement.* 38

Around the same time that Saint-Germain took office and led the census efforts, the Minister of the Navy pushed another form of manumission: *rachat.* Through *rachat*, an enslaved person in Senegal could hypothetically purchase their freedom using the money that they retained from their share of their own wages. In 1832, an act that permitted slaves to make “a demand to be definitively recognized as free,” was passed. 40 According to the act, this demand had to go through the mediation of either their master or the *procureur du roi* (“royal attorney”). Some form of monetary exchange between the parties needed to occur. How, when, and under what conditions this exchange would occur, however, was not clear. Governmental supervision was lacking, in part due to the colonial administration’s high turnover rate. From 1817 to 1840, Senegal changed governors sixteen times. These frequent changes created inconsistency in the application of policies.

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40 Getz, *Slavery and Reform*, 73; Guillet, “Notes de l’Ordonnateur.”
The number of *engagés à temps* in the census preserves the memory of the French’s dubious efforts to shift the labor force away from slavery and towards generalized emancipation. On top of the 10,010 enslaved individuals that worked and lived in Saint-Louis and Gorée, the 1838 census mentions a total 1,748 *engagés à temps* in these towns. Instead of forgoing *engagement* when their agricultural ventures failed, the French continued to push individuals from one form of coerced labor into another. This continued enforcement of unfree African labor occurred under the guise of gradual abolition. Kelly Brignac summarizes it well: “*engagement* and *rachat* can be situated in this broader historical transition: the French sought to rebuild economic profits in the peripheries of its empire by creating a labor system that technically obeyed anti-slaving treaties and ordinances.”\(^41\) They did so while retaining a large captive population that outweighed the *engagé* population nearly six to one.

*Engagement* encouraged financial and moral indebtedness to the French. Formerly enslaved people were obliged to their *engagistes*, to whom they paid the price of their freedom by working. They could only pay this price because of the French *engagement* system, which supposedly spared them from eternal enslavement.\(^42\) *Engagement* perpetuated the idea that freedom was indeed not free. In reality, it demonstrated that the absence of slavery did not create freedom. Under this system, the burden of reclaiming freedom would fall upon the formerly enslaved persons themselves. *Rachat* was an explicit expression of this burden, acting as another means to impose indebtedness upon the enslaved population. The enslaved population owed an indeterminate sum to their owners, under indeterminate conditions, with indeterminate supervision. These ambiguous conditions reflected the French commitment to preserve private property in the form of an enslaved African labor force.

**The 1844 Investigation**

By the early 1840s, the abolitionist agenda had made little progress in Senegal. What the French envisioned as steps towards abolition—*engagement* and *rachat*—ultimately demonstrated the colonial administration’s ineptitude. Few enslaved people followed these paths to freedom. In 1840, the Minister of the Navy appointed a special commission that reiterated the agenda of gradual emancipation,

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\(^41\) Brignac, “Free and Bound,” 11.
\(^42\) Brignac, “Free and Bound,” 22.
proposing a system of apprenticeship much like engagement. Ironically, even fellow administrators frowned upon this proposal. This rejection was not in favor of slavery but rather against the greater colonial administration’s inability to implement effective policies. According to the “normally esclavagiste (proslavery) commander of Gorée,” it was “necessary for their [captives’] liberation to be both instantaneous and definitive.”

Two years later, the Commission of Colonial Affairs was called upon to reconsider the mechanics of a gradual abolition. In the minutes of their May 1842 meeting, they outlined the apparent difficulties that they faced in their humanitarian mission. The Commission remarked that Islam prevented the intervention of French law in indigenous affairs. Islamic jurists had increasingly governed the surrounding Western African polities since the beginning of the nineteenth century with the establishment of theocracies such as Futa Toro and Futa Jalon. By the nineteenth century, most Senegalese were converts or practicing Muslims. Consequently, Muslims were closely tied to commerce in Saint-Louis and Gorée. Muslim merchant families wielded influence with their wealth and property, which included enslaved individuals. They were also accomplices to the slave trade thanks to their shared values with slave-trading interior leaders. These included “the practice of Islam, a hierarchical social structure that emphasized tribute and labor service, and a wide-ranging commerce in many goods.”

In addition, the Commission stressed that the colony’s commercial relationships with the surrounding peoples, who had no interest in abolishing slavery, would be jeopardized by emancipation. If news traveled—which it inevitably would—a state in which slavery was abolished would encourage foreign enslaved peoples to flee and inflict financial loss upon the colony’s trading partners. Finally, the Commission noted that the enslaved population seemed more or less content.

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46 “Annexe au Procès Verbal.”

They appealed to **rachat** as a means of easing the Senegalese people into abolition. In this view, if the enslaved population were truly discontent, they could emancipate themselves. Yet, **rachat** was a misleading measurement of the enslaved population’s contentment. Could enslaved people purchase their own freedom with the promise of post-emancipation security? Most could not. The Commission’s 1842 observations were nothing other than a redrafting of ineffective, tone-deaf policies that neglected both the indigenous population’s attitudes and reality.

The colonial administration had failed to recognize the increasing struggle and unrest amongst Senegal’s indigenous population. Between 1840 and 1848, petty crime was common in Saint-Louis. The influential merchant class was recovering from the disappointment of the gum market’s crash.\footnote{Pasquier, “Le Sénégal,” 595.} Court cases such as **Affaire des Dames Desgrigny contre le Sieur Fox, Missionnaire Anglais** (1842) brought these troubles into a more disquieting light. At the time of the affair, Antoine, the subject of the case, was twelve years old. He was born to Thérèse Nar, an enslaved woman from Gorée, who had married a free British subject, Jacques Makoumba, with her owner’s consent. On a voyage to England, where he would continue his studies, Antoine and his chaperone, the missionary Sir Fox, passed through his mother’s hometown. In Gorée, his mother’s previous owners took him captive. Although Antoine had a baptismal certificate signed outside of the colony and claimed to have never previously stepped foot in Senegal, witnesses testified that they recognized him and that he was born in Gorée.\footnote{“Affaire des Dames Desgrigny contre le Sieur Fox, Missionnaire Anglais,” 1843, SEN XIV 16, Archives nationales d’outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence, France, ark:/61561/ql127oiiqpl.}

As private counsel to the governor, the Chief of Judiciary Service wrote lamentingly that the boy was so close to “reaping the fruits of his intellect, only for him to fall into slavery.”\footnote{50“Affaire des Dames Desgrigny.”} He argued against the witnesses, who he deemed unreliable and against the jury. Moreover, the Chief drew attention to the fact that it did not matter if Antoine was born in Gorée or not. Antoine had the law on his side; a
French woman could marry a foreigner and become a foreigner herself. By virtue of this marriage, the previous owners of an enslaved French women lost their claim. The woman then passed this “foreigner status” to her children. The same was true for Thérèse and her son.

On the Isle Bourbon (modern-day Réunion), a case not too dissimilar to Antoine’s and Thérèse’s unraveled. In 1817, a man by the name of Furcy claimed his freedom. He stated that he was born to a free mother, Madeleine, and was being held against his will as a slave. Madeleine had been manumitted many years prior when Furcy was an infant. Since she was “freed” after his birth, Furcy justified his freedom by citing a voyage that his mother made to France as a young enslaved woman. His argument relied on the free-soil maxim, whereby any enslaved person who set foot on mainland France became free. This fact was hidden from Madeleine, who was actually “free” at the time of Furcy’s birth. Accordingly, Furcy was born with unrecognized free status. Cases such as these lay bare the tensions surrounding “freedom” in the pre-abolition French colonies. In Senegal, although French law attempted to standardize status heritability and politics for slavery, it held little weight within the peoples’ mind, which ascribed to indigenous and Islamic law. Vulnerable individuals such as Antoine fell victim to the manipulation of the truth and the law.

On January 23, 1844, Governor Édouard Bouët-Willaumez instituted an investigative commission. This body represented the upper echelon of Senegal’s European and métis population. It featured ten prominent members of Saint-Louis’ French community, including future métis mayors Blaise Dumont and Barthelemy Durand Valantin. The latter would represent Senegal in Paris in 1848, when the Second Republic established that seat in the constituent assembly.

The commission’s success did not depend on its ability to

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52 Jones, The Métis of Senegal, 40; “La commission réunie le 19 février à 2 heures en la salle ordinaire de ses séances, a entendu les personnes ci après nommées, et afin de reproduire avec fidélité les opinions par elles émises, leurs réponses aux questions posées plus haut ont été littéralement inscrites,” SEN XIV 13, Archives nationales d’outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence, France, ark:/61561/q1l27oiqpl.
reinforce gradual abolitionist policies like *rachat* and *engagement*, which resulted in debt relationships. Rather, it was created to assess the wider population’s sense on general emancipation. Most of the investigation would be done in Saint-Louis by interviewing formerly enslaved individuals, slave-owners, *signares*, and the principal Senegalese and European merchants. Surveying French officials also ventured out to other ports along the Senegal River to interview merchants. These groups of people, both in and outside Saint-Louis, were questioned about numerous aspects of the colony and society. The contents of the survey include mini biographies, a list of slaves under their owners, and the price of *rachat* for emancipated slaves.  

This commission concentrated its efforts towards responding to the conditions and convictions of the indigenous society. It sought out their opinion on France’s role within indigenous affairs, banking, religion, and more. The commission’s president, Monsieur Larcher, proposed thirty-five questions, some of which considered administrative matters such as state intervention in emancipation. His queries indicated the administration’s growing consciousness of Senegal’s growing financial troubles. The colony’s debt, he noted, “surpasses 2 million [francs].” Larcher then asked, “if, as a result of emancipation with preliminary indemnity amounting to 3 million [francs], for example, was assigned to the redemption of the 6,000 captives in Saint-Louis and this larger sum thrown into the town’s monetary flux, would the money be usefully used to pay off the debt?”; “Would the liberation of the majority of debt-holders not result in bringing the colony back to prosperous conditions, as it had been so spectacularly like in other times?”; “Did not the enormous debt that weighs almost entirely on the indigenous population produce a hopelessness and bring them to a state of inertia that is the biggest obstacle to the development of work, industry, and morality?”

The French understood that Senegal’s economy was not as profitable as it was during the Atlantic slave trade. They attribut-
ed the debt to what they perceived as the indigenous population’s “hopelessness,” “inertia,” and slow economic development. Yet, while economic development may have slowed, it was an inaccurate to attribute this phenomenon to population-wide despair. From the French perspective, did external events such as the crash of the gum economy and failed cotton plantations (both of which they had a hand in) not have any influence on Senegal’s economy? Contrary to this gloomy portrait of the economy, there was also proof of profit from the peanut trade, which had taken off in 1840.\textsuperscript{55}

The survey’s emphasis on Senegal’s economy seems to touch on more than just French concern for the indigenous population’s well-being. If profitable, slavery’s abolition would be all the more worth it. Emancipation would serve French efforts to bring Senegal back to prosperity, and, more broadly, it would increase European investments in West Africa. The exploitation of Senegal’s economic profitability and the colony’s economic revival were just as much a part of the colonial agenda as in 1817.

Moreover, the survey contained questions that reveal the French administration’s poor understanding of Senegalese competence and functioning. It asked, “do Africans understand the importance of the economy?”; “do Africans care innately enough for [land] ownership and family to feel a need to work?”; “do Africans provide for their family members’ needs with the money they earn?”; and “is education progressing amongst Africans?”\textsuperscript{56} These questions certainly do not inspire faith in the French’s portrait of the indigenous population.

As trivial and misleading as these questions may be, they are nevertheless significant. The fact that the French approached the indigenous population and recorded their answers was a significant development in their administration. Firstly, the survey required resources. Considering France’s difficulties with introducing the Senegalese census in the early 1830s, the commission’s task was not easy. Secondly, the French explicitly acknowledged that not all was well in Senegal. Contrary to previous reports, both the enslaved and free were not generally content. Finally, the commission’s investigative efforts distinguish 1844 from 1840, 1842, and all other gradual abolitionist efforts in their unrivaled bestowal of attention to the colonized population. This survey was not a standardized recording

\textsuperscript{55} Getz, \textit{Slavery and Reform}, 42.

\textsuperscript{56} “Questions préparées par Mr le Président.”
of the colony’s inhabitants like the census. Rather, it documented the indigenous population and their opinions on the state of slavery, the possibility of abolition, and colonial legislation. By collecting this information, the commission arrived at a conclusion that at least acknowledged and at most incorporated the indigenous population’s diverse perspectives into their policy considerations.

It must be stressed, however, that the narratives from this survey cannot be taken to be wholly reflective of the general population’s opinion. The role of language in Senegal gives one reason for suspicion. Like the census, French officials conducted the survey in French. They, therefore, transcribed the interviewed individuals’ speech in French. Yet, in the 1840s, the majority of Africans understood or spoke little of this language. French was not the general population’s first language, nor was it the language in which they engaged with the rest of Senegalese society. Rather, “Wolof prevailed everywhere in daily life. Even Frenchmen spoke it in the family circle since few of the signaras understood any French.”57 Among the people of Senegal, those who did speak French were of a higher socioeconomic status, notably wealthy male merchants. This trend narrows the survey’s sample of the population. Even among this group, a language barrier may still have influenced their recorded answer. The opinions that surveyors transcribed reflect, to some extent, the official’s understanding of their interviewees’ speech. The conducting official may not have understood the Africans’ answers. Nor is there any promise that the interviewees understood the French officials’ questions. Communication between the two parties could have easily been limited by these hurdles.

Another factor to consider is the content of the survey and its cultural barriers. For example, one of the potential developments that interested the French was the creation of caisse d’épargne, a savings bank. The survey asked, “would the institution of a savings bank, creating interest off all the sums that would be deposited there, be suitable for teaching Africans about the benefits of savings?” In anticipation of abolition, one of the French administration’s main concerns was the captive population’s financial literacy. If emancipated, would enslaved people be able to provide for their families and themselves using their education and skills? Since these individuals

represented such a large fraction of the population, their financial ruin would have brought down the colony. Within the administrative imagination, the creation of a savings bank would effectively ensure that previously enslaved individuals managed their wages through a centralized system in spite of the little financial education that they had received. The financial infrastructure of Senegal would resemble that of the metropole more closely.

Survey results suggest that Senegalese general opinion was in favor of a savings bank. However, as Ghislaine Lydon notes, the validity of these results is doubtful. The idea of a savings bank may have not been foreign to the indigenous population, but the term, “caisse d’épargne,” most likely was. Those familiar with the idea also most likely knew that it opposed the Islamic tradition of *riba*, the prohibition of accumulating or paying interest.

Answers from Senegal’s indigenous population also reflected colony’s social diversity. Islamic leaders, for example, were not unanimous in their responses. Their difference of opinions was less rooted in how they viewed the moral correctness of slavery and more in their predictions of how the enslaved population and owners would fare if emancipated. Many were concerned with the economic and societal consequences of abolition and to what extent the tradition of slavery could be uprooted. Their opinions were determined by how much they weighed the correctness of abolition and inalienability of freedom against the possible negative consequences of emancipation.

This concern took the form of questions such as: what would happen if enslaved people no longer lived at the expense of their owners? Would captives then turn to thievery? Could the “whites” assure that formerly enslaved individuals agree to work? What could make up for the profit that enslaved people procured for their owners? How could societal order be retained if the society was re-ordered? One Muslim elite, Madamel Sicé, responded:

> You tell us that [the situation of slavery] needs to change. Why, then, if all of us, free and captives, are well-off? Don’t you have rich and poor people in your country? You argue that the wealth of the rich serves the industry of the poor and provides them with living conditions. It's the same here: we are the ones who feed our captives, who take care of them, who heal them when they are

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sick, and they only suffer from hunger when we ourselves do. Even if it was agreed that to be free was better than to be captive, slavery provided structure and therefore, a stable social hierarchy. Enslaved people did indeed rely upon employment by their owners which, in turn, guaranteed a sufficient free labor force. These traditions had existed for generations. Slavery wove the histories of enslaved and free families together. To emancipate the enslaved and destroy the very institution that brought these people together would be to sever the ties that bound Senegal’s social and commercial networks. One enslaved woman, Lisa Auré, expressed the impossibility of the situation that abolition seemingly entailed: “I very much want to be free, but under the condition that I would always stay under the patronage of my mistress because with her support, even if free, I fear that I would become miserable.”

**Observations and Conclusions**

Despite its shortcomings, the 1844 survey is a landmark within French abolitionist history. Until that moment, the abolitionist movement was a top-down operation under the guise of the metropole. Members of the elite drew inspiration from the Enlightenment, took up the abolitionist cause, and exercised their influence within their social and intellectual circles throughout decades of political change within France. During and after the Napoleonic Wars, pressure to move towards abolition increased. In response, colonial policies accounted for the humanitarian and economic agenda in Senegal, but not the indigenous society’s traditions and systems of beliefs. The push for *rachat* and *engagement* from the 1820s up until the 1840s speaks in large part to an insistence on French ideals and profit. French officials favored gradual change over immediate abolition to avoid bloodshed, revolution, and a loss of free laborers.

Here, I appeal to the commission’s final observations on May 23, 1844, which pinpoint the shift in the colonial administration’s satisfaction with the status quo.

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I thank Dr. Thiago Mota at the Universidade Federal de Viçosa for highlighting this quote and the succeeding quotes within the survey.

60 “Examen de la Question d'Emancipation.”
discourse on slavery and abolition in Senegal. Even if slavery did not take the form of chattel slavery or slave plantations like in Saint-Domingue, the colony’s enslaved people desired freedom. In fact, they desired freedom in the same way that enslaved people in Martinique, Guadeloupe, and the rest of the French colonies desired freedom. The president of the commission wrote:

I make this very simple observation to respond to an argument that has been presented a few times in prior discussions. One had thought that captives [in Senegal] had been much happier than free people, and that they even refused emancipation if it was offered to them: I don’t know if the captives are happier than the free people, but what is certain is that they hardly desire this pleasure [slavery]; we have not heard a single captive speak in this way, it’s contrary to how we have seen them seize with such zeal and ardor the idea of liberty when we presented it to them, that we have had to stop our investigation in light of the fervor of their expressions [for freedom]. [...] We must therefore abolish slavery in Senegal.61

It was only thanks to the survey that the commission was able to correct a process of mistaken thinking that had dominated the earlier discussions of abolitionist policies. Contrary to the former prevailing view, enslaved people were not content. The desire to remain within the service of slave-owners was not to be confused for complacency or satisfaction. In fact, it was an expression of discontentment and a fear of destitution. Enslaved individuals such as Lisa Auré saw themselves stuck between two evils—slavery and insecurity—neither of which promised their desired independence and stability. Even amongst the free population, a similar concern over the practical aspects of abolition made individuals hesitate.

The act of speaking to, discussing, and engaging with the indigenous population enabled the colonial administration to incorporate the realities of Senegalese society into the abolitionist discourse. For the first time, the top-down function of the abolitionist agenda was challenged. The indigenous narrative resisted these false modes of thought that had preserved inefficient measures of abolition and redirected policymakers to more immediate measures. If abolition was necessary, as it appeared so, then it had to be imminent. This conclusion echoed the commander of Gorée’s words in 1840. It was “necessary for their [captives’] liberation to be both instantaneous

On the illuminated letters of Psalm 98, a penitent Charlemagne (d. 814), leader of the Carolingian Empire, kneels together with his sister Gisela (d. 810), the abbess of Chelles (Figure 1). Saint Gilles of Provence, or Aegidius (d. 710), joins them in celebrating mass and receiving communion. ¹ This image, featured in a late thirteenth-cen-

¹ Gilles was a seventh-century hermit who founded a monastery in Provence. According to legend, he defended a hind against hunters. During the Middle Ages, he became a very popular saint as the protector of cripples, lepers, and nursing mothers.
The Book of Hours, depicts the arrival of a letter from God telling the saint that Charlemagne refrained from confessing his sin of incest. Gisela, He reveals, is pregnant with a son and nephew who is to be named Roland. The story of Gisela and Charlemagne’s sinful union reappears in a variety of sources from the same period. It is sculpted into the south transept of Chartres’ Cathedral of Notre Dame (Figure 2) and painted on a wall in the chapel of Saint Clement. It adorns the pages of the 1260 Psalter of Lambert le Bègue. Two separate chapels of Saint Lauren, one located near Nantes and the other in the Loire Valley, represent the story in fresco. These numerous visual depictions demonstrate that the belief of Roland being Gisela and Charlemagne’s son was not a localized myth but a narrative that became popular in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Together, these images of repentance set the tone for much of what is remembered about Gisela’s life, a life defined by her alleged intimate relationship with her brother.

2 The Book of Hours was a late medieval prayer book used by lay people for private devotion. For a general description of the Book of Hours, see “[Book of Hours],” Library of Congress, accessed April 5, 2014, https://www.loc.gov/item/50041712/. Like many other editions, this Book of Hours was personalized for its patron, a Beguine in Liège, Belgium. The volume likely comes from around 1280 CE. “Psalter-Hours,” The Morgan Museum and Library, MS. M.183, folder 123r.

In contrast to the pervasiveness of the Saint Gilles narrative, the details of Gisela’s biography remain elusive. Even her name—alternatively Gisela, Gisla, Ghysla, or Gela—has been subject to different interpretations. Despite these uncertainties, her position as a religious and royal woman of the Carolingian court has left historians with many documents from which to raise more substantial questions regarding her and Charlemagne’s purported sin. Gisela was likely born towards the end of 757 CE, though her exact birthdate is unknown. The daughter of Pepin the Short, she was Charlemagne’s only surviving sister. Several eighth-century sources demonstrate her devotion to the monastic order, intellectual life, and the Carolingian court. Though betrothed to Leo, the son of Emperor Constantine V, Gisela instead pursued a life of faith. Around 780 CE, she joined the monastery of Chelles as a nun and purportedly became its abbess, though her leadership remains disputed.

Gisela led an incredibly rich life in Chelles, leaving behind relics, annals, and a scriptorium. She enriched her monastery both materially and culturally. Gisela

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4 This estimate of Gisela’s birthdate is based on a 758 CE letter from Pope Paul I to her father, King Pippin. In the letter, Paul acknowledged his reception of the linen used at Gisela’s baptism, a token of his proxy godparenthood.

5 See Jinty Nelson, “Chapter 17 Alcuin’s Letters Sent from Francia to Anglo-Saxon and Frankish Women Religious,” in *The Land of the English Kin*, (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2020), 365. Gisela’s position is put into doubt as “no contemporary writer of annals, charters or letters identified her as an abbess.” The first evidence of her holding that position comes from the seventeenth century, when Jean Mabillon and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz made “the supposition that Gisela was an abbess (and the most important in the empire).” Historians then “either borrowed [that supposition] or re-supposed it.” See Nelson, “Chapter 17,” 365.

Since the seventeenth century, it has also frequently been asserted that Gisela was abbess of Notre-Dame de Soissons. One historian of the diocese even claims that she lived, died, and was buried there. I think this is wrong, as her cousin Theodrada must have been abbess there by 804 CE at the latest. When Saint Paschasius Radbertus took monastic vows at Soissons as a boy, Theodrada was in office. He was born around 790 CE.

More recently, it has been proposed that Gisela was abbess of Notre-Dame d’Argenteuil, a priory of Saint-Denis until Charlemagne made it independent. The evidence for this assertion, however, is not compelling.
was nevertheless able to balance these religious commitments with her prominent role in Frankish intellectual and court life. She exchanged letters with Alcuin of York (735 CE- 804 CE), a renowned scholar, clergyman, poet, and advisor to Charlemagne who played a significant role in the Carolingian Renaissance. Their correspondence points to his mentorship and their intellectual camaraderie. Likewise, Gisela maintained a close relationship with Charlemagne himself. According to the *Vita Karoli Magni*, Einhard’s famed biography of Charlemagne, the emperor “cherished as much affection for her as for his mother.”

It was not until the thirteenth century that the Church began depicting Gisela as Roland’s mother. However, this could not have been the case. “The Song of Roland,” an epic poem that emerged in the late eleventh century from French oral tradition, recounted its namesake’s death at the 778 Battle of Roncevaux Pass. Combined with the available bibliographic information on Charlemagne, Gisela, and Saint Gilles, this separate story makes the Carolingian’s alleged sin implausible. Charlemagne was born around 747 CE while Saint Gilles died in 710 CE. Roland, according to his epic, died at the age of seventeen. Paired with Gisela’s birth around 757 CE, this information suggests that Gisela would have been around four years older than Roland. She could not have been his mother.


7 In his letters, Alcuin identified Gisela as a “noble sister in the bond of sweet love” and “[assured] her of her prayers of the brethren at Tours.”

8 Einhard (b. 770 CE) was a Frankish scholar, courtier, and a dedicated servant of Charlemagne. The *Vita Karoli Magni* was his main work. According to Hodgkin in Charles the Great (1897), the biography is considered “one of the most precious literary bequests of the early Middle Ages.” Einhard, *Life of Charlemagne*, trans. Samuel Epes Turner (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1880), 51.

9 Roland, for his part, was already the subject of his own cultural lore. This is discussed at greater length below.

The contradictions between the later medieval accounts of Gisela’s life and the letters, charters, and relics from the eighth century show how important it is to uncover the truths about the lives of the royal women in Charlemagne’s court. Few medieval representations of Gisela appear apart from the myth of her and Charlemagne’s sin. Despite being possibly one of the Carolingian court’s most well-known members, this remarkable figure has been condemned to a memory that neglects her religious and political achievements to serve the political and social agendas of later medieval times. In many cases, the assumption that women like Gisela were not educated or involved in political affairs facilitates the creation of these myths, which stand in direct contradiction to historical fact.

By evaluating the various sources connected Gisela’s life and the narrative of her alleged sin, this essay seeks to unveil her true legacy—a legacy that should recognize both her incredible character and the myths that developed after her death. The persistence of imagery alluding to Gisela’s purported incest has consequences beyond one woman’s legacy. These images also provide important insights into the different roles that royal women played throughout the Middle Ages and to the messages of penance promulgated during the thirteenth century. Despite posthumous depictions as a corrupting sinner, Gisela demonstrated that royal women played important and unique roles due to their ability to become involved in all aspects of mediaeval life; they provided a perfect common ground to integrate the religious, political, royal and intellectual circles together. The emergence of her mythical accusations parallel a broader development in Christianity: in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries medieval European society underwent a great moral transformation where fear of sin overtook the quest for individual honor as its central impetus. To affect this revolution, iconography like the Book of Hours’ depiction of Gisela was used to illuminate a “more authentic” picture of humanity, one of moral corruption, intrigue, and the “nature” which preyed on men.

The Myth of Roland:
Unravelling the Legend of Gisela’s Alleged Son

11 The Chelles monastery keeps Gisela’s relics in a twelfth-century bag, providing one notable exception to this general erasure. Hartmut Atsma and Jean Vezin, "Authentiques de reliques provenant de l’ancien monastère Notre-Dame de Chelles (VIIe-VIIIe siècles)," in Chartae Latine Antiquiores 18, no. 669, (Zurich: 1985), 84-108.
Also known as “The Song of Roland,” the Myth of Roland revolves around its namesake’s courageous stand at the 778 Battle of Roncevaux Pass.\(^\text{12}\) Roland, a knight of Charlemagne, is ambushed and killed by the Muslim King Marsilla. During the confrontation, the young man’s valor and heroism come to light.\(^\text{13}\) The poem portrays Roland, a symbol of honor, bravery, and unwavering loyalty, as the epitome of knightly virtue and willing to sacrifice his life for his king and his faith. Ultimately, Roland’s death secured him a place as a legendary figure in medieval European literature. His unwavering determination and refusal to surrender in the face of impossible odds made him an enduring symbol of heroism and martyrdom. Roland’s story survived through French oral lore before emerging as “The Song of Roland” in 1066 CE. This version of the myth arose at the beginning of the Battle of Hastings to inspire William the Conqueror’s soldiers to invade England.\(^\text{14}\)

While speculation about Charlemagne’s incest began in the tenth century with the *Vita Sancti Aegidii*, none appeared in the 1066 version of “The Song of Roland.” In fact, it was not until two centuries later that “the sin of Charlemagne” began including his sister and Roland as their son. By that time, the twelfth century had brought urbanization, economic growth, and the rise of a new merchant class. This created a sense of disconnect between the Church’s value and the new materialist society. New mendicant orders such as the Franciscans and the Dominicans surfaced as the Crusades and symbols of penance became popularized. In this new context, Roland’s heroic narrative and the Saint Gilles mass saw the introduction of a ‘sinful’ Charlemagne and Gisela to promote a new message of atonement. Examples of this new myth with respect to Charlemagne, the Crusades, and the monasteries associated with the Carolingian rulers include the Branch I of the Karlamagnus Saga, the illuminated letters (Figure 1), and the stained-glass windows in the Chartres cathedral.


\(^\text{13}\) Christopher Lucken, “From the Song of Roland to the Historia Caroli Magni: Singing or Writing War,” *Le Moyen Age* 125, no. 1 (2019): 53–73.

\(^\text{14}\) Lucken, “From the Song,” 53-54.

F. Suard, *Roland ou les Avatars d’une Folie Héroïque* (Paris: Klincksieck, 2012). Suard writes that while the Song of Roland was unknown at the beginning of the twelfth century, the legend of Roland was certainly popular, especially through the *Chronique du Pseudo-Turpin* (Historia Turpini or Historia Karoli Magni) and the numerous works that have been written afterwards.
Ines Martin

It is difficult to answer why these images of the myth of Saint Gilles were chosen. As evidenced by the many charters and documents, Gisela and Charlemagne did develop a strong and close relationship, but the reality of the emperor’s “sin” has always been a point of contention. The later perspectives of Gisela may trace back to Louis the Pious, Charlemagne’s successor. According to the historian Sylvie Joye, Charlemagne’s “excessive” relationship with his daughters influenced his successor to treat marriage in exactly the opposite manner. Louis “lost no time in making his sisters and half-sisters, and also his half-brothers and cousins, enter monastic institutions” due to the overwhelming power they had in the Carolingian court at Aachen. He “gave women back their traditional role, the weaving of alliances,” showing the dramatic transition in feminine political impact that accompanied this transition of power. Gisela’s later medieval depiction may reflect this change. Though the exact reason for their emergence remains uncertain, symbols related to Charlemagne, Roland, and penitence achieved a certain popularity at this time. Documents accounting for Gisela of Chelles’ life, however, recount a very different woman, one devoted to Chelles’ administration, her brother’s reign, and her own intellectual pursuits.

Gisela of Chelles: Reassessing the Historical Accounts and Visual Depictions
The exact date of Gisela’s introduction to the monastery of Chelles is unknown. Several textual sources, however, have survived that depict the different roles she played in the monastery as well as her religious, social, and intellectual influence at the Carolingian court. As Charlemagne’s only living sibling, Gisela proved to be a constant presence during the emperor’s thirty-year reign. It is evident that they

15 The monasteries often associated with the Carolingian rulers are Saint-Denis, Corbie, Cluny, Chelles, and Chartres.
The Karlomagnus Saga is a thirteenth-century Norse compilation about the life of Charlemagne up to the Battle of Roncevaux. It was compiled by King Hakon IV of Norway and appears to be largely based on now lost versions of twelfth-century French poems.
had an important bond, with Charlemagne entrusting his daughters Bertha (b. 779) and Rotruda (b. 775) to her at Chelles and Einhard’s *Vita Karoli Magni* repeatedly mentioning the emperor’s affection for her. Furthermore, Gisela seems to have had a major role in politics and court affairs. Charters and letters show her presence at important events such as Charlemagne’s coro

nation in 800 CE and the royal *divisio* in 806 CE, where she championed the claims of young Charles, the emperor’s oldest son. Her defense of Charles demonstrated her decisive voice in the division of Carolingian territories and power, which was extremely unusual for women and abbesses.

Due to her thorough education, Gisela was able to teach and advance the cause of education in the Church in the eighth century, making Chelles central to monastic culture and creating a close link between Charlemagne’s court and religious life. Historian Helene Scheck writes that “she aggressively collected an extraordinary collection of relics, erected at least one church, and donated a large sum to the royal basilica of St. Denis as ‘Ghysile, Nobilissima filia Pippini regis.’”

Furthermore, Charlemagne gifted her multiple relics, again showcasing their close relationship and Gisela’s prominent role as a woman in the religious, court, and intellectual milieu of the Carolingian empire. Chelles also hosted court meetings involving Gisela in Carolingian affairs. The aforementioned uncertainty of Gisela’s position as an abbess may in fact be further evidence of her broad influence. As Jinty Nelson observes, the lack of official documents naming her as an abbess despite her clear power may reveal her wish to have a less demanding religious position in order to be involved in all aspects of Carolingian life.

Gisela’s leadership and educational role in the monastery are evident. During her time in Chelles, she not only donated the monastery’s scriptorium but was likely the originator of Prior Metz Annals, a series of annals written in Chelles that recorded a year-by-year state of the monarchy from 741 CE to 805 CE. Valerie Garver

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mentions that “if the Prior Metz Annals were produced at the double monastery of Chelles where Charlemagne’s sister Gisela was abbess, it is possible a woman (or women) wrote them” and possibly one under Gisela’s orders. Scheck also notes Gisela’s authorship of other texts ascribed to the community at Chelles, including the early and later Lives of Balthild, its founder, the translation of her relics, the Life of Bertilla, the monastery’s first abbess, and the set of Frankish annals known as the Annales Mettenses Priores.

Furthermore, Gisela was highly revered in the Carolingian court at Aachen. This is clearly demonstrated by the panegyric poem “Karolus Magnus et Leo papa.” Angilbert, a French pet and secretary to Charlemagne, composed this piece in court after either Pope Leo’s visit to Paderborn in 799 or the imperial coronation in 800. In the poem, Gisela’s appearance conveys wealth and brightness while her inner virtue is captured in the white, silver, gold, and purple colors used to describe her. Garver explains that “white and silver symbolized purity and virginity,” while “the association of gold with faith, love, and wisdom meant ‘her golden brow’ complimented Gisela, a learned abbess who corresponded with perhaps the greatest of her brother’s court scholars, Alcuin. The purple of her veil and cloak would have been extremely costly, and purple was associated with humility, a highly appropriate virtue for an abbess.” The mere existence of such a panegyric in the Aachen court about Gisela, a religious woman, shows the level of influence and admiration that she received not only for her beauty and elegance but also for her virtue and wisdom. The significance of this tribute is clarified when compared to Angilbert’s series of epistolary poems about Charlemagne’s daughters. Though celebrated for their beauty and comportment, they do not earn the same effusive praise evident in Gisela’s panegyric.

24 Garver, Women and Aristocratic Culture in the Carolingian World, 22.
25 Garver, Women and Aristocratic Culture in the Carolingian World, 42. Garver writes about Angilbert’s poem, “to Charlemagne and His Entourage,” in PCR, no. 6, 114–17, lines 43–54.
religious woman. They present a markedly different picture of Gisela to the visual evidence that has remained of her life.

The Aachen court’s clearest indication of Gisela’s devotion to family and intellectual pursuits may be her correspondence with Alcuin of York (b. 735, d. 804).\(^26\) According to Einhard’s *Vita Karoli Magni*, Alcuin was “the most learned man anywhere to be found.”\(^27\) Gisela’s ties to the scholar were so strong that Alcuin dedicated his seven commentaries on the Gospel of Saint John to her and Charlemagne’s daughter Bertha after Gisela had asked him to provide some further explanation.\(^28\) Alcuin also dedicated a short poem to her, hailing the royal as a noble sister in the bond of sweet love.\(^29\) This more intimate tone reveals their close relationship as well as their mutual respect and regard. In another letter from 798 CE, Alcuin lamented the coup of fever which prevented him from visiting her while encouraging her to continue building her library at Chelles. Writing to Gisela and her niece Rotrude in 801, the scholar demonstrated how he was not only their teacher but also a spiritual guide and advisor. “The child of love is a child of God,” he noted, and “someone who reads the most sacred words of the Lord handed down to us by his saints hears God speaking; and the one who prays speaks with God.”\(^30\) Considering that Alcuin made no similar comments in his surviving correspondence with other royal women—Æthelburh, daughter of King Offa, and Æthelthryth, queen of Northumbria and wife of King Æthelwald Moll—we clearly see the strength of his bond with Gisela, their mutual respect, and their commitment to a religious life in the midst of the court.\(^31\) The panegyric about Gisela’s beauty, virtue and her close friendship with Alcuin illuminate her exceptional character as a royal woman in the eighth and ninth century.

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In stark contrast with the later myths that account for much of her historical persona.

The Emergence of Penance in Twelfth and Thirteenth Century Iconography

Stories about Charlemagne’s alleged sin have always had more importance concerning his daughters. In describing their relationship, Einhard’s *Vita Karoli Magni* used “contubernium,” which carried the double meaning of camaraderie and sexual relations. The term may have hinted at Charlemagne’s incest with his daughters or the peculiarly sharp criticism of the emperor’s sexual behaviors in multiple texts after his death. Furthermore, Charlemagne’s sarcophagus, whose decoration was chosen by his daughters, depicts the story of Proserpina’s violent abduction by the god of the underworld. The representation may have served as a metaphor for their father’s heathen and incestuous life. Despite these references, however, it seems that the sin of the emperor did not re-emerge until Gisela’s references in the thirteenth century, shedding light on how the popularization of penitent imagery may have led to the sudden increase in these visual iconographies.

The twelfth and thirteenth centuries were a dynamic and revolutionary age marked by urbanization, economic growth, and the development of new institutions, such as universities. The period saw several reforms from the Church, including the Investiture Controversy, the Fourth Lateran Council, and the rise of Scholasticism. Its new religious orders, the Franciscans and the Dominicans, focused especially on poverty, preaching, and active engagement with society. Most notably, traditional penitential books apparently ceased to be copied during the 1130s. In their place, newer, more innovative theories of penance and confession emerged. Abelard’s (d. 1142) *Scito te ipsum*, an investigation on ethics by the medieval French scholastic philosopher, became an important turning point in this transformation of religious doctrine. The central basis of Abelard’s work

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33 Nelson, “Women at the Court of Charlemagne: A Case of Monstrous Regiment?” 43.
was that, in the sight of God, deeds in themselves were neither good nor bad. Instead, what counted was a man’s intention. Sin was not something done, but whether the human mind consented to what it knew to be wrong. Consequently, sin was far more dependent on the intention of the person committing the act than the nature of the act itself.35 This idea would work its way into theology, art and jurisprudence as well as instate the “awakening of conscience” that led to the practice of private confessions to priests.36 Additionally, it sparked development of canon law, penitential practice, and cathedral schools and universities focused on atonement and confession. At Chartres, Ivo of Chartres wrote an influential treatise and canon of law regarding penance. Lauded as “one of the finest legal scholars” of the time, the town bishop was particularly close to Pope Urban II and the Re-

35 D. E. Luscombe, ed., Peter Abelard’s “Ethics”: An Edition with Introduction, English Translation and Notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). Luscombe emphasizes that Abelard’s Scito te ipsum was not a well-known text. It survives in only five medieval manuscripts. Two of these documents are from the twelfth century while the remaining three date back to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

M. T. Clanchy, Abelard: A Medieval Life, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 174, 218. Clanchy writes about how Abelard’s theories of penitence contributed to his teaching and intellectual career. He appears to have been born in 1092 or 1094 CE, and he was tried for heresy at Soissons in 1121 CE. Because of this trial, the first edition of Abelard’s Theologia was burned. In 1140 CE, another trial for heresy ended his teaching career. Pope Celestine II and Abbot Peter the Venerable of Cluny, however, do not appear to have acquiesced to this view of Abelard as a heretic.

36 Confession would later be followed by the ideology of penance and reconfirmed by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. At that same council, it was decreed that the clergy were to be forbidden to participate in judicial ordeal or the “Judgement of God.” See Rob Meens, Penance in Medieval Europe, 600–1200, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 191-192.

According to Rob Meens, “such a concern for the proper authorities used in penitentials and canonical rulings was already very much alive in the Carolingian period. The movement for Church reform known as the Gregorian Reform made such concerns even more acute. The papal reform movement tried to enhance the authority of the papacy in many different fields, such as its relations to local monasteries, to bishops and to the emperor. This emphatic struggle for papal influence throughout Europe led to a growth of legal disputes and therefore to a greater interest in legal matters.” See Meens, Penance in Medieval Europe, 191-192.
form movement. Ivo led to a significant change in the importance of penitence, which likely gave rise to iconography such as the town Cathedral of Notre-Dame’s 1225 statue of Charlemagne begging for forgiveness at the Mass of Saint Gilles (Figure 2). Jennifer Feltman writes that “on another level, through their location on the south transept facade the sculptures of the Mass of St. Gilles serve[d] to make the identity of Charlemagne’s sin publicly known, as the figures would have been visible to all strata of medieval society who used this portal to enter the cathedral.”

The increase in iconography of this saint should not be surprising either, as Saint Gilles is often depicted as being the protector of cripples and beggars - the closest personification to penance in a saintly figure.

Changes to the perception of Christ during this period may provide further clarity on the emergence of a pitiful Charlemagne and Gisela. The rise of the Franciscans in urban cities changed the portrayal of Jesus in the West. The new image of Christ emphasized his humility at his birth and death rather than showing a powerful, triumphant worker of miracles. During this time, the role of the individual gradually changed as a direct result of the twelfth and thirteenth century intellectual revival and formation of a more “complex society.” This period of crusades and the persecution of Jews created a need to hold Jesus as a focal point behind which reformers could rally. Thus, the Church underscored Christ’s humanity, which became an even more significant object of devotion and imitation. This more intimate, personal, and human relationship with Christ would not only allow crusaders and reformers to have a closer relationship with religion and a stronger sense of purpose; it would also allow lay people to feel more connected to the institution of the Church. This humanization of Christ empowered individuals to stand against opposition to the Christian religion, both as God’s representatives to


others and as advocates for humans before God. The eleventh and twelfth century’s widespread attacks on Jewish communities also suggest an increased emphasis on the Jewish role in the ‘murder’ of Christ, which further contributed to the prominence of this suffering and penitent representation of Jesus in his final hours.\(^{41}\) This same humanization is also seen with images of the Virgin Mary, proving that female representation was also part of this overall movement to humanize these divine figures.

It would not be surprising if Charlemagne, possibly one of the most important emperors of the Frankish kingdom, was likewise reinterpreted this way, causing Gisela to become a means for depicting his gravest sin.\(^{42}\) Evidence of Charlemagne and Gisela’s renewed representation can be found in twelfth century materials from Chelles. These sources allude to a sachet from the reliquary of Saint Florus containing some imperial relics that the emperor allegedly gifted his sister, including saintly figures and strands of hair.\(^{43}\) The bag itself depicted a man and a woman of courtly and noble nature. This sachet reinforces this emergence of Charlemagne’s and Gisela’s popularity in the late twelfth and thirteenth century, supporting a new interest with her life and her possibly incestual relationship with Charlemagne. By placing her at the emperor’s side, Gisela is seen as being penitent herself, showing elements of devotion, spirituality, and a plea for forgiveness. This development makes “The Song of Roland” all the more poignant, as it demonstrates the momentum changing the moral ideal from the heroic knight of the past to embodiments of justice, mercy, trust in God, and purity. By displaying the Saint Gilles narrative, the Church tied together the Emperor Charlemagne, his royal sister Gisela, the heroic Roland, and the saint

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\(^{41}\) Rowan Dorin, “Mass Expulsion in Medieval Europe,” (class lecture, Stanford University, Stanford, June 8, 2023).


of the beggars Gilles with the age’s popular practice of penance.

Conclusion
Iconography, such as the illuminated letters of Psalm 98 depicting Charlemagne and Gisela, has been instrumental not only in perpetuating myths that derail from existing sources but also in reconstructing the changing motives of the Church. These images show how the institution used the heroic figures of the past to promote changing ideologies. The association of Gisela’s and Charlemagne’s supposed incest with the myth of Roland seems to have arisen from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries’ growing concerns of an immoral new urban society. Responding to this fear, the Church placed an increasing emphasis on penitent imagery and absolution by the institution. As part of this shift, the image of Christ transformed to emphasize his humanity, leading to a more personal and intimate relationship with the divine and thus a closer connection with God in these emerging materialistic cities. Charlemagne’s portrayal as a penitent figure, along with Gisela’s presence as at his side, formed part of this effort to change society’s ‘correct’ moral values. These images serve to depict the pair’s devotion, spirituality, and appeal for forgiveness.

However, while recognizing how the Saint Gilles narrative fits within this broader context, it is important to consider the available evidence of Gisela’s life. We cannot overlook how this narrative has promoted a memory of her life that is far distant from what the eighth century sources display. Though incomplete, these documents reveal her role as a religious and royal woman of the Carolingian court, highlighting her spiritual devotion, intellectual pursuits, and governing responsibilities in Chelles. The remaining poems, letters, charters, and iconography on Gisela show the unique role she played in the Carolingian court, religious order, and renaissance. They highlight the importance of unveiling the myths that often prevent us from understanding impactful figures who played essential roles in shaping the societies that we study.

The myth of Gisela, Charlemagne, and Roland demonstrates the interplay between historical reality and mythical, revisionist narratives. The illuminated images and visual sources of the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries perpetuated a story that departed from what was known about Gisela’s life. By examining the primary sources and considering the cultural and religious context of her time, we can gain a deeper understanding of Gisela’s true role while better understanding how the Church used iconography to promote a moral transition towards penance. This way, we can challenge the myths that emerged centuries after her death and that remain with us today.
Nixon, Kissinger, and the Bangladesh Genocide: Balancing Diplomatic Priorities against Moral Considerations

Arvind Asokan

Introduction
On April 6, 1971, the explosive news of the Blood Telegram arrived on President Nixon’s desk. Penned by the last American Consul-General to Dacca, Arthur Blood, the message detailed Pakistan’s atrocities in East Pakistan, known today as Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Genocide was happening concomitantly to Nixon’s outreach to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Later that same month, Nixon received his highly anticipated invitation to visit from the Chinese Premier.\(^1\) In Nixon’s conception, the United States overture to the PRC would go down as a “great watershed in history, clearly the greatest since World War II.” Kissinger went on to rate the diplomatic maneuver as “the greatest since the Civil War, as far as the overall effect on the nation,” an apt reflection of the dynamics

\(^{1}\) In the interest of accuracy, this paper uses the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to refer to mainland China after the Chinese Communist Party’s takeover. Specifically, it marks the start of the PRC on October 1, 1949, when Mao declared its creation. This designation is consistent with US policy. The United States formally recognized the PRC on January 1, 1979, well after our period. Message From the Premier of the People’s Republic of China Chou En-lai to President Nixon, Beijing, April 21, 1971, box 1031, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, National Archives.
between the two men.²

Suffice to say, the academic debate surrounding the consequences of Nixon’s 1972 visit to China is far more nuanced. Modern scholarship is especially critical of the Nixon administration’s willingness to say one thing in public while doing something completely different in private. The resulting “credibility gap” parallels that which bedeviled the Johnson administration over the Vietnam War.³ While the Nixon administration sent private signals to the PRC through Paris and Warsaw, these efforts faltered. Their failure left the United States to choose between two of China’s close partners, Pakistan and Romania.⁴ After thorough internal deliberations and much experimentation, the Nixon administration chose Pakistan as its intermediary because its president (Yahya Khan) was acceptable to both US and Chinese leaders.⁵

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The moral dilemma in this situation arises from the question of whether, in eagerly pursuing the Pakistani channel for the diplomatic overture to China, the US was willing to overlook what is now recognized as the Bangladesh genocide. In the words of a high US official who was an eyewitness, “it was the most incredible, calculated thing since the days of the Nazis in Poland” such that up to 3,000,000 people were killed and 400,000 Bengali women were raped. Even though Pakistan offered distinct advantages as an intermediary, Romania under Nicolae Ceaușescu was an equally capable candidate with a lesser burden of human rights violations. Nevertheless, in choosing Pakistan over Romania, the US consciously prioritized the secrecy and immediacy of the diplomatic overture to the PRC. The Nixon administration chose to maximize the chances of success over the moral loss suffered in the short term and the strategic loss sustained in the long term.

Nixon’s Foreign Policy

Even before his presidency, Nixon was acutely aware of the future potential of the PRC. While serving as the Vice President under the Eisenhower administration, he remarked that “in twenty-five years, China would have a billion people and if isolated by others, it might turn into an explosive force.” Writing for Foreign Affairs in a piece entitled “Asia after Vietnam,” Nixon emphasized the futility of containment. He went so far as to suggest that this strategy would “not only place an unconscionable burden on our own country, but it would heighten the chances of nuclear war while undercutting the independent development of the nations of Asia.” For Nixon, it was imperative to pursue relations with the PRC. In the broader context of the Cold War, he cautioned, the United States could not “afford to wait for others to act, and then merely react.”


9 Nixon, “Asia After Viet Nam.”
to rapidly do whatever it took to get the PRC on board.

This task was one that Nixon was uniquely positioned to undertake. While others “would be destroyed by what is called the China lobby (pro-Taiwan),” he emerged from the Red Scare relatively unscathed.\(^{10}\) Upon ascending to the presidency on January 20, 1969, Nixon began working closely with Kissinger to develop a charm offensive to woo China. Barely a month after the inauguration, then Secretary of State William Rogers announced the willingness of the United States to increase scientific and cultural ties with the PRC.\(^{11}\) Soon after, the Nixon administration began seriously deliberating between the merits of Romania and Pakistan as the communication channel with the PRC, engaging in clandestine overtures unknown outside the White House.

### Between Romania and Pakistan

During his 1969 visit to Romania between August 2\(^{nd}\) and 3\(^{rd}\), Nixon met with Ceaușescu, whom he knew to be a devout communist who looked up to the PRC as a successful communist state.\(^{12}\) In this meeting, Nixon broached the question of US rapprochement with the PRC and asked Romania to become their interlocutor, a suggestion that Ceaușescu willingly accepted. In Nixon’s calculus, Romania was a close ally of the PRC. It was one of the first countries to recognize the PRC, and Nixon felt that “the Chinese might prefer to deal with the United States through Communist intermediaries,” making Romania preferable to Pakistan.\(^{13}\) Nixon’s efforts would bear fruit in January 1971 when Ceaușescu delivered him an invitation from the

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10 For commentary on Nixon and the Red Scare, see Kissinger, *White House Years*, 163.

Files for the President—China Material, Polo I, Record, July 1971, HAK Visit to PRC. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only, box 1032, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, National Archives.

The meeting was held in the “Chinese Government Guest House.” According to three memoranda from Lord to Kissinger (July 29, August 6, and August 12), these transcripts were prepared by Holdridge, Smyser, and Lord. Kissinger initialed Lord’s memoranda to indicate approval of the transcripts.


13 Romania extended formal diplomatic recognition to the PRC on October 5, 1949, just four days after Mao had proclaimed the PRC on October 1, 1949; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 181.
PRC. The message was especially significant because it made it clear that Nixon himself would be welcome in Beijing.\textsuperscript{14}

Interestingly, Nixon’s first stop ahead of Romania was in Pakistan on August 1, 1969, reflecting the close contention between these intermediaries. Nixon was keenly aware of the “all-weather partnership” between the PRC and Pakistan, which served as a means of subduing China’s restive Xinjiang and Tibet provinces.\textsuperscript{15} Most importantly, the PRC-Pakistan alliance served to check India’s power in the region. Pakistan had solidified its relationship to the PCR by ceding “over 13,000 square miles of territory” to resolve their territorial disputes, opening up a united front against India based on mutual interest.\textsuperscript{16}

Moreover, it was abundantly clear that both Nixon and Kissinger were much more favorably disposed toward Pakistan than India. Their inclination was informed by the view that “Pakistan comes out way ahead in terms of likely progress, partly because India is headed down the road toward becoming a socialist state.”\textsuperscript{17} The assessment reflected the Cold War’s power dynamics, as India was a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement while Pakistan was a trusted US ally. On a personal level, Nixon harbored a deep animosity towards Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who he referred to as “that bitch” and an “old witch.”\textsuperscript{18} Conversely, Nixon admired President Khan for having “no patience for the wiles of politicians,”

\textsuperscript{14} Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 12, 1971, box 1031, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, National Archives.


and Kissinger saw Khan as a “splendid product of Sandhurst.”

At the first meeting between Nixon and Khan on August 1, 1969, Nixon was remarkably candid. “The US,” he explained, would “welcome accommodations with Communist China and would appreciate it if President Khan would let Zhou Enlai know this.” Khan eagerly accepted the proposal. At their next in-person meeting on October 25, 1970, Nixon expressed a willingness “to send a representative to some third party capital to open communications with Beijing” and urged Khan to visit the PRC soon. Nixon’s efforts proved successful on December 8, 1970. The Khan brought the good news from Mao Zedong himself that “a special envoy of President Nixon will be most welcome in Peking.”

Approximately one month after this diplomatic success, however, the Romanian channel indicated that the President himself would be welcome in Peking. Though the reply through Pakistani channel arrived sooner, the additional offer implied that the Chinese had revealed more through the Romanian channel. Even Kissinger—a man obsessed with the PRC's philosopher-kings, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai—could not divine the reason for this variance. His solution was to return the same message through both Romanian and Pakistani channels. China replied via Pakistan on April 21, 1971, conveying its willingness to receive either Nixon or Kissinger in Peking.


For Kissinger’s comment on Khan, see Memorandum of Conversation. Meeting between the President with Pakistan President Yahya, October 25, 1970, E012958, 1-3/3, 05-09-01, The Oval Office.


22 In the interest of consistency, I have elected to use Pinyin transcription instead of the more traditional Wade-Giles transcription to represent all Chinese names and terms. This is because Pinyin is the convention currently employed by the People’s Republic of China and most modern scholars of China. Thus, “Mao Tse-tung” becomes “Mao Zedong”, and “Chou En-lai” becomes “Zhou Enlai.”


23 Memorandum From the President.

24 Kissinger, White House Years, 699.

Even after this response, Nixon and Kissinger continued to deliberate between Romania and Pakistan as intermediaries. An aide to Kissinger remarked, “we laid out a smorgasbord, and they [Nixon and Kissinger] picked Pakistan.”

This choice could be attributed to Chinese concerns about the “Soviet penetration of even a country as fiercely independent as Romania.” Thus, it can be reasonably concluded that secrecy and immediacy guided the choice of Pakistan as an intermediary. In Kissinger’s words, “without secrecy, there would have been no invitation or acceptance to visit China,” echoing the PCR’s concerns that any leak to the Soviets would jeopardize Chinese security—the very matter they sought to fortify by pursuing diplomatic ties with the US. Similarly, Nixon and Kissinger perceived Pakistan to be a more secure channel from the Chinese perspective. Their conclusion was supported by Zhou’s remarks that “the United States knows that Pakistan is a great friend of China and therefore we attach importance to the message,” a narrative Khan was eager to tap into as a military man capable of executing secretive missions.

In addition to confidentiality, the Pakistani channel offered the immediacy that Nixon’s administration sought, as it was the first to deliver both messages from the PRC. By contrast, replies through the Romanian channel came at least a month later, and Ceaușescu was perceived as less well-connected than Khan to the PRC leadership. Ultimately, Nixon and Kissinger selected Pakistan as an intermediary to maximize the secrecy and immediacy crucial to a successful approach to China. These very traits, however, were mirrored in the Khan regime’s atrocities in East Pakistan. The secrecy and immediacy with which it pursued the United States’s aims mirrored its secrecy and immediacy in carrying out a genocide for which it was in desperate need of diplomatic backing.

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27 Kissinger, *White House Years*, 181.
28 Memorandum for the President's Files, Briefing of the White House Staff on the July 15 Announcement of the President's Trip to Peking, 19 July 1971; “Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), Washington, December 12, 1971, 8:45-9:42 a.m,” *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972*.
**Blood in Dhaka**

As it pursued communications on behalf of the United States, the Khan regime operated within extreme domestic turmoil. In 1947, India was partitioned under the premise that Muslims would be given a separate state. Yet, Muslims in India were not concentrated in any one region. Consequently, the ensuing Pakistani state consisted of West and East Pakistan, two areas that shared little in common other than religion. In the nascent Pakistani state, the army—only 7 percent of which was Bengali—emerged as the political linchpin. This disproportion was a stark demonstration of the country’s lopsided balance of power. Unsatisfied with the present circumstances, the Bengali intelligentsia led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman launched the Awami League as a political platform to demand greater autonomy for East Pakistan.

When the first Pakistan general election was held on December 7, 1970, the result was a landslide victory for the Awami League, which had won 99% of the seats in East Pakistan. As the Bengali nationalists had won an outright majority of seats in Pakistan, Rahman was, in effect, the Prime Minister in waiting. In response, President Khan resisted convening the constituent assembly and began a bloody campaign known as Operation Searchlight, which saw up to 3,000,000 Bengalis murdered. This campaign of absolute terror specifically targeted those perceived to be opposed to the Pakistani regime, such as student activists who had been vocal about their demands for their autonomy. As part of Khan’s purge, hundreds of students were gunned down at the University of Dacca.

As the US Consul-General in Dacca, Archer Blood duly reported the atrocities being inflicted by the Khan regime in East Pakistan. When he learned of the massacre of one of his students at the University of Dacca, Kissinger responded that the “British didn’t dominate 400 million Indians all those years by being gentle,” a comment characteristic of his view of the unfolding violence.

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32 Bass, *The Blood Telegram*, 18; Blood had a reputation for being a maverick.
human tragedy. Feeling his messages were not going through to his superiors, Blood boldly published the Blood Telegram, declaring that “our government has evidenced what many will consider moral bankruptcy.” Though his conscience remained intact, Blood was subsequently recalled from his position, and his career was ruined.

Understanding the importance of secrecy and immediacy is paramount in analyzing why Blood's appeals were ignored. When the Blood Telegram initially leaked, Nixon and Kissinger appeared more concerned that it would reach Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy and pose domestic political problems for them. As Nixon remarked, “I would tell the people in the State Department not a goddamn thing they [did not] need to know.” This also reflected the concentration of power between Nixon and Kissinger in their efforts to preserve absolute secrecy regarding the outreach to the PRC. Moreover, immediacy may explain why messages through Khan arrived earlier than those through Ceaușescu, as Khan was desperate for US political and military cover for his genocide. Nixon and Kissinger knew full well the scale of the atrocities being committed by Pakistan. The note through Khan arrived on April 21 while the Blood Telegram was published on April 6. This timeline, coupled with the fact that the choice of an intermediary had yet to be made as of April 22, shows that the pair chose to ignore the Bangladesh genocide for strategic gain.

First Envoy to the People’s Republic of China

Having decided upon Pakistan as its communication channel with the PRC, the Nixon administration’s inaction on the Bangladesh genocide stood in stark contrast to the condemnations by US allies

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34 On April 6, 1971, Blood sent a petition signed by twenty members of the consulate staff and supported by himself that criticized the United States government’s failure to condemn the Pakistani army’s atrocities. See U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Dissent from U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan, April 6, 1971, Confidential. Includes Signatures from the Department of State.


such as the United Kingdom and France.\textsuperscript{38} The US position came under immense domestic pressure as public opinion crystalized against Pakistan. TIME Magazine and the New York Times published reports on the scale of atrocities, capturing the minds of intellectuals and the political milieu.\textsuperscript{39} Even so, Nixon remained undeterred. His olive branch to the PRC was already in full swing. Because the invitation through Khan mentioned Kissinger by name, it was decided that he would be the emissary.

Kissinger left for what was ostensibly a regular trip to Pakistan on July 6 to meet Khan. There, he quizzed Khan in detail on “how to handle the Chinese in the toast, how to treat them, and how to respond to them” and “the Chinese technique of talking to foreigners,” exploiting the president’s personal relationship with the Chinese leaders.\textsuperscript{40} In a clandestine operation, Kissinger feigned gastritis and the Khan hired a body double to remain in Pakistan as Kissinger himself flew to Beijing courtesy of the Pakistani president’s private jet. Throughout this operation, secrecy was paramount. Khan, in turn, demonstrated a military precision for detail by personally overseeing every aspect of Kissinger’s trip.

Interestingly, Kissinger and Nixon stressed to the Chinese that “they should not meet with other US political figures,” again emphasizing the importance of secrecy for both parties.\textsuperscript{41} The Nixon administration feared domestic political consequences while the PCR feared leakage to the Soviets. The requirement for secrecy and the geographic proximity to China made Romania a less appealing communication channel, as the shadow of the Soviet Union lingered.


\textsuperscript{40} Sultan Mohammed Khan, Foreign Secretary, Pakistan, “On: Dr. Kissinger’s Journey to China,” PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/china/filmmore/reference/interview/khan05.html.

in the background.\textsuperscript{42}

Despite being unable to meet Mao, Kissinger’s meeting with Zhou proved fruitful in laying a solid groundwork for US-PRC relations. This initial engagement effectively set into motion the events that would lead to Nixon’s visit to China. On July 15, mere days after Kissinger’s return to the US, Nixon announced that Kissinger had negotiated a US presidential trip to China.\textsuperscript{43} Nixon had “taken this action,” he explained, “because of [his] profound conviction that all nations will gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.”\textsuperscript{44}

As US-PRC ties were now secure, the leverage Khan hoped to gain by playing the role of an intermediary correspondingly diminished. With Nixon’s public announcement, the distinct advantages offered by Pakistan in terms of secrecy and immediacy evaporated as both parties could now openly and directly communicate with each other. Sensing that Khan was on his way out of office, Nixon caved into domestic pressure by enabling sanctions on the Pakistani regime.\textsuperscript{45} Feeling cornered, Khan ordered aerial strikes on Indian air stations on December 3, 1971, triggering the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. This move played right into India’s strategic goals. As one of Gandhi’s aides remarked, “the fool has done exactly what one had expected,” giving India a casus belli to openly engage in hostilities on the side of Bengali insurgents. In under two weeks, Dacca would fall on December 16. The Khan’s own fall followed only slightly after. On December 20, he resigned in disgrace for presiding over the “dissolution of Pakistan.”\textsuperscript{46}

**Nixon goes to China**

On February 21, 1972, precisely two months after Khan’s resignation, Nixon began his epochal visit to the PRC. His much-welcomed gesture of extending a handshake to Zhou served to ameliorate the insult Zhou had suffered from Secretary of State John

\textsuperscript{42} Kissinger, *White House Years*, 181.
\textsuperscript{43} Kissinger, *White House Years*, 759.
\textsuperscript{44} “Getting to Beijing.”
Dulles, who had refused his handshake at the Geneva Summit of 1955.\textsuperscript{47} In this sense, the humiliation the PRC suffered at the hands of the West was now over. Twenty-two years of diplomatic isolation gave way to a more meaningful relationship with the US. The PRC could now deal with the US directly on the vexing question of the ROC and Vietnam. Khan emerged only once in the conversation between Nixon and Mao. Nixon remarked that “one doesn’t burn down a bridge which has proved useful,” foreshadowing the extent to which Nixon and Mao went to protect Pakistan’s former president from being held to account for the genocide he perpetuated.\textsuperscript{48}

Conclusions

While Pakistan may have been a better-suited intermediary than Romania, United States’s moral losses from supporting a dictator who perpetuated a genocide metamorphosed into a strategic loss. The US subsequently lost prestige in South Asia, and its alignment with Pakistan drove India into the arms of the Soviet Union. Gandhi felt compelled to sign the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the consequences of which linger to this day, such as India’s refusal to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In fact, a survey from 2022 found that 43% of Indians rated Russia as India’s most reliable partner while only 27% chose the US, indicating how US actions have poisoned relations for multiple generations.\textsuperscript{49} Furthermore, the US role in the Bangladeshi genocide continues to plague its relationship with Dhaka. Even in Pakistan, the bifurcation is perceived as an act of betrayal towards a loyal ally which aided the US outreach to the PRC.\textsuperscript{50}

While one could advance the argument that any backsliding of relations with South Asia was worth the benefits of an enhanced US-PRC relationship, it is important to note that there was not necessarily a tradeoff to be made between the PRC and South Asia. Nixon could very well have pursued the Romanian channel despite

\begin{itemize}
\item 47 Jonathan Spence, \textit{The Search for Modern China} (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013), 568.
\item 48 Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, February 23, 1972, 2:00–6:00 p.m, box 87, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, National Archives; Margaret Macmillan, \textit{Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World} (New York: Random House, 2007), 238.
\item 49 Harsh V. Pant, et al., “The ORF Foreign Policy Survey 2022: India @75 and the World,” Observer Research Foundation, November 2022.
\item 50 Bass, \textit{The Blood Telegram}, 331.
\end{itemize}
its limitations. He could even have explored other communication channels, such as Singapore, whose leader Lee Kuan Yew enjoyed cordial ties with the Chinese leadership without the moral baggage of Pakistan. While Nixon’s quest for immediacy is understandable, it is difficult to justify this priority at the cost of diminished relations with South Asia, and it certainly does not suffice as an explanation for ignoring the State Department calls to condemn Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger had until at least April 22, 1971, to finalize a communication channel with the PRC. Ultimately, they decided on Pakistan to prioritize short-term diplomatic gain over long-term moral and strategic considerations. Most importantly, they went ahead with their choice despite knowing full well the scale of the atrocities being perpetuated in East Pakistan, which Blood’s earnest telegrams detailed. Above all, Nixon and Kissinger perceived secrecy and immediacy as the sine qua non of outreach to the PRC. For these qualities, a better alternative to Pakistan had yet to emerge. While Nixon and Kissinger cannot be held to account for failing to foresee the bifurcation of Pakistan, there is concrete evidence that they were willing to condone the Bangladesh genocide in exchange for the greatest chance at rapprochement with the PRC in the shortest amount of time.
In the mid-1800s, Brazil and the United States experienced parallel historical developments. Both nations sustained societies predicated on the institution of slavery. Both featured industrious agricultural exporters and large enslaved populations—the two largest in the world. In fact, to Brazilian congressman José Maria Paranhos, the only country where the problem of slavery “had comparable importance to Brazil was the United States of America.”\(^1\) Consequently, and perhaps inevitably, the repercussions of the bloody American Civil War contributed to the dawn of a new slavery crisis in Brazil. Abolitionist societies emerged for the first time, political debates adopted pro and anti-slavery undertones, and the national press arose as a staunch advocate of emancipation. Such was the sentiment that enveloped Brazilian society in the 1860s, culminating in the nation’s first emancipation act in 1871. Recognized as the “first stone of a great edifice,” the revolutionary Law of Free Birth set the stage for the complete abolition of slavery in 1888.\(^2\)

Brazil’s paradigmatic shift occurred for a variety of reasons. Maria Clicea’s doctoral dissertation, for instance, argues that the United States served as a countermodel, contributing to the triumph

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of gradual emancipation as Brazil’s primary anti-slavery ideology. More broadly, the primary historiographic discourse on the United States’ influence centers around the international pressure caused by American emancipation. This paper, however, will focus on the role of the American Civil War and Reconstruction in molding Brazil’s anti-slavery thought. Divided into two sections, it draws a distinction between the effects of the Civil War and those of American post-abolitionism. Both parts, however, rely heavily on primary sources to discern the Brazilian collective imagination. They analyze how these citizens incorporated rhetoric around the United States into the country’s anti-slavery arguments and movements. More specifically, this paper argues that between 1860 and 1871, Brazilian anti-slavery thought drew on the American Civil War as a moral model and Reconstruction as an economic model.

A Moral Model: The Impacts of the American Civil War

Out of the ashes of its Civil War, the American union arose as the paragon of freedom. Black emancipation and the consummation of American liberties became central arguments for the nascent anti-slavery movement both in the streets and in government. American emancipation consolidated a new anti-slavery world order. Emancipation was no longer a pipe dream for moral idealists and rare anti-slavery advocates. More importantly, the United States became as a steward of abolitionism, a moral model for anti-slavery thinkers in Brazil.

Now an exemplar of anti-slavery society, the United States could no longer protect Brazil’s staunch pro-slavery ideologues from the institution’s immorality. Before the Emancipation Proclamation, the United States’ standing as the defender of liberty and a marked slave society had been key to substantiating Brazil’s pro-slavery ideology. Senator Francisco Barreto put it bluntly. Amidst Brazil’s congressional debates over the law that would later free newborn

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slaves, he asserted that his country was “shielded.” The Civil War’s emancipatory premise, however, radically shifted Brazilian perceptions of slavery’s morality. To Rio Branco, one of the leading anti-slavery advocates in the house, American emancipation represented death of “the last example which could serve as moral grounds in the civilized world against the aversion that incites slavery.” The American model, once a “shield,” left Brazil morally defenseless.

With the rise of American abolitionism, a new anti-slavery paradigm emerged in the West. To some Brazilian thinkers, this new world order represented the “lights of the century” and “the trail of civilization.” All, however, recognized that the American Civil War represented the cumulation of a global emancipatory movement which had pervaded the Western hemisphere since 1834. The arrival of this new age lay at the heart of Brazilian calls for emancipation. According to Nabuco de Araújo, Brazil’s isolation from this new “civilized world” would represent an “abyss” if no changes were made to the institution of slavery. Similarly, during one of the state council meetings, José Rodrigues argued for gradual emancipation as a means through which Brazil could return to the “tracks of civilization.” For Brazil’s leading political actors, their nation’s anti-slavery legislation would arise under the weight and example of American abolitionism. Above all, the dawning of this new age held moral implications. According to Pedro Malheiros, author of the influential third volume of A Escravidão no Brasil, abolition would allow “Brazil [to be] be admitted to the communion of civilized Nations, on equal moral footing.” Far from an aberration in the national discourse, Malheiros’s book reverberated through Brazilian society. Most likely, so too did his view of the new moral paradigm. Consolidated by American abolition, a global emancipatory movement amplified Brazilian anti-slavery cries, which condemned the nation to isolation and moral inferiority.

6 Diário do Rio de Janeiro, June 1, 1871, 2.
7 “Meeting Notes from April.”
8 Clicea, Repercussões Da Guerra Civil, 32.
9 “Meeting Notes from April.”
10 “Meeting Notes from April.”
In Brazil, the American model was imagined through the eyes of its heroes. Poet Antonio Frederico de Castro Alves, a leader of the newly organized abolitionist movement, inextricably linked the Brazilian struggle against slavery to Lincoln:

To shout to the winds the inspiration of Gracchus
To wrap oneself in the cloak of Spartacus
The serf among the masses
Lincoln - a Lazarus wakes up again
And from the tomb of ignominy raises the people
To make of a vermin - a king! 13

A symbol of emancipation, Lincoln became a “king” to many anti-slavery Brazilians. Given that Brazil’s anti-slavery movement was formerly nonexistent, its emergence with American symbols reveals the fundamental influence of emancipation in the United States.

More importantly, Castro Alves’s work infused the Brazilian movement with a religious character. In a parallel to Lazarus’s resurrection in the gospel of John, America’s enslaved population had arisen during the Civil War. To Brazilian anti-slavery activists, Lincoln’s mission as a slave liberator boasted of divine approval. Consequently, so did theirs. Religious-like devotion was attributed to American emancipation heroes in more than just popular literature. Radical abolitionist Luiz Gama, for example, modeled himself after who he deemed freedom revolutionaries. He claimed, “I want to be a madman like John Brown, Spartacus, Lincoln, Jesus.” 14 On equal footing with Christ, Lincoln’s apotheosis in the minds of radical emancipationists was complete. The American model provided a hero to the nascent Brazilian anti-slavery movement, but, most importantly, divine legitimacy.

The United States, once a pro-slavery “shield,” had consolidated a new world order premised on the righteousness of emancipation. Consequently, Brazilian perception of the institution of slavery rapidly pivoted towards an understanding of its immorality. In their congress, anti-slavery representatives gained renewed moral standing. As to the Brazilian people, a new anti-slavery movement arose, one that was religiously devoted to American heroes and the


victory of American emancipation.

An Economic Model: The Impacts of Reconstruction
The American Civil War bore the international mantle of emancipation and contributed to anti-slavery fervor in Brazil. It was Reconstruction, however, that struck the fatal blow against the Brazilian pro-slavery movement which had stubbornly blockaded emancipationist policy in the nation.

Before delving into the influence of Reconstruction on anti-slavery thought, it is key to highlight the pro-slavery arguments that the American model served to dismantle. Above all, Brazilian pro-slavery thought centered around the “necessary evil” ideology. “Slavery,” its proponents argued, “was so deeply rooted in Brazilian soil… that it would create more damages than benefits to remove it.”\textsuperscript{15} At the heart of those “damages” lay the potential disruption of Brazil’s agricultural production. José Martiniano de Alencar, a conservative member of parliament, best expressed this viewpoint. Abolitionist policy, he claimed, was “killing [Brazil’s] first industry, agriculture.”\textsuperscript{16} Hence, in order to combat pro-slavery arguments, anti-slavery movements had to move beyond the mere morality of emancipation and prove its pragmatic value. To that end, Brazilian anti-slavery thinkers turned to American Reconstruction as a model.

As vehicles for the distribution of foreign press, Brazil’s national newspapers became leading advocates of the successes of American Reconstruction. The newspaper Novo Mundo, for instance, revealed Brazil’s economic lens on American Reconstruction. “The antislavery camp,” it declared, “could affirm that emancipation in the largest slaveholding country in the Americas was an economic success.”\textsuperscript{17} In addition to the economic triumph of free labor, Novo Mundo highlighted the changing role of the United States in Brazilian emancipation. The United States went from an “important tool in the defense of national slavery” to a model for

\footnotesize{15} Roberto Saba, American Mirror: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Emancipation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021), 105.


\footnotesize{17} Rafael de Bivar Marquese, “A Guerra Civil Dos Estados Unidos e a Crise Da Escravidão No Brasil,” Afro-Ásia, no. 51 (April 2015): 19, doi.org/10.9771/aa.v0i51.17663.
emancipation. This quote was hardly the only reference to the successes of emancipation. *Novo Mundo*’s articles overflowed with the triumphs of the Grant administration, the recovery of American cotton production, and even the dedication of free Black Americans to their work. According to historian Alain Youssef, *Novo Mundo* garnered a faithful audience and contributed to changing the public’s expectations for post-abolition society. The newspaper served to debunk pro-slavery’s “necessary evil” ideology, portraying post-abolition as a resounding economic success. Through the papers, the Brazilian people could now turn to American Reconstruction to debunk pro-slavery ideology.

The influence of the national press and its messages on the significance of Reconstruction also reached the higher echelons of Brazilian government. In 1870, a House special commission charged with analyzing the “servile elements” of the nation echoed *Novo Mundo*’s arguments. In utter disbelief, they claimed that the free Blacks had dedicated themselves to the fields “in such a way that the production of cotton [was]... nearing what it was before the civil war.” Once again, the unexpected rapid recovery of American agriculture and the commitment of Black people under conditions of free labor served to root out the old pro-slavery mentality regarding post-abolitionism.

Along with the successes of Reconstruction, the economic strength of the pre-Civil War American North also served as a model for Brazil’s abolitionist movement. In government, anti-slavery representatives began to revise their understanding of American history prior to the Civil War, painting it with substantive optimism. Justifying his Free Womb bill before the House, Rio Branco asked rhetorically “were not the northern states without slavery more civilized and richer than the southern states of the American union,

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when the latter tolerated the institution?”22 Brazil’s abolition societies likewise emphasized northern success. A member of the Radical Club and soon-to-be one of the most influential thinkers in Brazilian history, Rui Barbosa turned to the nineteenth-century United States to justify the superiority of free labor. “[Virginia] being until 1787 the pearl of the United States, has been reduced to the fourth place in the federation, having only doubled in population, while Pennsylvania’s [population] increased sixfold and New York’s tenfold, from 1790 to 1850.”23 The American experience was a case-in-point for the superiority of free labor. Moving beyond early American history, Barbosa asserted that American success “before and after 1863” attested to the benefits of free labor and merited Brazil’s acceptance.24 Faced with a consequentialist pro-slavery ideology—the so-called “necessary evil” argument—the United States became a hallmark of free labor and economic recovery in Brazil. Brazilian anti-slavery thinkers used American Reconstruction to argue for the success of post-abolition, using the United States’ experience as a pragmatic justification for emancipation. Reconstruction permeated Brazilian society from the press to the seats of government, substantiating the rise of Brazilian anti-slavery thought in the 1860s.

**Conclusion**

Far from a mere national event, the American Civil War and Reconstruction became global stewards of emancipation. For Brazil, the post-abolition United States threatened to dismantle its pro-slavery ideology and uphold both the radical idealist as well as the pragmatic abolitionist. Confronted with the rise of a new world paradigm, pro-slavery ideologues were no longer “shielded” by the United States. Instead, the American model condemned them. Amidst the successes of Reconstruction, pro-slavery ideologues also could no longer sustain their views of slavery as a “necessary evil.” Backed by the American experience, an emerging anti-slavery ideology now advocated for the superiority of free labor and the

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22 “Servile Element: Opinion of the Special Commission Presented to the Chamber of Deputies in the Session of June 30th, 1871, about the Proposition, from May 12th of the Same Year,” (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1871), 16.

23 Rui Barbosa, “Quinta Conferencia Radical,” *Radical Paulistano*, September 25, 1869.

24 Barbosa, “Quinta Conferencia Radical.”
morality of emancipation.

This paper joins existing scholarship in recognizing the significance of the American experience, which became ingrained into Brazil’s collective imagination. Unprecedented outpouring of anti-slavery sentiment engulfed the nation. Reaching all sectors of society, this inundation echoed the language of the American Civil War and the abolitionist American heroes. As such, the histories of the United States and Brazil remained inextricably linked, chained by the rise and fall of slavery.
Pillars of the Revolution: Union, Liberty, and Popular Sovereignty Debated during Ratification

Eric Areklett

Introduction
During the winter of 1788, America was at an ideological crossroads. Before the people of the United States stood an entirely new system of government. They had to determine whether or not to ratify the Constitution. This pivot point in our history is perhaps best examined under the framework established by *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*. In this book, the famed American historian Bernard Bailyn divided the development of the ideological foundations of American government into three distinct phases. The first occurred before the colonies declared their independence from Great Britain. Centered on the “fear of centralized power” this stage was “rooted in the belief that free states are fragile and degenerate easily into tyrannies unless vigilantly protected by a free, knowledgeable, and uncorrupted electorate.” The second phase put the application of this ideology to the test with the creation of state constitutions and the Articles of Confederation. The third phase was born in summer of 1787 during the Constitutional Convention and wrestled over during the subsequent ratification debates. At this stage of the Revolution, Bailyn explains, America refined the beliefs that it advanced during the first two phases. The United States worked to create a governmental theory that mitigated the effects not only of tyranny but also of other potential dangers, such as anarchy. Just as the first phase of the Revolution divided Loyalists and Patriots over its necessity, this third phase featured two distinct camps who waged

a rhetorical war with each other over the advisability of the Constitution. On one side of this debate, the Federalists embraced the third phase’s new developments. On the other side, the Anti-Federalists rebuked the Federalists’ apprehensions over anarchy, choosing to remain faithful to the first two phases of the Revolution.

Even as the Federalists undeniably expanded the role of the national government, the “Revolutionary ideology was [still] fundamental to their belief.” Indeed, the imperial crisis with Great Britain and the subsequent Revolutionary War had a profound impact on the worldview of all the politicians and statesmen who debated the new Constitution’s ratification. Nevertheless, certain leaders clung to the traditions of the Revolutionary period more strongly than others. The Anti-Federalists attached themselves to a fixed conception of the Revolution that primarily revolved around the Patriots’ fear of tyranny, which dominated the first and second phases. In the third phase, however, others expanded their conception of the ideal American government to include a remedy for anarchy, as dangerous events auguring this vice had plagued the nation in the 1780s. Because of this slight broadening of principles, the Federalists abandoned their disdain for certain practices that were anathema to the revolutionaries of 1776, such as the creation of a national executive, national regulation of commerce, and national promotion of a standing army.

Federalists, however, were understandably hesitant to announce their willingness to deviate from the standard of government championed during the Revolutionary War. Therefore, during the ratification debates, they portrayed themselves as ardent defenders of the ideals of the Revolution—whether honestly or not. The extent to which Federalists pursued this strategy, however, differed by region. In Virginia, for instance, the Federalists at the state ratifying convention acknowledged that certain clauses in the Constitution advanced practices that were once considered inherent threats to the Revolution’s three pillars: union, liberty, and popular sovereignty. Nonetheless, they argued that a decade of experience had shown that the Constitution would be necessary to preserve the Revolution. In Massachusetts, however, the Federalists maintained that the Constitution neither altered the pillars of the Revolution nor the ways in which the theory ought to be applied.

4 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 325.
The Pillars of the Revolution

During ratification, it proved nearly impossible for Federalists and Anti-Federalists to establish a uniform interpretation of the Revolution’s events. Its pillars of union, liberty, and popular sovereignty, however, appeared self-evident. Even as the Federalists and Anti-Federalists passionately sparred over whether to ratify the Constitution, both sides generally agreed on the principles of the Revolution and the need to preserve them.

At both the Virginia and Massachusetts ratifying conventions, nearly all delegates supported the importance of maintaining the Union. As Virginia Federalist Edmund Pendleton put it, “we have seen the advantages and blessings of the Union. Every intelligent and patriotic mind must be convinced that it is essentially necessary for our happiness.”5 Virtually all delegates arrived at the same conclusion as Pendleton, recognizing (1) the practical necessity of the Union and (2) the emotional attachment that veterans held towards its preservation. Henry Lee of Westmoreland, for example, claimed to “love the people of the North, not because they have adopted the Constitution; but, because I fought with them as my countrymen, and because I consider them as such.”6 Throughout the conventions, both Federalists and Anti-Federalists took the importance of Union as a given. Despite their differences, neither side felt a need to support this principle through lengthy clarification.

Delegates to the state ratifying conventions likewise identified and emphasized the Revolutionary principles of liberty and popular sovereignty. To ground the stakes of the constitutional debate, Anti-Federalist George Mason declared a sentiment that both sides could rally behind. Ratification, he claimed, implicated the “liberty or misery of millions yet unborn.”7 Though the exact liberties and their respective weights were uncertain, all the delegates understood that America, at its core, stood for political liberty. This liberty had to be protected to preserve the Revolution. Alongside liberty, the inde-

dependence movement was also inextricably linked to the proliferation of popular sovereignty. Both principles joined preserving the union as central tenets of the constitutional debate.

On June 9, 1788, Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry summarized the importance of the pillars of the Revolution to the ratification debates. A leading figure in Virginia politics, Henry headed the state’s opposition to the Constitution. Addressing the Virginia ratifying convention, he asked, “tell me, where and when did freedom exist, when the sword and purse were given up from the people? Unless a miracle in human affairs is interposed, no nation ever retained its liberty after the loss of the sword and purse. Can you prove by any argumentative deduction, that it is possible to be safe without retaining one of these? If you give them up you are gone.” Even though the Federalists would disagree with the framing of Henry’s question, they drew their conclusions from the same premises. Both sides knew, to use the language of Henry, that the people needed to retain the essential powers of government—the power of the sword and the power of purse—in order to retain their liberty. If they did not, the Union would face destruction and the people would risk being “gone.” Recognizing the significance of union, liberty, and popular sovereignty, however, was not enough. Both sides found that they needed to better define the principles that had driven the virtuous Revolution. They then had to explain the ways in which their side was better promoting their implementation. The burden that the Federalists assumed through the debate was not to deny the significance of “the people” or of “retaining liberty,” but rather to argue that the Constitution would better defend these interests than the Articles of Confederation.

The Virginia Ratifying Convention
At the Virginia constitutional ratification convention, Patrick Henry sharply criticized the document for attempting to dismantle the pillars of the Revolution. He began his attack by forecasting the potential end to the Union, the cornerstone of the American Revolution. Henry argued that the “States will never be embraced in one federal pale. If you attempt to force it down men’s throats, and call it Union, dreadful consequences must follow.” Passionate about preserving

8 “The Virginia Convention, Monday, 9 June,” 1066.
9 “The Virginia Convention, Monday, 9 June,” 1066.
10 “The Virginia Convention, Monday, 9 June,” 1057.
the Union, he believed that the Constitution would be insufficient to bind the states together and would, therefore, subject the nation to all of the dangers of the United States’ dissolution. Henry further criticized the Constitution by appealing to the Revolutionary pillar of liberty. Henry claimed that “the new system proposed in Philadelphia will destroy the State Governments, and swallow the liberties of the people, without giving them previous notice.”\textsuperscript{11} For example, the new system would, unlike the Articles of Confederation, appoint a national executive called the President. Henry believed that there were “few men who [could] be trusted” with this position’s powers, alluding to George Washington as being uniquely qualified for the presidency.\textsuperscript{12}

Overall, Henry saw the Constitution as a radical innovation in governmental theory. He called the experiment a dangerous “new medicine” for a disease that, he believed, needed less ambitious cures.\textsuperscript{13} Henry credited the success of the Revolution to the existence of distinct state governments. Therefore, he believed that consolidation ran orthogonal to the Revolution’s ideals. Losing the states, he argued, amounted to creating the essence of tyranny. Given his conception of the people and the states, it is hardly surprising that Henry denied that a strong national government could be adequately representative. Strong allegiance to state governments was not, however, one of the Revolution’s common pillars. Henry concluded his argument against consolidation by returning to the pillar of liberty. He determined that “to depart from our present confederacy, rivets me to my former opinion, and convinces me that consolidation must end in the destruction of our liberties.”\textsuperscript{14} As an Anti-Federalist, Henry articulated his stance in terms of defending the pillars of the Revolution. He concluded that the Constitution would threaten the pillars and therefore opposed it.

Though not as influential as Henry, other Anti-Federalists like George Mason likewise sought to defend the pillars of the Revolution and their contemporary applications. Mason believed the Constitution needed a bill of rights to secure liberty for the people of the United States. The 1787 Constitution, however, lacked this protection. Therefore, at the Virginia ratifying convention, Mason pitched the idea of amending the new plan through this addition. In particu-

\textsuperscript{11} “The Virginia Convention, Monday, 9 June,” 1056.
\textsuperscript{12} “The Virginia Convention, Monday, 9 June,” 1058.
\textsuperscript{13} “The Virginia Convention, Monday, 9 June,” 1068.
\textsuperscript{14} “The Virginia Convention, Monday, 9 June,” 1070.
lar, Mason advocated that they “must have such amendments as will secure the liberties and happiness of the people, on a plain simple construction, not on a doubtful ground.” Mason ultimately framed his stance on the Constitution in terms of the pillars of the Revolution. The need to protect liberty justified a bill of rights. Seeking further support for this argument, Mason then appealed to the Revolutionary experience. He noted the important role that bills of rights played not only in Virginia but also in nearly all of the thirteen states. Given the past reliance on this form of protection, Mason was skeptical of securing American liberty through a different means. Therefore, to Mason and the Anti-Federalists, the absence of a bill of rights amounted to an absence of liberty. Mason—just like Henry—consulted the pillars of the Revolution to form his arguments, but—unlike the Federalists—he believed that the practices used in the Revolution to defend the pillars ought to remain in place. Put differently, the Anti-Federalists were unwilling to compromise on the Revolution’s principles and the ways that revolutionaries had applied these principles.

To refute the Anti-Federalist position in Virginia, the Federalists at the state ratifying convention defended the pillars of the American Revolution but embraced alternative ways to implement these common ends. Given the enlargement of power in the national government and the creation of two new branches at the national level, the Federalists first needed to defend the Constitution against the claim that the new system betrayed popular sovereignty. Henry Lee first noted that “whoever will have a right to vote for a Representative to our Legislature, will also have a right to vote for a Federal Representative. This will render that branch of Congress very democratic.” In addition to being democratic in nature, Lee defended the Constitution as being properly limited in scope. He guaranteed that people serving in government under the Constitution would “have no powers but what [were] enumerated in that paper. “When a question arises with respect to the legality of any power, exercised or assumed by Congress,” he asserted, “it is plain on the side of the governed. Is it enumerated in the Constitution? If it be, it is legal and just. It is

15 “The Virginia Convention, Wednesday, 11 June,” 1162.
Mason also advocated for a bill of rights to protect the states. He stated, “we ask such amendments as will point out what powers are reserved to the State Governments,” urging an explicit protection of states’ rights. See “The Virginia Convention, Wednesday, 11 June,” 1162.

16 “The Virginia Convention, Monday, 9 June,” 1080.
otherwise arbitrary and unconstitutional.” 17 This idea, that the national government only reserves certain enumerated powers and that these powers will be exercised by legislators elected by the people, proved to the Federalists that the new system aligned with the revolutionary principle of popular sovereignty.

In step with the Anti-Federalists, Lee then inculcated that the new Constitution would preserve the liberty fought for during the Revolution. Lee argued, “candour must confess, that it is infinitely more attentive to the liberties of the people than any State Government.” He further declared, “this new system shews in stronger terms than words could declare, that the liberties of the people are secure.” 18 Lee’s conclusion that the Constitution would best protect the liberties of Americans highlights the fact that the Federalists and Anti-Federalists were speaking the same language. They both viewed themselves as defenders of the pillars of the Revolution. Whether they advocated for a new or old system of government, they sought the form that best protected the Revolution’s liberty.

The Federalist recurrence to the pillars of the Revolution extended to their treatment of the Union. Just as they framed the Constitution as a means of realizing popular sovereignty and securing liberty, they also emphasized its role in keeping the United States together. Federalist Edmund Randolph for instance, noted, “I conceive the preservation of the Union to be a question of great magnitude. This must be the peculiar object of my attention, unless I depart from that rule which has regulated my conduct since the introduction of federal measures.” 19 Randolph believed that an increase in national power was essential to guaranteeing this Union. To refute Henry’s rhetoric against “consolidation,” he proclaimed that the Constitution merely “tells us what the present situation of America is.” 20 The lack of energy in the national government had made the current state of the United States’ domestic and international affairs bleak. The Constitution sought to provide a remedy to the direness of the American situation. Randolph further defended the increase of national power by asking Henry, “will not our united strength be more competent to

17 “The Virginia Convention, Monday, 9 June,” 1080.
18 “The Virginia Convention, Monday, 9 June,” 1080.
20 “The Virginia Convention, Tuesday, 10 June,” 1095.
our defence, against any assault, than the force of a part?\textsuperscript{21} He embraced the revolutionary pillars of union and liberty, but he acknowledged that a shift in procedure might be necessary to achieve those ends. Even if the revolutionaries of 1776 would have gawked at the powerful national government proposed in 1787, the Federalists did not hesitate to openly call for this change. They were willing to accept new applications of the Revolution’s principles to secure those central pillars.

Two speeches—Henry Lee’s on standing armies and George Nicholas’s on a national bill of rights—perhaps best exemplify the Federalists’ candid rejection of certain practices once considered essential to realizing the Revolution’s pillars. After assuring the convention floor, “there is no man without these walls who admires the militia more than I do,” Lee questioned the validity of the revolutionary allegiance to militias over standing armies. Even though he conceded that, in theory, a militia might be preferred to a national army, Lee noted that, in practice, he had “seen incontrovertible evidence that militia cannot always be relied upon.”\textsuperscript{22} In particular, he recalled a shortcoming of the militia during the Revolutionary War. At the 1781 Battle of Yorktown, he recounted, it was the “American regular troops [who] behaved there with the most gallant intrepidity,” allowing them to save the confrontation, and therefore, the Revolution.\textsuperscript{23} Armed with this practical evidence, Lee deviated from the Revolution’s preference of militias over a nationally regulated army. Lee proudly admitted that the Constitution “provides for the public defence as it ought to do. Regulars are to be employed when necessary; and the service of the militia will always be made use of. This, Sir, will promote agricultural industry and skill, and military discipline and science.”\textsuperscript{24} Here, just like with Randolph’s position on strengthening national authority over domestic policy, Lee embraced the Revolution’s pillars, but not its methods for achieving their ends. He supported defending the Union and the liberty of the people while rejecting a practice that he, citing experience, saw as inadequate to fulfilling those goals.

In a similar vein, George Nicholas demonstrated that the Constitution’s lack of a bill of rights did not necessarily betray the Revolution’s love for liberty. Unlike the Anti-Federalists, who ob-

\textsuperscript{21} “The Virginia Convention, Tuesday, 10 June,” 1095.
\textsuperscript{22} “The Virginia Convention, Monday, 9 June,” 1074.
\textsuperscript{23} “The Virginia Convention, Monday, 9 June,” 1074.
\textsuperscript{24} “The Virginia Convention, Monday, 9 June,” 1074.
sessively clung onto the Revolution’s use of these declarations, Nicholas questioned their inherent efficacy. On June 10, 1788, he asked the delegates to the Virginia convention, “have not the inadequacy of the present system, and repeated flagrant violations of justice, and the other principles recommended by the bill of rights, been amply proved?” Nicholas reminded the Committee of the Whole that Virginia and several other colonies included robust bills of rights which, without adequate energy, amounted to nothing more than parchment guarantees. Nicholas also turned the words of the Virginia Declaration of Rights against the Anti-Federalists. This document proclaimed, “no free Government, or the blessings of liberty can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.” Therefore, Nicholas argued, the Constitution was perfectly in line with—not a divergence from—the Virginian Declaration of Rights. Indeed, this section of the document appropriately summarized the Federalists’ position at the Virginia ratifying convention. The lack of energy in the national government was threatening the liberty secured by independence. To save American liberty, the Federalists deemed a return to the pillars of the Revolution necessary even if they needed to abandon certain practices they had developed along the way.

The Massachusetts Ratifying Convention

Overall, the Massachusetts Anti-Federalists’ approach to opposing ratification mirrored their Virginian counterparts. Just like the Anti-Federalists in Virginia, they believed that the Constitution was a betrayal of the Revolution. Furthermore, their conception of American Revolution’s core centered on the primacy of union, liberty, and popular sovereignty. In response to a Federalist invocation of unity, Anti-Federalist Amos Singletary unequivocally denied that the Constitution was consistent with the principles of the Revolution. Singletary stated, “if any body had proposed such a Constitution as this, in [the day of the Revolution], it would have been thrown away at once—it would not have been looked at.” He then went on to charge that the Constitution’s national government had the same

25 “The Virginia Convention, Wednesday, 10 June,” 1129.
26 “The Virginia Convention, Wednesday, 10 June,” 1129.
excess of power over the states that the British government had over the colonies. While not explicitly stated, Singletary’s apprehensions over the Constitution were clearly influenced by his conception of state sovereignty and his desire to maintain the liberty secured by independence. If the war took away Great Britain’s tyrannical taxation power over the states and the people, then he did not want to risk his liberty by trusting the “new medicine” of the Constitution. To Singletary and many Anti-Federalists, the potential cost of ratification was simply too high.

The rhetoric employed by Massachusetts Anti-Federalists John Taylor and General Thompson’s paralleled that of the Virginia ratifying convention even more closely. When Taylor opposed the biennial election of representatives for being insufficiently democratic, he invoked the Revolution’s pillar of liberty. He declared, “annual elections have been the practice of this State ever since its settlement, and no objection to such a mode of electing has ever been made—it has, indeed, sir, been considered as the safeguard of the liberties of the people—and the annihilation of it the avenue through which tyranny will enter.”

This statement wonderfully encapsulates the Anti-Federalist sentiment during the ratification conventions. They were jealous of the liberties fought for during the Revolution, they were fearful of tyranny, and they did not want to deviate from the practices that they had established during the Revolution in an attempt to secure their liberty. General Thompson invoked both union and liberty to oppose the Constitution. After reminding the convention floor that “by uniting we stand, by dividing we fall,” he asked, if the people of the United States had proved to be “a respectable people, in possession of liberty, property and virtue, and none in a better situation to defend themselves, why all this racket?” In other words, he believed that the current system of government already protected liberty and united the country. Since these principles constituted the most important ends of the Revolution, the Constitution, for Thompson, was superfluous.

In contrast to the degree of similarity between the Massachusetts and Virginia Anti-Federalists, the states’ Federalists diverged

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from one another. Across both states, Anti-Federalists mostly shared an approach to characterizing the Constitution’s relationship to revolutionary principles. The Massachusetts Federalists, on the other hand, differed from their Virginian counterparts in their unwillingness to acknowledge the extent of the Constitution’s novelty. Take for example, Thomas Dawes. Dawes, like all delegates, agreed with the importance of maintaining popular sovereignty in the general government. He added, however, that the Constitution provided a better fulfillment of this principle than the Articles of Confederation. He noted that the “right of electing Representatives in the Congress, as provided for in the proposed Constitution, will be the acquisition of a new privilege by the people.”30 The people “will then be immediately represented in the Federal Government,” and this representation was a better application of popular sovereignty than under the Articles.31 Unlike the Federalists in Virginia, who believed that past practice of vesting too much power with the people needed to be abandoned to provide the national government with more virtue and energy, the Federalists in Massachusetts argued that the Constitution did not remove any power from the people. In fact, the Constitution allowed an upgrade within the practices of the Revolution. The people of the United States had never been able to send a directly elected representative to a national legislature. Under the Constitution, they could.

In a similar fashion, Dawes sidestepped the debate over Congress’s ability to create a standing army by arguing that this practice had always existed in America and every other country. He injected his voice into the debate over Article I, Section VIII by noting that “there must be an authority somewhere, to raise and support armies.”32 By framing the Constitution’s allowance for a standing army this way, Dawes argued that the Constitution simply gave the legislature the common sense right to defend itself. Dawes also refuted the observation that standing armies were always perceived as inherently bad. He claimed that it was only declared “to be unconstitutional to raise or keep a standing army in time of peace, without the consent of the legislature.”33 Therefore, by giving Congress (the

30 “The Massachusetts Convention, 14 January 1788,” 1186.
31 “The Massachusetts Convention, 14 January 1788,” 1186.
33 “The Massachusetts Convention, 24 January 1788,” 1337.
legislature) the right to keep a standing army, the Constitution was neither abandoning its pledge to uphold the pillars of the Revolution nor violating any revolutionary practice against standing armies. The British standing army occupying Boston, according to Dawes, was not *ipso facto* evil. Rather, the force was merely evil because of its lack of consent from the Massachusetts legislature. This understanding of the Constitution’s clause for raising armies was clearly at odds with the Virginian conception of this same clause. The Virginian Federalists acknowledged that Article I, Section VIII deviated from Revolutionary-era practice, but they still defended it because they believed it essential to protecting the pillars of the Revolution. Perhaps more zealous to fully embrace the practices and ideals of 1776, the Massachusetts Federalists denied that the clause deviated from the Revolution at all.

**Conclusion**

Even though they differed in their conception of the novelty of the Constitution’s governmental practices and the advisability of the Constitution as a whole, all parties at the ratification conventions still embraced the three pillars of the Revolution. Therefore, it is hardly surprising to see the ratification debates littered with references to these principles, such as calls to “UNITE, or DIE.” Above all, the pillars of unity, liberty, and popular sovereignty triumphed in the contest. All sides agreed that the Revolution uniquely fostered the creation of these three pillars, and all sides fervently wanted to ensure that these pillars did not crumble. Despite these shared values, the Federalists and Anti-Federalists arrived at polar opposite conclusions concerning the prudence of ratification. Both sides framed the debate in terms of the Revolution and sought to preserve its principles. They differed, however, with respect to the degree of reverence they had for the practices that Americans had adopted in the first decade of independence. The Federalists of Virginia were willing to depart from these practices if it meant ensuring the protection of liberty. The Federalists of Massachusetts, on the other hand, believed that they were fully embracing both the theoretical and practical spirit of the Revolution.

That Massachusetts Federalists were hesitant to acknowledge the radical nature of the Constitution demonstrates the conservative nature of their state as well as their unique Revolutionary War strug-

34 “The Massachusetts Convention, 24 January 1788,” 1344.
gle. No colony suffered more from British tyranny before the war than Massachusetts. Therefore, Patriots from Massachusetts led the rebel cause and likely developed a unique devotion to everything that spawned from the Revolution, both in theory and in practice. In Virginia, however, a more progressive tradition was formed. Thinking outside of the box and developing new governmental theories or practices—even if it opposed the teachings of the Revolution—was not inherently bad. Therefore, Federalists in Virginia were able to appreciate the shift caused by the Revolution and fully embrace the Constitution as its next phase.
Blind Fighting: Totalitarianism and the Dehumanization of Warfare

Anna Pikarska

Modern-day warfare is characterized by highly technical advancements in military strategy and innovative tools for their implementation. With further technological development, war changes its nature to an extent that scenes of direct engagement between soldiers on the battlefield look surreal. At first, dehumanization might seem like an inherent element of this contemporary revolution in military affairs, which resulted from the rapid development of alternative methods of warfare. Yet, the connection between this concept and war precedes armed conflict. Dehumanization is a psychological phenomenon that revealed itself in the action-reaction sequence of intentional human activity before technological capabilities made it possible to avoid a head-to-head confrontation between opponents during battles. While major triggers of military revolutions influence society from the battlefield, dehumanization comes from the evolutionary development of humanity and manifested itself in a peaceful setting before changing the nature of war.

The emergence of totalitarian regimes at the beginning of the twentieth century introduced the idea of dehumanization into people’s life philosophies on a state level. Each aspect of an individual’s life – their ordinary actions, thoughts, and beliefs – was shaped by the idea that “non-human” human beings constituted a part of their society and posed a dire threat to humanity’s prosperity. Totalitarianism ruled over their minds. Both individual’s motivating ideas and the mechanisms by which they were mobilized came from the ruling Party. The state owned the masses. The people obeyed the authorities or faced death. Totalitarianism took the capabilities of human opportunism to an extreme. It secured mind-blowing scientific discoveries, high-speed economic development, and unbelievable levels of mass productivity. Simultaneously, however, the policies it enabled,
the long-term psychological impacts it inflicted, and the irreversible changes to the “humanity–ideology” relationship it wrought caused a multitude of demises. The human costs are well understood — the transformative impact on warfare less so. Warfare would never be the same after totalitarian regimes adopted dehumanization as their organizing principle. Totalitarianism legitimized the idea of a total war and complete extermination of “non-humans.” Moreover, it provided the tools of highest efficiency for dehumanization to flourish in battle by nurturing distinctive psychological adaptability mechanisms in a population.

The early twentieth century was characterized by the worldwide emergence of totalitarian movements. From fascist Italy to Communist China, totalitarianism became a widespread framework for isolated, ideologically driven societies. One of the first political scientists who attempted to describe the general mechanisms and impact of totalitarian states was Hannah Arendt. A German-Jewish historian and political theorist, she became one of the most influential political philosophers of the twentieth century. Published in 1951, Arendt’s book *The Origins of Totalitarianism* dwells on the philosophy of totalitarian regimes and their historical development. She characterizes this type of state rule as “a novel form of government” that “differs essentially from other forms of political oppression known to us such as despotism, tyranny and dictatorship.” Totalitarianism, Arendt explains, is uniquely aimed at “global conquest and total domination” rather than a subjugation of a certain population for a finite amount of time.\(^1\) Using ideological propaganda and terror, it transforms classes into “mass organizations of atomized, isolated individuals” — faceless masses with no “intellectual, spiritual, and artistic initiative” that are easily controllable by a form of absolute political power.\(^2\) The phenomenon of the totalitarian society lies in the attempt to transform individuals internally by creating a feeling of social isolation — a vulnerable emotional state that makes it possible to exert direct influence on people’s mindset most effectively. Arendt centers her argument about the nature and distinctive features of totalitarian regimes using the concept of loneliness. Totalitarian regimes differ from the other forms of government mainly in their ability to rule society “from the inside.” In totalitarian states, the

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control of the authorities goes well beyond the establishment of politically loyal institutions and a powerful propaganda machine. The system aims to control every aspect of citizens’ social lives in order to transform their mindset and engineer their everyday actions.

As Arendt highlights, the government of a totalitarian regime must force its citizens through stages of social isolation to achieve extreme loyalty from each individual on the personal level. This method of societal reorganization leads to the emergence of separate “social bubbles,” which internally mirror the state’s totalitarian structure. They keep each person isolated from the group in addition to cutting the group off from the rest of society. One of the predominant mechanisms employed by totalitarian governments to instill this multi-layered isolationism is the fabrication of “one enemy.” In his book *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*, Gustave Le Bon refers to this phenomenon as “the enemies of the people” or “the enemies of the nation,” accentuating this strategy’s ability to foster crowd coercion and a sense of comradeship among the masses. In Nazi Germany, a totalitarian regime founded on racial hierarchy, the primary “enemy” was a racially distinct group — “the Jew.” In Stalin’s USSR, the Party first advocated against the *kulaks* or wealthy peasants, a “class” enemy incompatible with Soviet class-centric ideology. As these totalitarian regimes persisted and grew stronger, both definitions of “the enemy” expanded: anyone whose actions or even presence in society went against the Party line was under lethal threat. By promoting animosity against “the enemy” on an ideological level, totalitarian governments introduced the idea of hostility against a particular group into citizens’ everyday lives. People were able to learn the mindset of “enemy extermination” in conditions which they perceived as “normality.” In war, a highly unstable environment, the skills learned as an adaptability mechanism for survival in a totalitarian state applied naturally to both the battlefield and the home front.

The promotion of antagonism against “one enemy” in a totalitarian regime was a major step towards dehumanized warfare. Dehumanization, as a psychological term, describes the ability “to conceive of other human beings—beings that are, in all fundamen-

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tal respects, indistinguishable from oneself—as not really human.”

Totalitarian regimes used this way of thinking as their key propaganda strategy. David Livingstone correctly observed that “[t]o be human, one must possess a human essence. A human-looking being that lacks this essence is not human.” Because “humanness” is not merely a physical trait, totalitarian regimes were able to determine what it meant to be “human” or “non-human.” With this power, they tied citizen’s humanity to their beliefs. The concept of “being human” became equal to the idea of being ideologically correct. As a result, Jews were not considered as possessing human qualities in Nazi-ruled society, as they were non-Aryan and could not be ideologically correct. In the same way, Soviet class enemies were perceived as lesser kinds of beings that required extermination because their social class, which presumably predetermined their beliefs, contradicted the Party line. Totalitarianism transformed and redefined the idea of dehumanization. A society reshaped by ideology could be made to believe that the extermination of other humans defined by specific characteristics was fundamentally beneficial to humanity. This very mindset laid the foundation for genocide – the purposeful elimination of a certain people in their entirety – which became an essential part of World War II through the Holocaust.

By integrating dehumanization into their ideology, totalitarian governments effectively integrated this thinking framework into the everyday lives of their citizens. However, the impact of totalitarianism on the nature of warfare is not limited to this concept of “one enemy,” which transferred from the streets to the battlefield. Apart from using ideas as a mechanism to exert power, totalitarian states triggered particular behavioral patterns in their citizens which enabled strict control of the population. These attitudes, which citizens had to take on to survive under the totalitarian regime, maximized their ability to incarnate dehumanization both on the battlefield and the home front. Shaped by Stalin’s policies, the 1930s Soviet Union serves as a demonstrative example of the way behaviors developed under the influence of totalitarianism evolved into subconsciously


5 He made this observation in reference to Morgan Godwyn’s work regarding Europeans’ dehumanization of enslaved Africans. While the historical contexts are separated by two centuries, the principles of humanity remain the same. Smith, “Paradoxes of Dehumanization,” 421.
controlled instincts. These, in turn, enabled and reinvigorated dehumanization during the Second World War.

In 1924, Stalin assumed power over the country of more than a hundred million people, 85% of whom still resided in rural areas. By 1941, he managed to transform every aspect of Soviet society, building a powerful human machine characterized by discipline and loyalty. While these characteristics have traditionally been ingrained in professional armies, the totalitarian USSR made them “second nature” to all of its citizens. Stalin’s policies of the 1930s immersed the Soviets in exceptionally harsh mental and physical conditions, keeping them in a psychological state of constant revolution that required extreme levels of adaptability. When the Soviet Union faced the war, its citizens subconsciously started adjusting to the war machine through the coping mechanisms they had been developing for years. These patterns of human behavior – ingrained in the Soviets’ personalities during peacetime – facilitated dehumanization during World War II.

Stalin’s plan to construct an entirely new society involved fostering a forceful inner transformation on the individual level. The conversion of the populous into “new Soviet men and women” became a defining feature of Stalinism during the 1930s. With the aim of directly shaping people’s mindset, this social trend destroyed the barrier between the private and public sides of human experience, normalizing the adoption of state-required behaviors during both peace and war. Under Stalin’s rule, the concept of “a new Soviet” emerged as an archetype of a perfect citizen of the USSR. It applied to all aspects of a person’s social role, from work to family relationships and self-perception. The question of whether the Soviet people fully achieved inner transformation remains open. During his comprehensive study of Soviet diaries from the 1930s, Jochen Hellbeck came to a “revisionist” conclusion that the “struggling believers” genuinely tried to rebuild their own mindset. Supporters of totalitarian views in Soviet historiography, however, claim that most citizens acted under extreme ideological pressure and showed their “correct

self” merely in public to adapt to social circumstances.Regardless of whether the Soviets purposefully attempted to convert themselves into “new Soviet people,” the main achievement of this ideological manipulation was the naturalization of self-transformation according to the government’s rules. As Stephen Kotkin shows in Magnetic Mountain, the personalities that individuals displayed in public had a social impact. The “new Soviets” self-transformation trend resulted in a crucial social development — the emergence of a population habituated to the subconscious abandonment of their beliefs for a Soviet identity defined by the Party line.

During World War II, the Soviets’ ability to immerse themselves into a certain personality type allowed the state to mobilize its citizens under the identity of “a Great Soviet Patriot” and let the population apply a familiar adaptability mechanism to personify the struggle against the new “enemy of the state,” namely the Nazis. The idea of Soviet patriotism, or fighting “for the Motherland,” acquired a distinct meaning in the context of an ongoing transformation into “new Soviet men and women.” The war provided an opportunity for the “revolutionization” of the propagandized identity itself. Being a “Great Patriot” in World War II implied a sense of redefined individual purpose. This individual belonged to a new collective revolutionary cause, the defense of “the Motherland.” The motivations of a Soviet soldier went beyond fighting for the land. Many Soviets perceived the war as a continuation of the revolution at home, whether that home was a place of birth, a family, a regime, or a new social order. On a deeper psychological level, a seeming adoption of a specific personality type – “a new Soviet” and “a devoted Soviet Patriot” – had become their subconscious adaptability mechanism during

the 1930s and proved significant in World War II. The Soviets who became used to taking on a particular role in their daily lives intuitively turned to the same technique to adjust to wartime conditions. The struggle against “the enemies of the state” was a crucial aspect of both identities. The Soviet people, who as “new Soviets” were continuously immersed in the fight against the regime’s “betrayers,” adopted the struggle against the Nazis as a new “natural feature” during the war. Dehumanization, which resulted from the promotion of ideological fighting against “the enemies of the people,” was already a part of the Soviet identity that people involuntarily internalized before 1939. Combined with the Soviets’ naturalized ability to achieve self-transformation according to the Party demands, this phenomenon created a powerful tandem of “technique and purpose” that distinguished the Soviet army and civilians in World War II.

Despite its apparent significance, the idea of cultivating “new Soviet citizens” does not completely account for Soviet adaptability, which undoubtedly fostered dehumanization during World War II. Life under totalitarian rule required extreme social mobility and the capacity to quickly summon both physical and psychological resources. Together, these demands triggered an outstandingly effective war effort. Stalin’s 1930s were characterized by rapid social and economic changes. With a politically driven wave of industrialization, the urban population went from 26.3 to 55.9 million people over the course of the thirteen years between 1926 and 1939. Extraordinary development in production was accompanied by the Soviet Famine in 1932–33 that killed millions, policies of *dekulakization* which resulted in mass deportations and destruction of the villages, and intensified NKVD activity which substantially increased the number of work prisoners in Gulag and culminated in the Great Terror of 1937–38. All these events exemplify considerable changes that Soviet citizens had to endure and the destruction of their “normality.” People had to quickly learn new ways of life in this psychologically distressing environment, which required continuous concentration and adaptation to unexpected circumstances. Besides, perpetual fear and the inability to express any opinions that deviated from the Party line put Soviets into a “mental cage,” a feeling of persistent threat without any opportunity to achieve emotional catharsis. During early Stalin-

ism, Soviet society constituted hundreds of “small USSRs,” isolated social circles that internally operated by the “rules” of the Party. It thereby deprived its citizens of a safe place where they could release emotional tension. The living conditions in Stalin’s USSR immersed citizens in a state of constant readiness and fostered their ability to use all available resources to cope with each day’s onerous demands.

Various aspects of the Soviets’ forced adaptability were later exploited to intensify the impact of “anti-human” sentiments and increase the ability to resist the “enemy of the nation” during the war. Unlike other forms of government, totalitarian regimes forced their citizens into a state of constant struggle before war was on the horizon, limiting the psychological gap between wartime and “normal” life. Under Stalin’s rule, the Soviets were subjected to chronic fear and forced to fight for their survival. In the 1930s, the revolution went beyond the streets and the crowds. It came home at 4 am and everted Soviet lives. The Soviet ability to mobilize, maximize a severely limited number of resources, and act flexibly mentally prepared them for the war. In his article for the American Journal of Psychology, Charles Bird argues that individuals lack conscious reasoning in emergency situations. Instead, they rely on their subconsciousness. Describing the psychological effect of war, he emphasizes that “individual thinking almost ceased, the processes of consciousness for many were stagnant and dissociated; people were governed almost entirely by their emotions.” For the Soviets who lived through the 1930s in the USSR, adaptability mechanisms became habitual instincts of survival. Consequently, wartime dehumanization came naturally into the Soviets’ lives with the outbreak of conflict. By 1939, they had both experienced the phenomenon itself and gone through the psychological “adjustments” that turned it into a normal human behavior. When the war reached Soviet territory in 1941, its citizens were already accustomed to mental endurance in such conditions. They had ingrained adaptability methods into their subconscious daily behavior, allowing for dehumanization to flour-

Although revisionists lend less credit to ideological influence in their interpretation of Soviet adaptability, its pervasive presence cannot be overlooked. Soviet ideology redefined struggle, revolution, and life purpose for the citizens of the USSR, which made it a major trigger and a coping mechanism for a necessary psychological adaptation to Stalinism. Ideology played a crucial role in the establishment of a power dynamic between the ruling Party of a totalitarian state and its citizens. The influence of party dogma not only stood behind all the adaptation and self-alteration strategies discussed above but also defined the role of dehumanization in individual’s worldviews. Stalin’s policies of constraint were implemented alongside the ideologically driven propagation of individual struggle, which the Party portrayed as a necessary step toward the construction of a new socialist society. Stalinism transformed the meaning of “revolutionization” for the Soviets — Marx described the idea of class struggle on paper; Lenin modified it and spread it to the masses; Stalin transformed it further and “injected” it into Soviet social circles, families, and minds. Stalin’s rule in the 1930s proved that revolution never ends. While Communism could be a defined goal, socialism was a utopian undefined dream — a “daily revolution.” This constant struggle became a goal, a lifestyle, and a place of security for the Soviets. Stalin’s extremist policies, the nonexistent definition of the revolution’s endpoint, and the forced internal transformation of individuals combined in Soviet minds into the Stoic interpretation of struggle. They perceived the concept of revolutionization with its pain and hardship as a necessary


16 Hellbeck, Hellbeck, and Hellbeck, “Rethinking the Stalinist Subject, 456–63.


and inevitable process for the prosperity of future generations.\(^\text{19}\)

With the start of World War II, the Soviets’ perception of struggle and revolution enhanced the effect of the existing tandem: the adaptability techniques and previous exposure to the idea of “the enemies of the state.” The Soviets saw their service to “the Motherland” as another major step in the revolution which they were forced to keep fighting on their own. This revolution, an internal transformation, would transform them into “new Soviets.”\(^\text{20}\) The war brought hardship, death, and constraint, but it also reincarnated hope, purpose, and meaning. In 1939, the enemy of the state became visible and real. With the attack of the Nazis, the “enemy of the people” transformed from an abstract image on the front pages of Pravda to a tangible, life-threatening force. Stalin continued the revolution in the Soviets’ minds with his policies and propaganda, but the war brought it into real life. The Soviet glorification of struggle and its meaning transferred from their heads to the factories and battlefields. More importantly, the Soviets applied the concept of struggle in its Stoic interpretation to both the enemy and themselves. This phenomenon extends the meaning of dehumanization, which is typically considered to be a psychological “lens” through which people perceive others. In addition to dehumanizing the enemy, the Soviet people had the ability to dehumanize their own selves individually. This mindset explains the “astonishing strength and toughness” that impressed foreign army members during World War II and became a Soviet cliche.\(^\text{21}\) The ability to self-dehumanize lies at the core of the Soviets’ anomalous endurance and normalization of self-sacrifice. While the destruction of “the enemy” was the aim and previously adopted adaptability techniques were the means, self-dehumanization became a central, subconscious mechanism that drove the conscious war effort. People became the main Soviet weapon during the USSR’s defense operations during World War II. Neither bloody Stalingrad (1,129,619 total casualties), nor the Battle of Dniepro [Dniepr], (1,687,164 total casualties) would have been possible without the internalization of dehumanization and the self-justification of human

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\(^\text{20}\) Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind, 355-356.

Although totalitarian states share common features, attempts to establish a direct causal relationship between the regime and citizens’ behavior in war conditions have their limitations. The USSR of the 1930s is an irreparable society that emerged from a synthesis of numerous factors, such as ideology, Stalin’s policies, the Soviets’ history, socio-economic conditions at the time, and chance. Totalitarianism undeniably shapes societies, and its impact on the mindset of people can hardly be ignored. Nevertheless, chance leaves room for unpredictability, whether in Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s USSR, or on the battlefield. According to Clausewitz, war as a phenomenon is “composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity…chance and probability…and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy.” As much as people assume power over their actions—including the ones that lead to wars—their actions likewise have power over them. In the same way, Clausewitz emphasized the fact that war shapes societies to an extent that is impossible to predict. In 1945, no soldier nor noncombatant, no Nazi nor Soviet, would return to the person they were in 1939. Yet, the analysis of totalitarianism and its influence on society leads to the recognition of specific patterns in human behavior. While it is impossible to predict people’s actions with extreme precision, the trends observed in relationships between individual’s mindset and their behavior under certain conditions provide perspective. Totalitarianism may not have been a causative factor for dehumanization, but it is evidently connected to the intensification of this psychological phenomenon during war.

Totalitarianism revolutionized dehumanization and its expression before bringing it to the battlefield in its new form. As Arendt argues, “what totalitarian ideologies aim at is not the transformation of the outside world or the revolutionizing transmutation of soci-

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ety, but the transformation of human nature itself.” Totalitarianism eradicates boundaries between a person and society, between an individual’s opinions and their ideologically influenced thoughts. In Stalin’s USSR, ideology naturalized dehumanization as an acceptable attitude toward “the others,” and totalitarianism coerced the Soviets to enforce this mentality upon themselves. Stalin’s Soviet Union is an example of a society that was able to dehumanize everything but a great utopian idea of a future socialist society which had no clear definition. In Arendt’s words, such a trend leads to the destruction of humanity. World War II showed the impact of totalitarianism on societies in action. The one and only total war, it proved that dehumanization has lethal consequences, and not only for the people who are called “the enemy.” When internalized, dehumanization destroys people’s acknowledgment of their own human selves. Self-sacrifice that verges on the level of self-extinction becomes a real possibility, a goal, and a life purpose at once — a self-justified mindset in pursuance of a bigger, non-human goal.